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abstract
the national endowment for democracy and
THE EXPORT OF “MADE-IN-AMERICA” DEMOCRACY
FEBRUARY 2001
COLIN S. CAVELL, B.A., LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Patricia J. Mills
The promise of democracy, as an Enlightenment ideal, has been to specifically
transcend the dichotomy of ruler and ruled by establishing self-rule of the people
themselves as the normative basis of governance in the modem world. Reproduction of
societies and the socioeconomic form this takes along with associated ideological
constmcts which legitimize such formations, however, have produced various
understandings ofjust exactly what is meant by democracy as well pitting one
conception against another. The Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
(1945-1991) brought the question of democracy to the forefront ofmodem political
debate, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet model on December 25, 1991 has
motivated the U.S. to place its own capitalist democracy forward as a model to be
exported abroad through agencies like the National Endowment for Democracy and
emulated thoughout the world. The present study examines this democracy-promotion
project of the U.S. through the NED, exploring the various contradictory tensions which
this form of democracy produces in the context of an increasingly capitalist
globalization of the world that has
21" century.
accelerated in the post-Cold War period and into the
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INTRODUCTION
The recent conjuncture of a form of democracy with the practice of hegemony ,n
United States foreign policy is the focus of the present study.' Specifically, the practice
of democracy as a form of governance previously restncted to internal state politics-
that IS, a pattern of political behavior either enforced by law and/or norms within state
boundanes—has become the major ideological means by which the United States seeks
to transform its internal political philosophy into an instrument for hegemony in
international politics in the, presumably, anarchical post-Cold War world. And, more
importantly, what makes this conjuncture worthy of a closer analysis, as opposed to
previous chauvinistic aspirations along these lines, is precisely the relatively broad
success (cf. Sklar and Berlet, 1991-92, p. 12) which the United States has obtained in
this regard while avoiding the necessity of direct and continuous United Slates military
involvement.^
Webster’s defines democracy as: “1 a
: government by the people; esp
: mle of the
majority b : a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and
exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usu.
involving periodically held free elections” (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary,
1898/1984, p. 338). Hegemony is defined by Webster’s as: “preponderant influence or'
authority esp. of one nation over others” (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
1898/1984, p. 561).
2
One notable example of U.S. chauvinism is that expounded in the late 1800s after the
U.S. conquest of the Philippines by the-then senator from the state of Indiana, Senator
Albert J. Beveridge, in a speech before his senatorial colleagues (cf Beveridge,
Imperialism At Its Height, in Barlett, 1 947, pp. 385-8).
1
The success of democratic transitions in Latin America during the 1980s, away
from the dominance of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, is evidence of this success
(O-Donnell, et al„ 1986; Wiarda, 1990). Also, the capitulation of former communist
regimes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as the decade of the 1990s began was
showcased as the highlight of this new U.S. foreign policy which seeks to promote
democracy (or, more precisely, democratic capitalism) abroad (cf. NED Strategy
Document, 1992, p. 1). Currently, the transformation of authoritarian regimes to liberal
forms of democracy has also altered the political landscape of many countries in Africa.
Worldwide, according to Freedom House (which is officially a nongovernmental agency
but often works to support U.S. foreign policies), 65 countries and 50 related territories
were rated as politically “Free” at the end of 1990, four more than m 1989, with only
33% of the world’s 5.323 billion people (1990 estimate), or 50 nations and 9 territories,
classified in the “Not Free” category (McColm, 1991, p. 36).’ By the beginning of
3
The International Freedom of Expression Exchange Clearing House, Action Alert
Service writes that Freedom House’s current activities include surveys and programs
aimed, amongst other things, at: “Promoting an engaged U.S. foreign policy” (IFEX
web site, <http://www.ifex.org/org/fh/>). Former U.S. U.N. Ambassador Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick praised Freedom House for having “demonstrated through decades since its
founding [in 1941] a most extraordinarily consistent, clearheaded commitment to the
democratic politics in free societies” (Freedom House web site:
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>). In addition to managing the regional networking
component ofUSAID's Democracy Network program, its American Volunteers in
International Development (AVID) program, its Center for Religious Freedom which
defends “persecuted Christians worldwide”, its Cuba Democracy Project (CDP), and
numerous other projects. Freedom House proudly announces its support for democratic
change by proclaiming:
With support from foundations, corporations, labor unions, private
donors, and the U.S. government. Freedom House's international
democratization programs are advancing the remarkable worldwide
2
1998, of an estimated world population of 5.771 billion people tn 191 sovereign states
and 59 related territories. 22% or 81 countries and 44 related terr.tones were rated as
"Free” while 39% or 53 countries and 1 1 related territories were deemed to be “Not
Free” (Karatnycky, 1998, p. 4).“ And as the new century begins. Freedom House's
expansion of political and economic freedom (Freedom House web site
‘^http://www. freedomhouse.org/>.
For criticisms of Freedom House’s Annual Survey and how the Survey is seen as
supporting U.S. foreign policy by unfairly glossing over the disparaging human rights
policies of U.S. allies, see also Scoble and Wiseberg, 1981, p. 160 and Schoultz
January-March, 1980, pp. 94-6. In the 1986-1987 Survey, Raymond D. Gastil
’
responded to cnticisms which purported that Freedom House’s Survey of Freedom “is
really a propagandistic attempt to generate support for American foreign policy or the
capitalistic economic system” by asserting: “The author would like to take this’
opportunity to assure readers that he serves no such masters, and that his judgments can
e as unpalatable to many within the Freedom House organization as to these critics”
(Gastil, 1987, pp. 80-1).
Freedom House utilizes three categories of freedom: “Free”, “Partly Free”, and
“Not Free”. Its Survey groups two sets of characteristics under political rights and civil
liberties. Free and fair elections and their mechanics are the primary concern of the
Survey s focus on political rights, while freedom “to develop views, institutions and
personal autonomy apart from the state” characterize the Survey’s focus on civil
liberties (McColm, 1991, pp. 49-51).
4
By the beginning of 1993, 75 countries and 48 related territories were designated as
“Free”, or 25% of the world’s estimated population of 5.446 billion people, with 31% of
the population living in 38 states and 12 related territories falling under the “Not Free”
categorization (McColm, 1993, p. 4). In its 1996 survey, out of an estimated world
population of 5.701 5 billion people. Freedom House rated 76 countries and 44 related
territories as “Free” with 62 states and six related territories labeled “Partly Free” (i.e.
with some constraints on political rights and civil liberties) while 53 countries and 8
related territories were designated as “Not Free” (i.e. in which basic rights are denied)
(Karatnycky, 1996, p. 4). This latter figure in the “Not Free” category, one should note,
represented a jump from 1990 to nearly 39% of the world’s population. The report does
note a rise in the number of “formal democracies,” with up to 1 17 of the world’s 191
countries and 57 related territories or 61% as compared to 42% or 41 of the world’s
countries just ten years ago. This translates into 3.1 billion people out of a 1996 world
population of 5.7 billion living under “democratically elected governments.” The report
notes, however, that “[djemocracy is not synonymous with freedom,” and, hence.
3
survey classir.es 85 of the world's 192 countries or 44.27% as Free, another 60
countries or 3 1 .25% as Partly Free, while only 47 countries or 24.45% of all states fall
under the Not Free category. Overall, the survey concludes that at the beginning of the
year 2000, “38.9 percent of the world’s population lives in Free societies, 25.58 percent
lives tn Partly Free states, and 35.5
1 percent lives in Not Free countries” (Karatnycky,
2000).
It would be an exaggeration to link all of these transitions to U.S. actions alone
or even to claim U.S. involvement as the proximate cause leading to a democratic
transition m each particular case. Still, because this distinct type of democracy, which
is being heralded by Freedom House and other U.S. allied organizations, differs
substantially from what are known as “peoples’ democracies” in communist or former
socialist bloc countries, and which, in fact, is closely modeled upon the U.S. model of
democracy depicted below in Chapter 4, it is one of the underlying assumptions of this
study that regimes which meet U.S. “democratic” criteria are, in large measure,
recipients of prior and/or current U.S. interventionist action and aid to promote its brand
of democracy abroad. U.S. efforts in this regard thus can be said to constitute a
designates only 76 of the world’s 117 democracies as “Free”, with 40 classified as
“Partly Free”, and only one—Bosnia—as “Not Free” (Karatnycky, 1996, pp. 4-5).
Socialist countries known as “Peoples’ Democracies” like the People’s Republic of
China, Republic of Cuba, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, or the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea fall, according to the Freedom House classification, under the “Not
Free” category. Indeed, the latter three regimes were listed by Freedom House as
members of “The Most Repressive Regimes of 1998” (1998).
As Adam Watson stated in reference to Spartan and Athenian support for
oligarchy or democracy: “they did it because they saw advantage to themselves in
doing so.” “Similarly the British government in its nineteenth-century heyday and the
United States government today have encouraged democracy in the different sense in
4
pers,s,en. in.ervent.on.s, and external vanable in either effecting these trans.tions or at
least in
.nfluencing the fo™ they take. Furthemtore, to the degree the U.S. does claim
credit for these trans.t.ons (cf. NED SD. 1992. p. 1; Bush. 1992. p. A16; NED Annual
Report 1999. 2000. p. 4. Albright. May 16. 2000). it is important to analyze this claim
in order to examine the spec, fie impact on the construction of U.S. policy. Moreover,
utthzatton of passive. non-m,litary instruments to foster compliance with U.S. policies
amongst foreign populations recognizes that the reconstruction of U.S. hegemony in the
post-Cold War world and the reestablishment of American supremacy (either in the
Western bloc itself or in the world generally) requires more than domination “through
the applicatton offeree in the world economy.” a point made by Augelli and Murphy
(1988. p. 198). As such, one of the questions examined herein is to what degree the
U.S. export of democracy abroad constitutes the ethical aspect ofAmerican hegemony,
given the present conjunction of U.S. economic and military dominance. As well, the
praettee ofdemocracy promotion raises questions as to whether this is a wholly new
practice undertaken by the U.S.. what type of democracy is being advocated and/or
exported, and for whose benefit?
The nature of these democratic transformations and specifically the U.S. role
effecting them requires an examination of the now institutionalized overt role which
being played by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the agency first
m
IS
which we now understand it. Intervention in internal affairs, to the degree necessary to
ensure that the government of another community is friendly to the intervening power,
has the effect of integrating the system, of shifting it in practice further towards the
imperial end of the spectmm” (Watson, 1992, p. 53).
5
officially proposed by President Reagan in a June 8, 1982 speech to the British
Parliament.*’ In order to counter Soviet totalitarianism, he satd it was necessary to
foster the tnfrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press
unions, political parties, universities-which allows a people to choosetheu own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own
ditterences through peaceful means (Reagan, 1982, p. 549)
Enacted into law by Congress in November 1983, the NED is, curiously, a privately
incorporated organization which, nonetheless, happens to be funded by the U.S.
government and subject to the oversight and review procedures of Congress. It has been
suggested that this contradictory basis of the NED structure is a way to get government
funding on the one hand, while its private status “enables it to deflect criticism from the
U.S. government when its policies and programs go awry or prove embarrassing”
(Wiarda, 1990a, p. 1 50). But while the supposedly private status of the NED may keep
its activities out of the purview of the American public, its status in the eyes of other
governments and dissident organizations is not so ambiguous and, in fact, subjects the
agency to their immediate suspicion and hesitation, especially when it claims to be
The idea of establishing nongovernmental organizations to provide overt funding to
private sector groups engaged in international programs was first proposed by the
Johnson Administration after public disclosure of the CIA’s covert funding of overseas
activities of private organizations in the late 1960s. This idea was not acted upon until,
in 1979, the leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties created the American
Political Foundation (APF) as a nonprofit, bipartisan organization designed to undertake
political exchanges with their counterparts abroad. It was the APF which formulated a
research proposal to examine how the U.S. could support democratic forces abroad and
sought and received President Reagan’s support for these efforts. In his 1982 British
Parliament speech. President Reagan also referred to the examples of the German and
other European parties which had programs to assist democratic forces abroad (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-84- 121, pp. 1-2). [NOTE: All
General Accounting Office Reports are listed herein by their GAO classification and
found in the Bibliography under the heading: U.S. General Accounting Office.]
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promoting democracy (cf. Weaver and Barnes,
Parenti, 1995, p. 53; Blum, 2000, p. 183).
1091, pp. 138-40; Grey, May 21, 1998;
Because the focus of this dissertation rests primarily on the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED), which is only one instmment
to effect its policies abroad, a more accurate
amongst many which the U.S. utilizes
assessment of the overall impact of U.S.
foreign policy on democratic transitions abroad would require analyses not only of these
other agencies, programs, and practices but as well detailed comparisons of their impact
in the countries where such democratic governmental forces emerge. Consequently,
whatever conclusions herein reached can only be said to be tentative, partial, limited,
and denved from an examination of only one instrument of U.S. foreign policy, viz. the
NED. As Cohen notes, the NED’s budget is but “0.2 percent of Amenca’s $16 billion
foreign operations budget and just 0.01 percent of its $300 billion defense budget”
(2000, p. 848). Indeed, he points out, even if the NED’s average annual budget of
around $32 million were “increased tenfold, to $320 million, this would amount to less
than 2 percent of the more than $16 billion m the U.S. budget for foreign operations and
State Department appropriations, and 0.1 percent of the $300 billion defense budget”
(Cohen, 2000, p. 852). Admittedly, this is an acknowledgement of the limitations of
this dissertation s conclusions, and the reader is thus provided with a caveat against
generalizing findings rendered herein regarding the NED to overall U.S. foreign
policies.
But what specifically characterizes the current form of U.S. democracy elevated
to the level of foreign policy, and how does it differ from previous U.S. attempts to
export democracy abroad? And how is this current form of democracy being exported
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and/., ^ha, purposes! Does democracy in .h,s fonn contnm suff.ccni con,radio,ions
,0 forestall or even counteract the United States’ quest for world hegetnony? And what
IS It about the export of American democracy that allows the Chamber of Commerce,
the AFL-CIO, and the Republican and Democratic parties-organizations with
seemingly diverse interests, to agree on the meaning of democracy in order to work m
tandem and promote it abroad? These questions lend purpose to, and stake out certain
specific areas of focus for, this study.
It is important, to begin with, to note that the intersection of democracy and
hegemony has been examined before (cf. Gramsci, 1955; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985;
Doyle, 1986a, Robinson, 1996). The uniqueness of this study, however, lies first in its
understanding that these two concepts, democracy and hegemony, now occupy a central
role m U.S. foreign policy (though the latter concept of hegemony is more an unspoken
practice than a fully articulated policy). And they have been conjoined by American
7
That U.S. world hegemony is a fully articulated policy, however, can be argued on the
basis of a 46-page 1992 Pentagon planning document which described itself as
definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense’ for preparation of defense budgets
for fiscal 1994 through 1999” (Gellman, March 11, 1992, p. Al). Drafted under the
supervision of Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary for policy, the “Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG) received little publicity, yet declared that the political and military
mission of the U.S. in the post-cold war era will be “to insure that no rival superpower
IS allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territory of the former Soviet
Union.” As Patrick Tyler of The New York Times stated, “the Pentagon document
articulates the clearest rejection to date of collective internationalism.” He continues:
The classified document makes the case for a world dominated by one superpower
whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and sufficient military
might to deter any nation or group of nations from challenging American primacy”
(March 8, 1992, The New York Times, p. Al & A14). As regards the authority of this
DPG document. Barton Gellman, Washington Post National Correspondent,
communcated to me in personal correspondence the following:
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foreign pol.cynrakers ,o take advantage of the new eond.t.ons prov.ded by the post-Cold
War world and the collapse of the former Soviet Union in an explicitly overt attempt to
replace the anarchical nature of international politics with a “new world order” under
U.S. leadership. And though Robinson argues that “a transnational elite which is the
agent of transnational capital” has already superceded ruling class direction from any
particular national state, what is being argued by others is that the U.S., acting as a
traditional sovereign state, is pursuing nothing less than a policy of world hegemony
(Robinson, 1996, p. 4; Tyler, 1992, pp. 1, 14). One of the main fronts of this battle is in
the realm of politics, the orienting of governments around the world to the structures of
a capitalist market economy, a subordinate and apolitical trade union movement,
institutions of civil society, and western liberal democratic forms of governance
(competitive elections, individual procedural rights, an active role for private-sector
organizations, etc.). Thus, there is a move to process or procedural democracy as
opposed to substantive democracy. In this respect, procedural democracy is limited to
the political and legal world of voting, due process, and fair procedures while
[T]he [1992 Pentagon] document was Dick Cheney’s last Defense
Planning Guidance for the Bush administration. In itself it represented
the culmination of a formal mechanism within DOD to define the
fundamental security interests and strategy of the United States. It was
not a draft or a proposal, but, as the story said, the standard against which
military planners should measure their work. In bureaucratic practice,
the DPG is the narrative that explains and justifies the choices made in
the DOD budget.
There would be no requirement for Congress to endorse it,
though the legislative history or committee reports of the associated
budgets might comment.
. . .You’re right to say the policy was adopted by publication of
Cheney’s DPG, which required interdepartmental approval (Scowcroft,
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sukslnnlivc
.Icnoccy expands ,hc concep, ol
.len„.e,aey U, .nclude ,he (onne.
pmvisnms in a.I.lili.n, l„ e.|nali/,ing social and economic cmulilions. Snl.slanlive
.Icnmcracy can lines l,c rcrccd lo as "rcsnlls-oricnlcd" dcinocacy, in lhal II,c end icsnil
ol Ihc dcmocialic process should piodncc a socicly approaching malcrial c,|nalily. U.S.
cllorls al pronn,ling proccinral democracy ahroad, lo Ihc conirary, arc nndcrsloo.1
herein as cnconraging U,rm al Ihc expense ol snhslancc, cxaccrhalinp, malcrial
inc(|iiiilily in llic process.
My hypothesis is tlK.l the type oldemoeraey the I ).S. wishes to export abroad is
Miurowly eonstriieted and essentiali/,es an unalterable lie lo eapilalisi economies and, in
|)artienlar, is supported ahroad only insofar as it henellts I ).S. national and eeonoinie
interests as the predominant world capitalist power.' Such a eoneeplion ofdemoeraey
does not allow for particular historical traditions and eusloms in any ^^iven eoimlry nor
lor the possibility ol each state’s ohjeelive conditions to inlluenee its own demoeratie
development; eonsequenlly, the U.S. promotion ofdemoeraey ahroad will eontinue lo
engender resentment toward this foreign export heeause it is meant lo serve U.S. goals
and not indigenous needs, as has been witnessed most recently in the ’hOs in Haiti,
Bakei) in the Hush administration (Personal eorrespondenee with Barton
( iellman on November 2b, 2000).
K
One underlying assumption in this analysis is that the aeeentiialion of eai)ilalist
eeonoinie struetiires, praeliees, laws, etc. in other eouniries does benefil U.S, national
intciesis given the history ol uneven colonial and neo-eolonial development which has
resulted in an asymmetrical relationshi|) between a dominant U.S. stale versus all other
stales and which, heeause ol their relative weakness i 7.v-r'/-i 7.v the U.S. hegemon, are
unable lo set the terms ol trade, and, hence, ollen are the reeipienis ol disadvantageous
trade regjmes and/or political alliances. I’lirlhermore, unless and iiiilil some world stale
transeends the cm rent I J.S. heg.emon, it is unlikely that any other eapilalisi stale will be
to
Somalia, and Russia. Also, I will show that because “democracy promotion” is often
merely a mask for establishing and continuing U.S. hegemony abroad, contradictions
are likely to emerge between the rhetoric and practice of this policy thus raising
generalized doubts amongst the populations having this “democracy” forced on them.
For example, multi-million dollar U.S. aid for the United Nicaraguan Opposition
(UNO) in the 1990 presidential election in Nicaragua in addition to a simultaneous U.S.
support for a brutal counterrevolutionary war against the governing Sandinistas found
many Nicaraguans skeptical of U.S. efforts at promoting democracy.’^ And such doubts
are not only about the nature of this brand of democracy but also about its subversion
able to take advantage of “free market” conditions, given their subordination to the U.S.
hegemon, and their dependence upon it to maintain system stability and order.
Notes Cohn: In 1995, President Clinton called democracy promotion ‘one of the
central pillars of the United States security strategy.’ But democracy needs to be
promoted for its own sake, not simply as an instrument to further U.S. security or
economic interests.” Not dismissing a U.S. role entirely in supporting democratic
processes, Cohn nonetheless argues that such U.S. assistance can be supported “only if
democracy assistance is delinked from furthering U.S. security and economic interests.
One way to accomplish this is for U.S. democracy assistance to be channeled through
multilateral and regional organizations” (Cohn, July 9, 1999, p. 4).
As Weaver and Barnes point out in regards to the 1990 electoral defeat of the
Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) by the United Nicaraguan Opposition
(UNO), which was heavily financed with $5.2 million by the NED between 1984 and
1989 and with an estimated $15 million by the CIA plus an additional $5.9 million from
a congressional package approved in October 1989:
The FSLN pointed to UNO’s heavy U.S. financing, to UNO’s ex-
Somocistas on UNO’s candidate lists as proof that UNO was simply a
new form of U.S.-sponsored counterrevolution....
UNO’s electoral victory did achieve Washington’s goals of
unseating the FSLN, defeating uncompromising Nicaraguan nationalism,
and bringing back into power leaders who know their place in the U.S.
backyard. That, however, is not the same thing as promoting democracy
(Weaver and Barnes, 1991, pp. 138-40).
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and challenge of the notion of state sovereignty which forms the basis of current
international law. Moreover, to the extent that the demands of capital accumulation fail
to reach their desired targets and social conflicts threaten to spill over from established
institutions into the political arena in other countries, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be
able to pursue its newfound evangelism of promoting democracy with as much fervor as
It currently exudes. Should this cmsade degenerate, however, it is doubtful that the U.S.
will return to its idealized tradition of isolationism, as the logic of global capitalism now
prohibits that luxury, lest the US yield its hegemony to another aspirant.” Indeed, if the
use offeree replaces or overshadows the weapon of democratic propaganda, the
resulting visage of iron-fisted politics will cast into doubt whatever democratic
intentions may have existed. Consequently, selective support for democracy abroad
will expose U.S. interest in democratic development as merely self-serving, thus
characterizing its commitment to democratic principles as primarily—though not
merely rhetorical and pretentious, as process democracy is exposed as merely a
hollow shell without material content.
US isolationism in the inter-war years, writes Coker,
derived much of its legitimacy in the eyes of the American people from
the wish to keep the country’s virtue intact. Unable to expand any
further once the frontier had been reached, unwilling to follow up
Theodore Roosevelt’s imperial mission which for a briefmoment in the
United States’ history had extended the frontier into the Pacific, the
Americans felt ‘trapped in time’. In this supreme moment of
introspection, of ‘sectarian withdrawal’, many Americans felt the need to
maintain their exceptional standing by contracting out of a comipting
world which had little or nothing to offer the United States, or the
American people (Coker, 1989, p. 8).
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In order to begin our examination of the U.S. export of democracy, it is first
necessary to inquire into the specificity of the concepts of democracy and hegemony. In
Chapter 1
,
both concepts are defined according to past and present usages. In particular,
It is argued that the term “democracy” has undergone an historical transition by which,
under conditions of capitalism, its legitimacy as a valid theory of political obligation is
being undermined. The work of C.B. Macpherson will be examined to bnng out the
key contradiction which emerges when democracy is mixed with capitalism;
specifically, it is one that pits an owning class which must maintain a possessive market
society m order to ensure its ruling position against a dispossessed working class which
finds It increasingly difficult to remain politically obligated to a system that keeps it
subordinated. In order to forestall any further damage to its legitimacy, attempts to
mask this contradiction are continuously undertaken by those holding sovereign power
while continuing to insist that the form of government by which they rule be classified
as a democracy. And though ruling classes will always appeal to its citizens’ sense of
patriotism that political sentiment which Hegel defined as “assured conviction with
truth as its basis” which results from the citizens’ belief that “rationality is actually
present in the state to ward off challenges to its legitimacy, one is reminded of
Marx s statement that the “state is too serious a business to be subjected to such
buffoonery” [such as a despotism which relies on patriotism for its salvation]. “A Ship
of Fools can perhaps be allowed to drift before the wind for a good while,” he writes,
“but it will still drift to its doom [i.e. the approaching revolution] precisely because the
fools refuse to believe it possible” (Hegel, 1821/1967, pp. 163-4; Marx, 1943).
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With regard to the concept of hegemony, various perspectives are laid out frotn
that of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight to that of Mtehael Doyle and Antonio Gramsci.
Gramsct's understanding of hegemony, which is rooted ,n the formation of the state
itself, and which focuses on the intemelations between ntling classes and subaltern
groups ,n the interplay between political society and civil society, is chosen as the
methodological tool by which to examine the cument U.S. export of democracy, for it ts
the only approach to hegemony, of those examined herein, which is based in a solidly
class analytical framework.
In Chapter 2, an historical examination of the modem states system is
undertaken so as to provide some background to contemporary international relations.
In particular, an examination of the origins of the modem states-system is undertaken
beginning with the Realist perspective of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. This is
followed by a delineation of various theoretical approaches within the discipline of
international relations (IR). Some of these approaches take the sovereign state as their
basic unit of analysis but others, since the rapid development of globalizing forces in the
latter twentieth century, have yielded to analyses that are global in orientation and take
the world capitalist system as their primary level of theorization. These later systems
theorists provide the theoretical tools which lend guidance to this dissertation and help
onent the reader to the complex processes which set the stage for the diplomatic
practice of democracy promotion undertaken by the NED, understanding such
democracy promotion as a necessary behavior on the road to globalization under U.S.
hegemonic dominance.
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In recogmzmg that post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy has a unity of purpose
built around a specific theme, v/z. “democracy,”
“democracy-building,” and “democracy
promotion,” a genealogical exposition of prior attempts by the U.S. to promote
democracy abroad is necessary to show that this is not a wholly new policy embarked
upon by the U.S. Specifically, in Chapter 3, 1 will focus on the example of the long
history of U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and the persistent U.S.
interventionist behavior in those regions under the guise of promoting “freedom and
democracy.” This history will demonstrate that the U.S. has much practical experience
by which to guide its current efforts to promote democracy thoughout the world.
In Chapter 4, 1 focus on the origin, structure, and grant-funding practices of the
NED itself and analyze the specific nature of the form of democracy being exported,
how and for what purposes it is exported, and examine particular instances ofNED
funding in order to assess its impact on building democracy abroad. Because of the
focused activities of the NED in many areas of the world, in particular in funding
activist intellectuals who otherwise might be inclined to acquiesce to local anti-U.S.
and/or anti-capitalist oppositional forces, it is implicit that the NED is succeeding in
pacifying many foreign populations through its direct involvement in the internal
political affairs of other countries. For example, despite the highly publicized open
admission by U.S. officials of millions of dollars in NED aid, the Serbian opposition
leader, Vojislav Kostunica, supported by many thousands of citizens claimed victory
against incumbent President Slobodan Milosevic in the rump state of Yugoslavia in the
September 2000 elections, eventually forcing Milosevic from office on October 6 with
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Kostunica ascending to the Presidency (Lancaster, September 19, 2000, p. At ; Erlanger,
September 20, 2000; Dobbs, December 11
, 2000, p. Al)
In Chapter 5, I critique the latest attempt by the U.S. to maintain its hegemony
through the export of democracy abroad. I question whether the western liberal
democratic state is the best form for the realization of continued capitalist accumulation
under U.S. hegemony in the rest of the world or whether this form of the state produces
Its own contradictions that could upset its hegemony. In this concluding chapter, I
examine certain aspects of global capitalist development since WWII and the effect this
development is having on the relations between the so-called “developing nations” vis-
a-vis the so-called “developed nations.” As well, with the accelerated globalization of
the world market m the 1990s, I examine established international economic bodies
assessing their role as regards the objective of supporting and/or maintaining U.S.
hegemony. Utilizing a Marxian class analysis, I then construct a basic theoretical model
of capitalist production as it operates within the current global market and analyze, on
the basis of this model, the likely concomitant effect on the U.S. export of democracy in
general within the ever-developing contradictory influences that are both bringing the
world together in a web of economic ties while simultaneously exacerbating economic
cleavages in the process.
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I. democracy and hegemony
Democracy ConceptnaHypH
To conjoin in one sentence the concepts democracy and hegemony is a
contradiction, for while notions of freedom are conjured by the first concept (at least in
our own histoncal epoch), its negation emanates from the second. And while both
concepts refer to a specific type of political order, hegemony has more often been
associated with a state’s external relations, while democracy has been conceived
histoncally as an endogenous state practice, a fact which heretofore has both facilitated
and circumscnbed the nature of “democratic” states’ interactions.’^ To the degree that
states interact either violently or through diplomatic means, the stronger—determined
pnmanly by battlefield strength, though economic might and intellectual capacities
Watson uses the term hegemony to refer to “some power or authority in a system
[which] is able to ‘lay down the law’ about the operation of the system, that is to
determine to some extent the external relations between member states, while leaving
them domestically independent.” Though he notes that some scholars usually reserve
the term hegemony to describe the exercise of this authority by a single power, he
argues. The difficulty there is that in fact the authority can be exercised either by a
powerful individual state, or as is often the case by a group of such states” (Watson
1992,p. 15).
The distinction between internal and external realms is a common dichotomy
utilized by state theorists which both allows and delimits which forms of behavior are
considered appropriate, in their view, to each realm. Whereas this debate in
international relations once centered on theories ofhuman nature and then shifted to the
condition of anarchy and the distribution ofpower in the states-system, both otherwise
subsumed under the concept of “structure”, Wendt (1992) has recently moved the
debate onto the question of “process” involving the interaction of participants in the
system and the learning attained thereby. He argues that there is no essential feature to
the anarchical condition of the states-system such as to give rise necessarily to self-help
and power politics in the international arena.
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have necessarily effected the form in which victories resulted—has usually dominated
.he relationship and thereby established a relationship of hegemony.'^ Democracy, on
the other hand, is said to exist in so far as political authonty arises from an uncoerced
affirmation by a majority of citizens-at least of all those eonsidered to be citizens.
Previous writers have postulated a similar dichotomy as the one stated above-v,z„
the relationship between freedom and order (Lowe, 1988; Forsey, 1974; Gorovitz, 1967;
Commager, 1966; Heimann, 1947; and Eden, 1948).'^ Indeed, students of politics will
most assuredly be confronted with this latter dichotomy, as it is said that all of politics
IS a reconciliation of these two in one form or another (though some would claim, as do
certain religions and philosophies, that both are unattainable without justice)." But to
say that democracy and hegemony are analagous to freedom and order is to mistake the
undelineated abstraction of the latter concepts with the specificity of the former when
they, i.e. democracy and hegemony, are conceived as practices. Various kinds of states
throughout history have elaimed to serve the goals of freedom and order as does nearly
“As a legal construct,” write Kegley and Wittkopf, “states are assumed to possess a
relatively permanent population, a well-defined territory, and a government possessing
sovereignty (that is, supreme authority over its inhabitants as well as freedom from
interference by others)” (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1981/1989, p. 36).
Other recurrent dichotomies along these lines include the relationship between
liberty and equality (Hadley, 1925/1969; Nielsen, 1985; Robbins, 1977; Paul, Miller,
and Paul, 1985), liberty and justice (Day, 1987; Smith and Murphy, 1965; Bollier,
1982) and freedom and equality (Dixon, 1986; Sjostrand, 1973; Oddo, 1979).
Der Derian posits the relationship of order to anarchy, arguing that international
societies, institutions, and regimes having been historically constructed “out of the
desire for order and the fear of anarchy.” International theory and critical investigations
both share this recognition yet differ over “the degree to which anarchy is conceived as
the threat and order as the task; or put less charitably,” he states, “whether the will to
order produces the very effect of anarchy” (Der Derian, 1995, p. 4).
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every slate today. But the particular political practices undertaken by different kinds of
states to achieve these goals not only vary in their approaches but likewise in their
specific conceptualizations of these goals, hence the specificity of democratic or
hegemonic state politics as opposed to, for example, anstocratic or confederation state
pohtics-each ofwhich seeks freedom and order in the abstract through different
definitively ordered practices.
Both democracy and hegemony when conceived as ordered practices thus relate to
certain specified relationships that give cogency to their particularity. For example, a
notion of equality characteristically sets off the concept of democracy from its
alternatives, including—as per Aristotle’s constitutional schema—monarchy,
aristocracy, polity, tyranny or oligarchy.’^ In fact, as far as Aristotle was concerned,
democracy, along with tyranny and oligarchy, was a deviant form of governance.
Democracy was a deviation from polity, for the demos or masses ruled not in the interest
of the common good, i.e. for rich and poor alike, but only for their own advantage, i.e.
for the benefit of the men without means” (Aristotle, 335-322 B.C.E./1984, Bk. Ill, Ch.
Hansen states: “First, demokratia was both a political system and a set of political
ideals. Second, the ideals singled out by the Athenian democrats were liberty
{eleutheria) and equality (isonomia and other compounds with isos, the adjective
meaning “equal”) (Hansen, 1989, p. 3).
Anstotle’s focus on various constitutions for comparative political analysis is
somewhat indicative of a particular reverence the ancient Greeks had for constitutions,
believing them to be the foundation of society’s happiness or misery. As one noted
Greek historian stated: “Now in all political situations we must understand that the
principal factor which makes for success or failure is the form of a state’s constitution:
it is from this source, as if from a fountainhead, that all designs and plans of action not
only originate but reach their fulfilment” (Polybius, c. 200-118 B.C.E./l 979/1 986 pp
302-3).
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V... para.
.279a32-.279b4, p. ,90)." Indeed, for ,he Greeks in genera,, denrocracy was
literally taken to mean rule by a particular social class, the poor masses. The etymology
democracy comes from a combination of the Greek words demos (the people) and
kratia (authority) and literally translates as ‘power of the people.’"* “Democracy.”
Po,y™‘r,c too'nrB '’-‘-anlybius (c. 200-118 .C.E.) also delineates six kinds of government, but for Polybiusthese SIX forms naturally develop in a cycle of political revolution with kingship
anstocracy, and democracy rightfully describing the virtuous forms of government
while rule, minonty or oligarchic rule, and mob rule aptly descriptive of theirdefective and degenerative forms which leads to a transition to a different form As
regards democracy. Polybius states: “In the same way a state in which the mass of
ci izens IS free to do whatever it pleases or takes into its head is not a democracy. But
where it is both traditional and customary to reverence the gods, to care for our parents
to respect our elders, to obey the laws, and in such a community to ensure that the will
’
of the majority prevails—this situation it is proper to describe as democracy ” It is
interesting to note that Polybius states that the best constitution is “one which includes
elements of all three [i.e. kingship, aristocracy, and democracy] species.” for. he adds
this has been proved not only in theory but in practiee by Lycurgus. who was the firs’t
to construct a constitution, that of Sparta, on this principle” (Polybius c 200-118
B.C.E./l 979/1 986, pp. 303-4).
When Cleisthenes (c. 572 - c. 485 B.C.E.), thought by Athenians to be the principal
founder of their democracy*, first implemented his reforms, Martin notes, “he made the
preexisting villages of the countryside and the neighborhoods of the city ofAthens
(both called ‘demes,’ demoi) the constituent units of Athenian political organization.”
The demos were the people who resided in these units, which were mostly country
villages. The wealthy landowners resided mostly in the city, though many had country
houses as well. “Organized in their demes, the male citizens participated directly in the
running of their government: they kept track in deme registers of which males were
citizens and therefore eligible at eighteen to attend the assembly to vote on laws and
public policies. Concludes Martin: “Cleisthenes’ rearrangement of the political map
of Athenian government meant that local notables no longer could easily control
election results just by exercising influence on the poorer people in their immediate
area.” Furthermore, “the idea that persuasion, rather than force or status, should
constitute the mechanism for political decision making in the emerging Athenian
democracy fit well with the spirit of the intellectual changes which were taking place
during the late Archaic age. That is, the idea that people had to present plausible
reasons for their recommendations corresponded to one of the period’s new ways of
thought” (Martin, 1996, pp. 87-8).
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by mixing the constitution well.” In particuL'7 777''ir"'
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Sninni7 , M netting up courts drawn from the entire body of citizens he li e
XII Para i?73b« 2^'’-323/1962/1984, Book II^
furt’hered the cause ’ofthe^”
' Aristotle to the effect that Solont ne of e common people through three populist measures- n “the
created t'r
'“ans on the security of the person of the debtor [whicM
ns : 7T “the7?' than 's exercise ofCitize hip, 2) the extension to any person of the right to take legal action in behalf of
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“ advancement of opularpower. It nabled any citizen, regardless of social status, to contribute to theen orcement of Solon’s laws by initiating legal action,” and, 3) “the institution of anappeals procedure, ephesis, and of a new court, the he!iaia, to hear appeals [which!
r.he oa77r >he arbitrary admimstrati™ ofjustice
(Ostwald, 1986,
pp^
14-15). Noting that Solon’s reforms of the administration ofjustice
ere left untouched by Cleisthenes, Ostwald states that the identification of Cleisthenes
as the one who instituted democracy in Athens “can, however, be justified only as a
retrospective inference drawn from effects to origins. The ongms themselves, asdescnbed by Herodotus and Aristotle, show that Cleisthenes’ aim was not to place thedecisive power of governing the state (kratos) into the hands of the demos, but rather to
ameliorate conditions that had first brought about tyranny in Athens and had resulted in
political stnfe as soon as the Peisistratids had been expelled in 5 1 1/10 B.C. Cleisthenes
was, in other words, no ideological democrat but a practical statesman and politician
concerned with eliminating the roots of internal conflict from the society in which he
lived” (Ostwald, 1986, pp. 15-6).
In his funeral oration, Pericles points out the numerical essence of democracy as well
as its meritocratic virtue as follows; ‘“Our constitution is called a democracy because
power IS m the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question
of settling disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting
one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not
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democracy does no. hold
.n.e in our own day-a, leas, no, off,c,ally adnrihed by ,he
world's mos, self-idenl.fied democracy, ,he U.S., excep, on rare occasions-
demons,ra,es ,he his.oncal ai.era.ion ,he concep, has gone .hrough, especially under ,he
condhions of capi,alisnr “ The merger ofdemocracy wi,h capi.ahsm mus,
.herefore be
examined, since Ihe shift away from ,he hislorical Greek origins of democracy has
particular implications for the present study.
The Crisis of Political Obligation
In his book. The Political Theory ofPossessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke,
C.B. Macpherson examines ,he foundalions of liberal-democralic iheory as found in ihe
works of Hobbes, Harringlon, Locke and ihe Levellers, all wriling within the context of
two seventeenth-century English revolutions.^' Locating the “essential ingredient” of
membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No
one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity
because of poverty’ ’ (Pericles, quoted in Thucydides, c. 460-404 B.C.E./l 954/1 985
Book II, Para. 37, p. 145).
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Major General Smedley D. Butler quoted from a U.S. military publication. Training
Manual No. 2000-25, which stated: “The United States is a republic, not a democracy.
Democracy is a government of the masses.. .results in mobocracy...the attitude toward
property is Communistie...the attitude toward law is that the will of the majority shall
regulate, whether it be based upon deliberation, or governed by passion, prejudice and
impulse... it results in demagogism, license, agitation, discontent, anarchy” (quoted in
Butler, 1935, Part I, p. 9).
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As the left wing of the English bourgeois revolution of 1640-1660, the Levellers
fought against the remnants of feudalism but also resisted the rise of capitalism. With a
large following amongst the London poor, the Levellers represented those groups being
tom asunder in the transition to capitalism. Their political program, radical for its day,
included the demand for the separation of church and state, together with demands for
religious tolerance for Catholics, Jews, and atheists, as well as demands for annual
22
bo.h
.he practical struggle and the theore.tcal jus.ifica.ton of the seventeenth-century
European revolutionary upheaval in the new belief in the value and “nghts” of the
individual (who, to the major theorists of the time, was chteny the white European
propertied male), a belief most clearly emphasized in Hobbes and Locke, Macpherson
detects in their conceptions of the individual a central problem which, winie
correspondtng subs.an.tally to the actual relations of a market socte.y, has nonetheless
come to undermine the legitimacy of liberal-democratic theory. The difficulty hes in
the “possessive quality” which conceptualizes the individual “as essentially the
propnetor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”
Freedom, as “the” human essence, was conceptualized in the negative sense as “freedom
from dependence on the will of others”—freedom being a function of possession.
Society was seen as constituted on a contractual basis and consisted of relations of
exchange between proprietors. Political society, thus “became a calculated device for
the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of
exchange” (Macpherson, 1962/1988, p. 3). Seventeenth-century concepts of freedom,
nght, obligation, and justice were consequently shaped by this overriding concept of
possessive individualism.” And while this concept ofpossession gave liberal theory its
strength in the seventeenth century, it became its source ofweakness in the nineteenth,
and, has failed, according to Macpherson, as a foundation of liberal-democratic theory
in the twentieth century. This transformation, states Macpherson, is not that the basic
assumptions of possessive individualism no longer correspond to the conditions of
elections, universal male suffrage, and the redistribution of wealth (“The Levellers and
Irish Freedom,” 1997).
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market society; they sti„ do-even though sonte hbeta, theorists do no. tecogntze this
and try to discard these assumptions. No, the real trouble, Macpherson argues, is that
the social context changed with the emergence of “working-class poh.tcal articulacy”
,
the ntneteenth century, which is politically expressed today in the right of un.versal
suffrage-a concession won by the dispossessed from the possessing class through the
organization and mass mobilization of the working class.“ Reflecting this poh.ical
change m order to maintain their rule, the possessing class adopted the rhetoric and, at
rimes, the symbolism, of equality, which democracy presupposes, while effectively
denying it of substantive content, though concessions, however temporary, have also
been won by the dispossessed, e.g. social security benefits. And though (as of 1962
when Macpherson’s book was firs, published) the possessing (capt.alis.) class has still
been able to maintain effective control over political power in much of the world, the
increasing necessity to rely on deception to maintain its control is effectively
undermining any adequate basis for a moral justification of liberal democracy. The
''
Following the U.S. Civil War (1860-65), the ratification of the fifteenth amendment
to the U.S. Constitution m 1870 legally ensured Black American males with the right to
vote. With the passage of the twentieth amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920,
women in the U.S. gained the right of suffrage. On June 2, 1924, the American Indian
Citizenship Act was passed by Congress granting all non-citizen Indians bom within the
territorial limits of the United States citizenship
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As one commentator wrote regarding the present relationship between wealth and
political power in the world, particularly as played out in the World Trade Organization:
The Group of Seven (G-7)—the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Japan,
Italy and Canada—had a gross national product of close to $20 trillion in
1997. That is 64 percent of the world’s production coming from
countries with only 1 1
.8 percent of the world’s population. Of the top
500 corporations in the world, only six are from countries outside the
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key con.rad,c,,o„ which emerges when democracy is nnxed with capdahsn,, iherefore.
s .ha. be.ween a possessing class, wh.eh mus. main.a.n
.he exis.ence of a possessive
marke. socie.y .o preserve i.s posi.ion, and a dispossessed working class, which, w,.h
.he acquisi.ion of .he demoera.ic franchise and hence a poli.ical voice, is increasingly
skeplical of Ihe liberal-democra.ic lheo
.7 of poli.ical obligalion.'" Essenlially,
U.S Europe, Canada or Japan. Of Ihe 100 larges, banks in .he world all
are from .he impenahsl counines. As of 1997 Ihe imperialis. coun.ries
exported close to $5 tnllion and imported a similar amount—controlling
the vast majority of world trade. In the same year, the oppressed
countnes were m debt to the tune of $2.2 trillion to the imperialist banks
and governments of the world. The underdeveloped countries are truly
pnsoners m the WTO. The WTO processes are carried out behind closed
doors among the rulers of the organization, whose proposals are brought
to the General Council. The governments of the Third World basically sit
outside waiting to hear what the G-7 proposes (Goldstein, December 9
,
The most notable instance of official deception by the U.S. government was its
increasing, yet undisclosed, involvement in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War
revealed by the “Pentagon Papers” released to The New York Times by psychiatrist and
government employee Daniel Ellsberg in 1971. As the Columbia Encyclopedia (Sixth
The study revealed a considerable degree of miscalculation, bureaucratic
arrogance, and deception on the part of U.S. policymakers. In particular,
it found that the U.S. government had continually resisted full disclosure
of increasing military involvement in Southeast Asia—air strikes over
Laos, raids along the coast of North Vietnam, and offensive actions by
U.S. marines had taken place long before the American public was
informed (2000 <http://www.bartleby.com/65/pe/PentPap.html>).
Flathman points out that the practice of political obligation is not a necessary part
of a political order. Political societies sometimes achieve a degree of order and
uniformity of behavior by force, deception, and manipulation; other political orders are
marked by a degree of order and uniform behavior owing to the habitual, unthinking
conformity of their subjects.” Flathman’s conception of ‘political obligation’, as a
conscious political order not characterized by force, deception, and manipulation,
implies a normative concept. As such, he argues, “in point of fact reason and choice are
an integral part of the practice of political obligation” (Flathman, 1972, pp. 64-5). As
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Macpherson foresaw in 1962 a continuous crisis of legitimacy on the political horizon
for the liberal-capitalist state.
To unravel this contradiction, Macpherson examines the social basis of liberal
theory which its founders, including Hobbes, Hamngton, Locke and the Levellers, took
for granted, and notes that all shared the recognition that each person’s capacity to labor
IS his/her own property, is alienable, and is a market commodity which each man is
freely able to hand over to others for a price (thus distinguishing the worker from the
slave). It IS this characteristic of labor as alienable that prompts Macpherson to label
this kind of society a “possessive market society” (Macpherson, 1962/1988, p. 48).
Furthermore, once one’s capacity to labor becomes a generalized commodity, then
market relations begin to permeate all social relations. This form of society came into
being in seventeenth-century England, and the acceptance of this society, rooted in the
notion of possessive (white male) individualism, by the main political theories of the
time is due to their shared recognition of the following basic assumptions:
(i) What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the wills of
others.
(ii) Freedom from dependence on others means freedom from any relations with
others except those relations which the individual enters voluntarily with a view
to his own interest.
he writes elsewhere, having an obligation to do X is not the same as being under
compulsion to do it, and that acting to discharge an obligation is not the same as being
compelled. If compulsion has the force of necessity the question ofjustification simply
has no place. One does not do X, he suffers or experiences it.” And further: “Insofar,
then, as doing an action involves discharging an obligation, there is logical room for a
well-grounded decision on B ’s part to do the action or not” (Flathman, 1976, p. 77).
Though Macpherson considers the Levellers to be part of the newly emergent
bourgeoisie, others take a different view which sees them as the first segment of an
emergent working class or proletariat (cf. Brockway, 1980, p. 98).
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O'™ person and
capacities, for which he owes nothing to society
(.V) Although the tndividual cannot alienate the whole of his property tn hisown person, he may alienate his capacity to labour.
(v) Human society consists of a series of market relations
vO Since freedom from the wills of others is what makes a man human eachindivtdual s freedom can nghtfully be limited only by such obligations and rulesas are necessary to secure the same freedom of others.
(vii) Political society is a human contrivance for the protection of the
individual’s property in his person and goods, and (therefore) for the
maintenance of orderly relations of exchange between individuals regarded aspropnetors of themselves (Macpherson, 1962/1988, pp. 263-64).
These seven assumptions, argues Macpherson, remain indispensable to liberal
theory, but no sufficient principles of obligation can be derived from them today
because there are two conditions of a valid theory of political obligation that can no
longer be fulfilled by the current state of possessive market societies. First, Macpherson
argues, a valid theory of political obligation (without relying on Nature or the will of
God) “must be able to postulate that the individuals ofwhom the society is composed
see themselves, or are capable of seeing themselves, as equal in some respect more
fundamental than all the respects in which they are unequal.” In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, this fundamental notion of equality consisted of the equal
subordination of everyone to the determination of the market and its acceptance as
rightful or inevitable by virtually everybody until the nineteenth century.^^ Under these
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The “effective use of ‘obligation’ to guide conduct,” states Flathman, “presupposes a
considerable degree of commonality in the society or social group and contributes to
stable patterns of conduct.” “Commonality and stability,” he maintains, “are threatened
by unreflective conformity to particular legal rules and the general rule [i.e. ‘an
established rule to the effect that there is an obligation to obey the laws and other
authoritative commands of the state’ (p. 48)]. They are best maintained when the
conviction of the value of these rules is continuously renewed through critical
examination of their content and the consequences of accepting and obeying them
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conditions, argues Macpherson, “there was a sufficient basis for rational obligation of
all men to a political authority which could maintain and enforce the only possible
orderly human relations, namely, market relations” (Macpherson, 1962/1988, pp. 272-
73).
The second condition of a valid theory of political obligation is that “there be a
cohesion of self-interests, among all those who have a voice in choosing the
government, sufficient to offset the centrifugal forces of a possessive market society”
(Macpherson, 1962/1988, p. 273). By restricting political voice to a possessing class in
the zenith of market society in the seventeenth century, an adequate cohesion of
centnpetal forces existed to decide periodically, without anarchy, who should have the
sovereign power, thus providing a sufficient basis for an autonomous theory of
obligation of the individual to a constitutional liberal state.
This condition, like the first, was fulfilled until the nineteenth century when the
industrial working class (first in Europe and the U.S., though later replicated wherever
capitalist relations became the dominant mode of production) developed an autonomous
class consciousness and became, in Maepherson’s words, “politically articulate.” At
that point, working “[m]en no longer saw themselves fundamentally equal in an
inevitable subjection to the determination of the market,” for the market was seen as
overwhelmingly benefitting the possessing class. The evolution of market society thus
had produced a class which by the nineteenth century “could envisage alternatives to the
(Flathman, 1972, p. 63). While idealistic in his focus, Flathman’s interpretation of
political obligation attempts to avoid legal positivism (i.e. that law is whatever the ruler
says it is) by arguing that societies which operate upon a basis of political obligation do
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system” (Macpherson, 1962/1988, p. 273). As such, the first conchtion for an
autonomous theory of political obligation was no longer fulfilled, for the working class
did not see themselves as fundamentally equal to the possessing class. The inequality of
the system m fact relegated the working class to a subordinate position in society.
Similarly, the second condition of a cohesion of interests could no longer apply once the
working class claimed the democratic franchise for itself, thus forcing the possessing
class to yield on its monopoly of power. With two classes in opposition, both now with
a political voice, the previous assurance of a cohesion of self-interests such as to
periodically decide, without anarchy, who should have sovereign power was no longer
, ,
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tenable.
As a result, the possessing or capitalist class, since the nineteenth century, has,
by implication, had to deceive subject populations—or at least their working class
components about the true nature of capitalist democracy in order to maintain control
over political power at home and colonialism abroad so as to generate possessing class
cohesion on the international level in the advanced market societies. Indeed, the failed
combination of monarchy with democracy was not lost on the Americans as they
wrested paramount control over western capitalist relations from Britain during and
so without constraint upon reason and choice. [For an in-depth analysis into his
“formal-procedural theory of authority”, see Flathman (1980).]
Disunity of the dispossessed, however, would continue to fragment working-class
political power in the U.S. so long as women, Africans Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Americans, and others remained disenfranchised—victories which awaited
twentieth-century struggles which further exposed the weakness (if not limits) of and
eroded support for liberal democracy. The weight of centuries of gender- and racially-
biased laws and cultural attitudes will likewise hinder working-class unity into the
unforeseen future.
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following WWIl, The search for countless “enemies” to U.S. democracy, both
internally and externally, has since gone on unabated as does numerous military
28
Coker wntes that “Churchill was quite right to interpret the arrival of the American
era not so much a threat to British power as the conclusion of one phase in the histoiw ofhe English-speaking peoples and the beginning of the next” (Coker, 1989, p. 40).
However, we see a much more contested perspective from Canadian sociologist John A.
Geopolitical exhaustion played a decisive role in [Britain’s] decline.
Britain was faced in the modem world by Germany, a geopolitical rival
beyond appeasement. The waging of two world wars resulted in the loss
of external balances and inability in 1945 to protect itself against
America’s almost bmtal insistence on becoming the world’s leader (Hall
1997, p. 8).
Gamble (1981/1994) notes that the “uneasy relationship” between Britain and
the United States began in 191 7 as a consequence of the first world war which led to the
deterioration of Britain’s traditional naval prominence, the undermining of her financial
strength, and Britain’s inability “to establish and maintain the conditions for a liberal
world economic order.” Reconciling itself to a subordinate role to the U.S., particularly
after the new order emerged in the 1940s, Gamble explains;
The negotiated transfer of hegemony which took place between these
two Great Powers was unprecedented and by no means smooth. Britain
at many points resisted American demands and fought for its own
interests, and the preservation of its Empire (Gamble, 1981/1994 pp 27-
8 ).
And Woodcock in his Who Killed the British Empire? (1974) remarks that “the
United States has consistently applied pressure tending to the diminution of the Empire
from the time of the Washington Treaty [of 1922] fifty years ago” (p. 329).
James (1994) notes the American usurpation of Britain’s position in the Middle
East beginning in 1945 with the American rejection of the British proposal to have the
Turkish army placed under its command, the luring of Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia into the
American orbit, followed by the American takeover of Operation Boot, renamed Ajax
by the CIA, to overthrow Iranian leader Mussadiq and replace him with Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlevi in 1953, and the removal of Britain from influence over
Egypt and the Suez Canal in the 1950s. As contrasted with Britain’s traditional
dominance of the Middle East, James writes: “Now it was being hustled out, humbled,
and forced to comply with the wishes of the United States, which seemed poised to
usurp its old position” (James, 1994, pp. 568-77).
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.nterventions, assassinations, coups d'etat, wars, drug smuggling, etc. (cf, Cockburn &
St. Clair, 1998; LaFeber, 1993; Blum, 1986, 1995; Colby and Dennett, 1994; Gelbspan
1991; Kwitney, 1984; Stockwell, 1978; and Agee, 1975). In the twentieth century,
deception at home (e.g. the Tonkin Gulf “attacks”, the Pentagon Papers, Watergate,
Iran-Contra) continues to undermine the moral justification of liberal democracy."
of the three causes Mann (1988) assigns for the decline of Britain’s role in
world affairs, It is the second cause—“murder by other powers”—of which he says:
social scientists tend to downplay the importance of the second [cause] because most
are uncomfortable at handling geo-political and military power ” As to the specificity
of this murder”, Mann writes:
Amid these events we can find a few murderous acts committed by the
rising power, the United States, against Britain. The terms ofUS entry
into the Second World War and the terms of the settlement of 1945-6
were both designed to weaken British post-war power. Thus US goods
now had equal access to the Empire; thus the crippling burden of dollar
debt in 1945 was to be paid for by the import ofUS goods; thus the US
insistence on the convertibility of the sterling. In 1946 a rush to convert
sterling holdings into dollars depleted Britain’s gold and dollar reserves
and caused a crisis. Convertibility was suspended in 1 947 after a
demonstration, satisfactory to American eyes, of sterling’s vulnerability.
This was calculated to finish off Britain’s remaining global rivalry to the
United States. It was not nice behaviour, even if it was typical of a Great
Power on the make (as Britain itself had earlier been) (Mann 1988 pp
212-215).
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On August 5, 1964, alleged attacks (later discounted) by North Vietnamese gunboats
against U.S. destroyers were reported as motive for U.S. retaliatory bombing against
North Vietnam. President Johnson used the alleged attacks to greatly escalate U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam War. Two days later, on August 7, the U.S. Congress
approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which provided the President with
authorization to take whatever means deemed necessary to repel such “attacks” against
the United States and thus began the momentous escalation of the war which led to over
fifty thousand U.S. casualties and millions of Vietnamese casualties (cf Well, 1994).
The Pentagon Papers were a 7,000 page top-secret Defense Department history
completed in January 1969 analyzing how the decisions of four U.S administrations
during the period from WWII to 1968 led to a deeper and more intractable commitment
by the U.S. in Southeast Asia, little of which had been previously made public. On June
13, 1971, The New York Times began publishing a series of articles exposing these
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Meanwhile, the success of national independence movements abroad (e.g. in Africa and
Asia) undermines possessing class cohesion on the international level. Consequently,
the domestic possessing class in the advanced market societies has acted to further
increase its use of deception, or at the very least, obfuscation.” The goal, of course, is
to effectively keep power out of working-class hands.^'
p pers which heretofore had been kept from public knowledge. Immediately, the NixonAdmimstra ion s Justice Department asked for, and was granted, a court order blocking
further publication of the senes based on what they felt was an immediate threat to U.S.
national secunty. This was the first attempt ever made by the Federal Government to
mpose a pnor restraint on the press in the name of national security. The Supreme
Court eventually ruled that the government cannot block publication of a controversial
story before the public even sees it (cf Sheehan, et al., 1971).
On June 17, 1972, the office of the Democratic National Committee in the
Watergate Hotel m Washington D.C. was burglarized by a secret White House special
investigation unit referred to as the “Plumbers”, set up by President Nixon and the
Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), because their job was to stop the leaks to
the press from the Nixon White House by investigating the private lives of Nixon’s
cntics and political enemies. Five members of the Plumbers were arrested during the
Watergate Hotel break-in and their subsequent trial led to revelations exposing a secret
taping system m the White House, legal battles over “executive privilege”, firing of the
special prosecutor, the near-impeachment of President Nixon, and Nixon’s early
resignation, amongst other controversial and/or criminal allegations.
The Iran-Contra affair involved the covert selling of arms to Iran (through Israel)
by the Reagan Administration against his stated policy of neutrality (and thus resulting
in release of American hostages in Iran), utilizing the profits fi'om these arms sales to
fund a civil war in Nicaragua in direct violation of the 1984 act of Congress, the Boland
Amendment, which forbade United States agencies from giving aid to the Nicaraguan
contra rebels. As R.W. Apple wrote in The New York Times'. “Governments,
meantime, have continued to conceal and, on occasion, to prevaricate. The Iran-contra
affair, almost certainly illegal, was conceived and carried out by the Reagan
Administration in total secrecy, and no one involved blew the whistle—any more than
anyone had done so during the months and years as the nation stumbled ever deeper into
the Vietnam quagmire” (Apple, June 23, 1996; cf Kombluh & Byrne, 1993).
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Career CIA officer, Ralph McGehee, a 25-year employee of the CIA, stated how U.S.
government deception works:
I want to reveal to those who still believe in the myths of the CIA what it
is and what it actually does. ... My view backed by 25 years of
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expenence is, quite simply, that the CIA is the covert action arm of the
residency. Most of its money, manpower, and energy go into covert
operations that, as we have seen over the years, include backing dictators
and overthrowing democratically elected governments. The CIA is not
an intelligence agency. In fact, it acts largely as an anti-intelligence
agency, producing only that information wanted by policymakers to
support their plans and suppressing information that does not support
those plans. As the covert action arm of the President, the CIA uses
disinformation, much of it aimed at the U.S. public, to mold opinion. It
employs the gamut of disinformation techniques from forging documents
to planting and discovering “communist” weapons caches. But the major
weapon in its arsenal of disinformation is the ‘intelligence’ it feeds to
policymakers. Instead of gathering genuine intelligence that could serve
as the basis for reasonable policies, the CIA often ends up distorting
reality, creating out of whole cloth ‘intelligence’ to justify policies that
have already been decided upon. Policymakers then leak this
intelligence to the media to deceive us all and gain our support. Now
that President Reagan, in his Executive Order of December 4, 1981, has
authonzed the Agency to operate within the United States, the situation
can only worsen” (McGehee, 1983, p. xi)
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One aspect of this contest over control of the modem state can be seen in the
discourse of political obligation. Lister (1997) notes that “an increasingly influential
duties discourse is, in various guises, supplanting the dominant postwar [i.e. post-
WWII] social rights paradigm. Most importantly,” she writes, “both the new right (in
particular neo-conservatives) and communitarians have deliberately challenged the
rights discourse so as to shift the fulcrum of the citizenship paradigm which dominates
contemporary politics in the UK and the US. . ..” Citing two such examples (Lawrence
Mead’s Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (1986) and Michael
Novak’s, et al.’s. The New Consensus on Family and Welfare (1987)), Lister states that:
Both emphasize citizenship obligations over rights and both appeal to the common
good in identifying as the prime obligation engagement in paid work by welfare
recipients to support their families” (Lister, 1997, pp. 18-19). It is interesting to note in
these neoconservative admonishments of the poor regarding welfare recipients’ failure
to adhere to what they consider the poor’s political obligations [viz. get a job] the
absence of any reciprocal political obligations for the wealthy. Janoski argues that the
“chronic avoidance of obligations is puzzling because not only do rights require
obligations for their fulfillment, since no right may exist without an obligation to help
make the right exist, but obligations must also constrain each person’s bundle of
citizenship rights to make any system of rights workable.” And yet, he notes, “little is
known about what citizens in advanced-industrialized countries believe their obligations
to be, and what factors lead to those beliefs” (Janoski, 1998, pp. 53-4).
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Thus, the dilemma we are faced with today, argues Macpherson, is that “the
matunng of market society has cancelled that cohesion, among all those with a political
voice, which is a prerequisite for the deduction of obligation to a liberal state from
possessive individualist assumptions” [McPherson’s seven (see above)]. And yet, he
states, we cannot simply reject these assumptions without at the same time rejecting
market society itself. Thus, “[ejither we reject possessive individualist assumptions, in
which case our theory is unrealistic, or we retain them, in which case we cannot get a
valid theory of obligation” (Macpherson, 1962/1988, p. 275). As it is today, he says, we
have stuck with the possessive individualist assumptions and thus have remained
without a valid theory of political obligation. If Macpherson is right about an increasing
nonacceptance of the liberal theory of political obligation by the working classes of
advanced market societies, and particularly the U.S., then on what basis can and should
populations in other countries accept this form of capitalist-democracy or, as the Clinton
Administration refers to it, market democracy?^^ By what means can the U.S. hope to
convince other populations of the vitality of “made-in-America” democracy? To
attempt to answer these questions, we will next need to focus on the concept of
hegemony.
Cohn writes that “the Clinton administration was the first to use the term ‘market
democracies.’ However,” she adds, “this definitional linkage of free market policies
with
political democracy is often more theoretical than real. Economic globalization,
privatization, and free trade tend to widen the gap between rich and poor, and this can
exacerbate crime, corruption, and instability, thus undermining efforts to build
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Hesemony Conceptual izeH
The speciHc fomi m which order manifests itself as hegemony (as distinct, for
example, from confederation or union) is through /iredommmicc. In its Macedonian
origins, the word hegemony stood for “leader" and meant preponderant inlluence or
authority, especially of one nation over others. Medley Bull prefers the term of
preponderance to describe the unilateral behavior of great powers in particular areas of
the world or among particular groups of slates; moreover, he recognizes that such
behavior contributes to international order. Yet, not all forms of preponderance
constitute hegemony for Bull. Instead, the unilateral exploitation of preponderance
takes three forms for Bull: dominance, primacy, and hegemony. Dominance, Bull
argues, applies to the relationship in which a great power—without exercising imperial
sovereignty— treats smaller states within its domain as second-class members of
international society. Specifically, it “is characterized by the habitual use of force by a
great power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland, and by habitual disregard
of the universal norms of interstate behaviour that confer rights of sovereignty, equality
and independence upon these states” (Bull, 1977, p. 214). Military intervention and
occupation are prominent aspects of this sort of behavior. At the opposite extreme to
dominance is what Bull refers to as primacy. Primacy is exercised by a great power
over lesser states “without any resort to force or threat of force and with no more than
the ordinary degree of disregard for norms of sovereignty, equality and independence.”
Though not specific on what constitutes “the ordinary degree of disregard” of
democratic institutions. As a result, U.S. democracy programs may have a negative
impact on a country's political democratization processes” (Cohn, July 9, 1999, p. 3).
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intemat.onal norms. Bull does note that “some degree of disregard of these nonns is
charactenstic of all international relationships” (Bull, 1977, p. 214). As regards the
specificity of a relationship of primacy. Bull equates the position of the great power to
one of “leadership”, arguing that it “is freely conceded by the lesser states w.thin the
group concerned, and often expresses the recognition by the latter of the
disproportionately large contribution which the great power is able to make to the
achievement ofcommon purposes” (Bull, 1977, p. 215). Between the extremes of
dominance and pnmacy which characterizes the relations of great powers over lesser
states is hegemony. As is characteristic of dominance, so too in hegemony is there a
resort to force and the threat of foree, but unlike with the former, this exercise of force
‘ IS not habitual and uninhibited but occasional and reluctant.” Instruments other than
force are preferred by the great power in this hegemonic relationship, and the great
power resorts to force “only in situations of extremity and with a sense that in doing so
it is incurring a political cost” (Bull, 1977, p. 215). Thus, although the great power is
ready to violate norms of sovereignty, equality and independence of lesser states, it
nonetheless recognizes that such norms or rights exists and hence is forced to justify its
violations of them by “some specific overriding principle.” Quoting Georg
Schwarzenberger, Bull concludes that “hegemony is ‘imperialism with good manners’”
(quoted in Bull, 1977, p. 216).
Martin Wight writes of hegemony in a manner similar to Bull’s though without
the distinctions in reference to the ancient states-system of Hellas. “From the sixth
century [B.C.E.] [the Greeks] seem to have thought of [the Hellenic city-states system]
as having a natural leader or ‘president’, and they had several terms for this concept
—
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prostates tes Hellados, hegemon" (Wight, 1977, p. 65). But with the unparalleled stress
of the Persian invasions at the beginning of the fifth century, “a more collective
conception appeared,” notes Wight, such that Greek “hegemonial theory was linked
with a generally egalitarian assumption about the members of the states-system.” This
egahtanamsm, he argues, was shown not only by the survival of the archaic
Amphictyonic constitution a constitution which pledged a mutual respect of each
member polls and a duty of defense against violators—but also by “the absence of a
hierarchic conception of international society” (Wight, 1977, p. 65).” That the Greeks
did not have any term corresponding to ‘great power’ sets off ancient Hellas from the
modem states-system. Likewise, argues Wight, the apparent inability of the Greeks to
develop a theory of the balance of power, a system of diplomacy, and public
international law accounts for the absence of a sense of an equilibrium of power to act
as a foundation or constitution of international society in ancient Hellas (Wight, 1977,
p. 66).
In his work on Empires (1986a), Michael Doyle distinguishes hegemony from
imperialism and, like Bull and Wight above, restricts hegemony primarily to the domain
of control over a state’s external relations. “Control of both foreign and domestic policy
characterizes empire; control of only foreign policy, hegemony” (Doyle, 1986a, p. 40).
The reason for this distinction is attributed by Doyle to Thucydides who, he argues,
first drew this distinction, noting Sparta’s “allies,” despite their subjection to
Spartan hegemony during the Peloponnesian War, exercised a considerable
The term “Amphictyonic” refers to the league of the twelve leading states of ancient
Greece who formed “a league of good neighbours” (Trend, 1951, p. 170).
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degree of domestic autonomy-unlike the imperialized “allies” subject toAthens (Doyle, 1 986a, p. 40).
The distinction Doyle makes between the two concepts helps him to demarcate the
different spheres of control while giving intrusive primacy to imperial over hegemonic
control. In this regard.
impenal control involves both the process of control and its outcomes Control
IS achieved either formally (directly or indirectly) or informally through
influence over the penphery’s environment, political articulation, aggregation,
decision making, adjudication, and implementation, and usually with the
collaboration of local peripheral elites. The scope of the outcomes covers both
internal and external issues—who rules and what mles (Doyle, 1986a, p. 40).
The intimate involvement of the great power in the domestic—as well as foreign-
affairs of the subordinate states as denoted above by the great power’s control over
interest articulation and aggregation, decision making, adjudication, and implementation
contrasts sharply with Doyle’s notion of hegemony which denotes control over external
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policy alone. He demonstrates the differences in the purview of each concept with
reference to the fifth-century conflict between Sparta and Athens, which I will explore
in some detail since it relates to the present focus on the export of democracy to enhance
U.S. hegemony.
In the case of Athens, Doyle notes that its empire developed, first, by enslaving
the populations and colonizing the land of captured cities; second, coercion and force
were utilized to keep rebellious states within the Delian League and; third, Athenian
34
Interest articulation is the act of giving utterance or expression to political needs of
either all or part of a community. Interest aggregation is the act of galvanizing and
organizing individuals for the purposes of collectively advancing shared political
interests. Together, these activities are sometimes referred to as lobbying.
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emissaries supervised the payment of tribute and the poheies of the weakest cities. And
though force and the threat offeree characterized this imperial rule, Athens nonetheless
allowed its allies to have legally independent, formally sovereign governments, though
generally requiring democratic assemblies. As such, Athens ruled the Delian League
members by mfonnal imperial means. Still, it “nonetheless detennined both their
foreign relations and their significant domestic policies” (Doyle, 1986a, p. 56).
Two primary means sustained Athens’ informal empire including, firstly,
military intervention and, secondly, “the mixture of popularity and unpopularity which
Athenian democratic imperialism evoked among subordinate citizens.” Though
economic exploitation and imperial political restrictions provoked hatred, Doyle argues
that Athenian imperial control was “preferable to the external threat of Persia and the
internal threat of oligarchy.” Moreover, though Athens benefitted from naval tribute,
seizures of land, and restrictions on trade, the members of the Delian League received in
exchange several benefits, including “integration into the Athenian market, Athens’
suppression of piracy, and other imperially provided, international ‘collective goods’”
(Doyle, 1986a, p. 57). Still, the fact of political dependence on Athens was ever present
m “the local proxenoi, the informal leaders of the democratic faction and the appointed
representatives of Athenian interests” (Doyle, 1986a, p. 58).
In contrast to Athenian imperial control, Sparta’s dominance over the
Peloponnesian League did not require the payment of tribute by subordinate states nor
did Sparta impose the jurisdiction of its courts over its allies affairs or regulate the
commerce of its allies—activities which characterized Athenian rule. Doyle docs note
rhucydides’ comment that Sparta made sure its allies were oligarchies which docs
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imply a certain degree of control over domestic affairs-bul Doyle downplays this
aspect of Spartan control claiming that it “had no effect on its allies’ domestic societies
other than to guarantee their preexisting oligarchic constitutions ” Moreover, he implies
that this Spartan requirement over the internal form of government of its allies was not
so unusual, for “oligarchy was the traditional form of society in early ftfth-century
Greece, particularly among the cities that were members of the Peloponnesian League”
(Doyle, 1986a, p. 59). As regards this last point, Doyle appears to be reaching here in
order to support his distinction between Athenian imperialism and Spartan hegemony,
for the fact that oligarchy was the traditional form of government of the Peloponnesian
League carries no more supportive weight than to note that democracy characterized the
form of government of the Delian League members. Still, the fact that Sparta’s allies
retained a right to participate in all decisions of the Peloponnesian League and to keep
their own military forces does indicate a significant degree of Spartan noninvolvement
when compared to Athenian control over its Delian League members.
More specific to Doyle’s distinction of Athenian imperialism from Spartan
hegemony lies not in Thucydides’ observation that the three motives of security, honor,
and self-interest drew the Athenians out from their city to expand and protect their
empire, for Sparta too possessed these same motives, though not the same opportunities.
What was particularly unique to the Athenian empire, however, was what Thucydides
described as the Athenians’ “adventurous spirit’’, which Doyle attributes to both the
democratic constitution of Athens and to the socioeconomic fact that Athenian
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impenalism benefitted the citizens of Athens.'' The Athenian state drew strength from
Its “[hjighly participatory democracy” argues Doyle. This system, he writes,
m which each [free propertied male] citizen is both statesman and soldier,
produces an ideology of action, a ferment of policies, an attitude of aggressive
problem solving—the spirit of adventure that Thucydides described as being
behind Athenian expansion. Since there is no mediation between the state and
the citizen, the state being the people assembled, what each citizen proposes or
votes for m the assembly is both for himself and for the public (Doyle, 1 986a, p
Private [free propertied male] passions, reflecting both material and ideal interests, not
only inspired Athenian imperialism but were also, in turn, shaped by the public honor
conferred on these undertakings. Consequently, Doyle concludes, the Athenian empire
was not only of and by the people, but also for the people [i.e. the free propertied male
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citizens] (Doyle, 1986a, p. 66).
Cartledge notes that: Like all ancient Greek states, the Athenian democracy did not,
and would not have wanted to, recognise the modem theoretical notion of the
‘separation of powers’ of government and public administration. In the Athenian
demokratia of the fifth century B.C., both in constitutional theory and in everyday
political praxis the demos (People) exercised the kratos (sovereign power) in all three
spheres of legislation, executive action and jurisdiction.” He attributes the institutional
basis of this civic ideology to the reforms of Ephialtes and Perikles carried out in the
late 460s and 450s B.C.E. So complete, says Cartledge, was the association of
citizenship with the taking part in the administration ofjustice in ancient Athens, e.g.
serving as a judge and juror on the annually recmited panel of 6,000 dikastai “who
staffed at need the various People’s Courts”, that “in 423 Aristophanes {Clouds 206-8)
could make one of his comic characters pretend not to recognize a map of Athens
because he could see no dikastai depicted on it” (Cartledge, et al., 1990, pp. 42-4).
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“[I]n today’s terms,” says Cartledge, “Athens would fail to constitute a relevant
‘community’. Classical Athens, in Phillips’ (1993) estimation, scored highly with
regard to common history and shared values, widespread political participation, strong
bonds of solidarity (civil society, voluntary associations, family, property rights,
mitigation rather than elimination of class stratification, sufficient separation of private
from public domains). But these admitted successes were achieved only by means, and
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In this description of the Greek state, we should note the absence made by many
observers, including Doyle, of the large number of slaves which provided the backbone
of ancient Greek society. Whereas Wood & Wood note the dispute among
contemporary historians of the actual size of the slave population and their significance
to the economy of democratic Athens (Wood & Wood, 1978, pp. 36-7), de Ste. Croix-
by combining the labor from slavery, serfdom, and debt bondage-makes a convincing
argument that such “unfree labour” “was the main way in which the dominant
propertied classes of the ancient [Graeco-Roman] world derived their surplus, whether
or not the greater share in total production was due to unfree labour” (de Ste. Croix,
1981, pp. 52, 135, 173). As such, it is still correct to say that a large part of the ancient
Greek state, the democratic polis, was comprised of non-citizens, albeit perhaps not all
non-citizens were slaves. As to the significance of slavery and other forms of unfree
labor to the ancient democratic polis, one must note M. I. Finley’s argument linking the
first articulation of the concept of personal freedom to the rise of slavery as the main
dependent labor force in classical Greece. It is only after this fact, he tells us, that
“words were then created or adopted to express that idea” (Finley, 1968/1972, p. 308).
Alternatively, the Woods suggest that the concept of personal freedom may have
“followed upon the liberation of native labour” and hence “was bom among the Greeks
out of their own experience of dependence and liberation, not simply in contrasts to the
dependence of others.” Still, the latter do admit the likelihood that “the idea of
at the severe costs, of excluding and exploiting women and slaves for the benefit of a
small minority of male citizens. No doubt, all closely knit communities almost always
breed an opposition of insiders and outsiders, but on these grounds it would be hard to
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individual freedom was invented in reference to the condition of labour.” However,
though recognizing that the democratic polls, like other states, “was created and shaped
by the relations between appropnators and producers and served as a means of dealing
with the problems generated by the social division of labour,” the Woods nonetheless go
on to argue that “it is far too simple” to view the polis as merely an instrument of the
ruling class designed to extract labor and protect the property of the ruling minority. On
the contrary, they argue, the democratic polis “was as much—if not more—a weapon
for the subject classes in their struggle against their rulers, and that it was the rulers who
had reason to resist the political principle” (Wood & Wood, 1978, pp. 39-40). de Ste.
Croix echoes this conclusion as regards the Greek democratic experience which, he
writes, gives the whole citizen population extensive and enforceable legal rights, and
so gives the humbler and poorer citizen an opportunity of protecting himself against at
any rate the more extreme forms of ill-treatment by the powerful” (de Ste. Croix, 1981,
p. 141). It is perhaps this realm of enforceable legal rights, however limited and
restricted, which earned for Athens a degree of popular legitimacy and recognition of its
vitality.
Note should be made here of the similar exclusion ofwomen from many
scholarly accounts of the social basis of the ancient Greek state and particularly
women’s exclusion from the affairs of the polis. Spelman (1988) also points out the
necessity to recognize the distinction between a “free” female—considered as such due
to the status of “citizen” conferred on her husband—whom Aristotle referred to as
set Athens up as a moral-philosophical standard, let alone as a practicable model for us
to imitate...” (Cartledge, et ah, 1998, p. 9).
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“woman” as opposed to those females whom he huled to designate as sueh due to their
slave status. This distinction is important for understanding Aristotle’s conception of
the well-ordered state, as “the distinction between male and female is important only for
citizens; for slaves it is irrelevant” (Spelman, 1988, p. 42). This distinction further
supports Spelman’s argument that “it can never be the case that the treatment of a
woman has only to do with her gender and nothing to do with her class or race. That
she IS subject only to sexism tells us a lot about her race and class identity, her being
free or slave, and so on. For her, being subject only to sexism is made possible by these
other facts about her identity” (Spelman, 1988, p. 53). Spelman also points out that
Aristotle’s exclusion of the female slave from the status of woman did not likewise
translate into any superiority of her male counterpart, as the male slave was deprived of
any authority over the female slave, for as Aristotle uses the term “male” in his Politics,
“maleness signals the superiority a man has over a woman only if the male in question
is a natural ruler. This means that one of the marks of inferiority of a male slave is that
he is not a better specimen of humanity than his wife” (Spelman, 1988, p. 43).
Given the foregoing discussion of the limited extent of exactly who constituted
“the people” in ancient Greek society, it is thus with some reticence that the
contemporary reader is asked to believe in its “adventurous spirit” which is perchance
simply the spirit of imperialism, which imbued the propertied classes of ancient Greece.
And, likewise, in our own times, imperialism does benefit those in the metropole who,
in turn, cast a blind eye to the needs of those in the periphery whose labor surplus daily
fills the coffers of the imperial treasury. Writers like Thucydides and Doyle appear to
be drawn by this apparent dynamism of the Athenian city-states, which reflects more the
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class position of both men than the objective nature of the system m quest,on.
Nevertheless, this writer will concede that indeed there was a desire for expansion on
the part of many Athenian citizens, as many of the ancient writings tell us, though 1 do
not share Doyle’s judgement on its beneficent nature and will reserve comment on its
etiology. The consequences of such exclusions of large segments of the population
from political participation, however, are devastating to a modem theory of
participatory democracy and contrary to any discussion of political obligation which
depends on factors other than brute force and enslavement. Still, there remains the fact
that mling classes of the Athenian settler-states possessed a degree of freedom which
distinguished them from their contemporaries.
On the contrary, Sparta’s domestic society resembled a military camp. Below
the two figurehead kings, real political power rested with the aristocratically-controlled
senate (gerousia) which directed the assembly of citizen-soldiers and played a role in
electing the ephors, the ruling public officials of the Spartan state. Below this were the
perioeici, the conquered peoples of the Peloponnese and foreigners who had settled in
the Peloponnese, all ofwhom lacked political rights of participation in Spartan policy.
At the base of the Spartan state lay the previous Greek inhabitants of Messenia, the
helots, who were conquered by Sparta in the seventh century B.C.E. (Doyle, 1986a, p.
69).
These distinctions in the respective domestic societies produced what, for Doyle,
is the crucial difference distinguishing Athens from Sparta and Athenian imperialism
from Spartan hegemony, namely:
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the difference in “spirit” between the two rivals. Athens was aggressiveinnovative, Sparta passive, isolationist. Athens was capable of extending her
civilization, Sparta was not (Doyle, 1986a, p. 70).^^
With reference to imperialism and hegemony in general, Doyle concludes that
impenal metropoles can be distinguished from merely large, populous, or rich countnes
by virtue of two features, first, transnational extension and, second, political unity.
Furthermore, such metropoles must have peripheries under their rule. On the contrary,
[p]ohtically unified states that possess superior quantities (relative to their neighbors)
of the conventional resources ofpower—large populations, substantial armies, wealth—
but lack the differentiated society needed as a foundation for transnational extension
can, nonetheless, establish hegemonies” (Doyle, 1986a, p. 75).^^ Doyle is unclear as to
what he means by a differentiated society”, though one presumes it to be a class-
stratified society like the Greek city-states he admires.
And, yet, for all of Doyle’s praise of Athenian “spirit,” it was Athens which suffered
final defeat to Sparta in 405-4 B.C.E. thus ending the Peloponnesian War (cf Sagan
1991, p. 126).
’
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Doyle makes no explicit definition ofwhat he means by a “differentiated society”,
but in other references in this work, he refers to “socioeconomic differentiation” as a
basic element of empire (Doyle, 1986a, p. 344), speaks of the “conquering tribe” which
“becomes socially differentiated and centrally directed in order to retain empire”
(Doyle, 1986a, p. 106), and says that “[tjribal societies were both highly
undifferentiated and thoroughly integrated. They lacked a centralized state—the
political life of the society was not differentiated from its social life, nor was it
organized in a central coercive institution...” (Doyle, 1986a, p. 132), and perhaps the
most explanatory definition he provides is when he speaks about the primary weakness
of the tribal societies of the west, which, he claims, did not lack internal unity, “[rjather,
their primary weakness was a lack of social differentiation and thus their small scale.
Social roles were mixed together, familial ties shaped commerce and religion, and
political leaders were, indistinguishably, both public and private figures” (Doyle, 1986a,
p. 89).
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More pointedly, as regards the Greek experiment in democratic imperialism, one
should note its relatively short duration. From the rise of Athenian power between 480
and 475 B.C.E., as Persia was defeated m Europe and the Delian League was
established in 477, to the imposition of Athenian hegemony in 457 with the
incorporation of Boetia, Locris and Phocis into the Athenian alliance system and the
uniform introduction of Athenian coins, weights and measures on top of the previously
established tnbute payments which continued to be exacted, to the full implantation of
its empire between 448-445 B.C.E. following the Peace of Kallias which decisively
thrust Persia “out of the Hellenic states-system” (Wight, 1977, p. 88), to the empire’s
expansion to include up to 400 cities by 425, ending in the eventual collapse of
Athenian power in 404 B.C.E. after the Spartan defeat of the Athenian fleet the year
before at the battle of Aegospotami which ended the Peloponnesian War, only a mere 76
years had passed, and of those, stability characterized the export of Athenian democracy
for, at most, only 41 years. But even here, as Doyle notes, “[r]ebellions and defections
were frequent Naxos, Samos, and Mitylene are only the major revolts discussed by
Thucydides”—to which we must add “the horrifying repression of Melos” (Doyle,
1986a, p. 58) and, not to forget, the two temporary oligarchies which took over Athens
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Itself in 411 and 404.
With the Spartan defeat of Athens in 405/404 B.C.E. and, hence, the collapse of the
latter’s empire, it should be noted that for the next 81 years, as Sagan notes, Athens
enjoyed amazing stability for, he states: “No class or social brutality, from either
oligarchs or lower-class economic radicals, broke the civil peace.” Calling this period
from 403-322 B.C.E. “The Golden Age of the Radical Democracy,” Sagan argues:
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As to the causes of Athenian instability which led to an increase in defection and
violence and ended with the dissolution of the empire, it is interesting to note that Doyle
attributes these developments to “the near-equality” in material culture of Athens and its
allied subordinates. This “near-equality” in material culture, Doyle argues, led to a
perception of social and economic equality among the Greek islanders of the Aegean
and the Greek settlers of Ionia, Sicily, and Thessaly to the effect that a feeling persisted
that
Athenian rule reflected no natural (or technical) superiority but was a control
exercised by those who “should” have been equal (Doyle, 1986a, p. 58).
That this feeling of alienation between the Athenians and their subject populations may
have stimulated the subsequent turmoil is not to be downplayed; indeed, one should not
forget the actual policies which produced such estrangement, such as the heavy toll of
Athenian taxes which engendered resentment so strong that, as Doyle notes, it often
ended in the slaughter of the Athenian settler-garrisons.
Doyle’s conclusion on Athenian instability is similar to that of Plato who in The
Laws criticized the “excessive democracy” of Athens. This excess, Plato tells us, first
began with the mixing of different styles ofmusic which then led to the claim that there
were no standards of right and wrong. As a consequence, argues Plato, the judgement
ofwhat constituted good and bad music was left up to the subjective taste of “the
ordinary man” who had “the arrogance to set himself up as a capable judge.” And
music, Plato argues, only
It was a remarkably vibrant democratic era. It was also the greatest age
of philosophy ever, giving us Plato and Aristotle, and, therefore, the
basis of 2,500 years of Western thought (Sagan, 1991, p. 11).
48
engendered effrontery (Plato, 427-347 B.C.E./1970/1988, Bk. Ill, secs!
was an authority
i licence was not
and assurance
II . 700-1,
To the degree that a general feeling of equality~or
“near-equality” in “the material
culture” as Doyle puts it—develops in societies, a state is thus faced with the choice of
either attempting to arrest this development or, to the best extent possible, make the
reality conform to the ideal. The Athenians chose the former course of action-and
In contrast to Doyle, Wight, and Bull, Gramsci’s conception of hegemony
which will be utilized in the present study because of its explanatory utility, in that it is
the only approach to hegemony which is based in a solidly class analytical framework—
is not limited either to (1) state-to-state behavior or (2) to control over a state’s external
behavior. On the contrary, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is rooted in the formation
of the state itself and, hence, is a necessary strategm of any ruling group. In his “Notes
on Italian History” (1929-35), Gramsci distinguishes between ruling classes and
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subaltern groups. Ruling classes, he argues, maintain their historical unity not simply
on juridical or political bases though these are important—but, more fundamentally, it
“results from the organic relations between [1] State or political society and [2] ‘civil
society {PN,p. 52). As regards this latter distinction, Gramsci at one point provides a
formula for the state as “political society + civil society, in other words hegemony
lost.
49
protected by the armour of coercion” (PN, p. 263). But elsewhere he deliberately
distinguishes between the two concepts of state and civil society, reserving for the state
a role as representing “the coercive and punitive force ofjuridical regulation of a
country” (PN, p. 267). In this sense, the state is an ‘“educator”', “an instrument of
rationalisation (PN, p. 247), with “organisational and connective” functions (PN, p.
1 2) to conform civil society to the economic structure. The state, therefore
IS the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling
c ass not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the
active consent of those over whom it rules {PN, p. 244).
Civil society, on the other hand, “is the ensemble of organisms commonly called
private
,
it is the ethical content of the state based in moral relations resulting from the
cultural hegemony “which the dominant group exercises throughout society” (PN, p.
12). It is within civil society that subaltern groups reside.
And, subaltern classes, if they are to become the ruling classes—i.e. to form a
state of their own—must subordinate or eliminate the established ruling classes while
simultaneously winning the active or passive assent of other subaltern groups or allies.
This process is thus one of a transformation from subaltern to hegemonic/dominant
groups and involves the two phases of, first, establishing autonomy in relation to the
enemies which are to be defeated and, secondly, receiving active or passive support
from other subaltern groups. This struggle is played out in the field of civil society but
eventually involves direct conflict with the state itself and its vast repository ofjuridical
40
See Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks [referred to throughout as PN] (1929-
35/1971/1987). Due to the prison censors, Gramsci would sometimes use the word
50
oercive instraments. In the case of the nascent Italian bourgeoisie in the era of the
mediteval communes, Gramsci notes the Italian bourgeoisie’s failure “of uniting the
people around itself (PN, 53). Likewise, the bourgeois.e’s failure to solicit widespread
support m the national Risorgimento in Italy both delayed and moderated the outcome
of the subsequent revolution.
The key to Gramsci’s analyses and the methodological criterion on which he
bases much of his own study is his understanding
that the supremacy of a social group manifest(s) itself in two ways, as
domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership”. A social group
dominates antagonistic groups which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate
perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups {PN, p. 57).
It IS with regard to this second aspect of “leading” kindred and allied groups with
intellectual and moral leadership’” that Gramsci’s use of the term hegemony is to be
understood. His focus rests, in large measure, on the question of political obligation
which concerns Macpherson above. Gramsci’s debt to Lenin for this understanding of
“leadership” is duly noted (cf PN, pp. 357, 365, 380), yet I would argue, with Augelli
and Murphy (1988), that Lenin’s focus was restricted more to the task at hand, viz.
“dominance in a revolutionary alliance” (p. 1 1 8). The context of Lenin’s argument
about leadership was a polemic written against the Menshiviks who, he argued, would
abandon the peasantry and leave the task of the bourgeois revolution solely to the
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bourgeoisie itself Such tactics, Lenin argued, would result in the working-class party
‘group’ in place of the marxist term ‘class’. I shall utilize Gramsci’s terms as faithfully
as possible and leave it up to the reader’s insight to determine the difference.
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The bourgeois revolution against feudalism, i.e. against the power of landlords and
the state bureaucracy of the feudal state, is a revolution which replaces feudal
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finding
.(self
-dissolved’ in bourgeois democracy in the sense that the proletariat will
not succeed in placing its imprint on the revolution” (Lenin, 19(15/1972, p. 58) " More
pointedly, Lenin stressed the arming of the proletariat to accomplish this revolutionary
task, for, he noted: “In the Hnal analysis force alone settles the great problems of
political liberty and the class struggle” (Lenin, 1 905/ 1 972, p. 30). As such, Lenin
“continued to assume that the consolidation of power was ultimately a matter of armed
force which places his concept of hegemony in “a very restricted historical phase,
during a revolution” (Augclli & Murphy, 1988, p. 1 1 8). The significance ofGramsci’s
contribution, however, lies in his understanding that the necessity for leadership does
not end with the taking of state power. He writes:
monarchical and landed estate rule with the rule of the capitalist class, the bourgeoisie,
in which commodity production is the predominant mode of production and where
wage-labor replaces serfdom and the corvee or the system of labor rent. Recognizing
Itself as a social class, the bourgeoisie fights for freedom of trade and competition,
security of property and fruit of enterprise, free play in energies, markets, profit. As
Otto Rtihle stated: It is the historical task of the bourgeois revolution to overcome the
absolutism of the feudal era and to procure for capitalism, as the new economic system,
legal recognition and social acceptance in the framework of the bourgeois-liberal state
'
order— The success alone of the revolution, which consists in the creation of the
capitalist economic order
and the social order appropriate to it, determines its nature as a bourgeois revolution”
(Ruble, 1924/1970/1974).
“The big bourgeoisie, the landowners, and the factory owners, ...” Lenin argued, “...
owing to their class position they are incapable of waging a decisive struggle against
tsarism; they are too heavily fettered by private property, by capital and land to enter
into a decisive struggle. They stand in too great need of tsarism, with its bureaucratic,
police, and military forces for use against the proletariat and the peasantry, to want it to
be destroyed. No, the only force capable of gaining ‘a decisive victory over tsarism’, is
\he people, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, if we take the main, big forces, and
distribute the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie (also part of ‘the people’) between the
two. ‘The revolution’s decisive victory over tsarism’ means the establishment of the
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship ofthe proletariat and the peasantry'" (Lenin,
1905/1972, p. 56).
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A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise “leadership” beforeinning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal ronditions for
xerd™'?” W- i<
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As Gramsci points out in his “Study of Philosophy” (PAT), this concept of
hegemony represents a great philosophical advance as well as a politico-practical one,
for “it necessarily supposes an intellectual unity and an ethic in conformity with a
conception of reality that has gone beyond common sense and has become, if only
within narrow limits, a critical conception” (PAf, pp. 333-4). Intellectual unity and
political ethics are thus the two poles around which hegemony is to be constnicted and
expanded.
Such intellectual unity of a particular social class is the specific task of
intellectuals who perform an essential mediating function in the struggle between the
various subaltern groups and the ruling classes. Gramsci is not saying here that some
humans are not intellectuals, rather he is referring to those who perform this immediate
social function and hence form a professional category in that their task is that of
intellectual elaboration. Intellectuals are thus “organizers and leaders”, “‘specialised’ in
conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas” who are able to distinguish
concretely “the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus” (FN, p. 334). For
Gramsci, every social group which has an essential function in economic production
creates organically one or more strata of intellectuals attached to it. And though he
recognizes that certain traditional ’ professional intellectuals tend to portray themselves
as above class interests and thus as having an inter-class aura about them, it is the
organic intellectuals who truly unite a social group by giving it “an awareness of its
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own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” {PN,
PP. 3-5). Wnting in the 1930s, he argues that in the context of the existing state, “the
intellectuals are the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of
social hegemony and political government.” Their task involves the generation of a
spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general
direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” and the use of the
coercive power of the state “which ‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do
not ‘consent’ either actively or passively” (PN, p. 12). This equation of “force and
consent,” the “‘double perspective’ in political action and state life....corresponding to
the double nature of the Machiavellian Centaur”-the two essential elements in the
maintenance of state power—are taken by Gramsci from Machiavelli who instructed the
Prince to use both law and force, for though the former was natural for the control of
men, it often proved inadequate, and hence the latter, which was necessary for beasts,
should likewise be at the Prince’s disposal (Gramsci, 1926-37/1957/1983, p. Ibl)."*^
A would-be ruling class must develop beyond an economic-corporate state
through an ethical-political hegemony in civil society before it can achieve domination
of the state. In this regard, a social group must first consolidate itself around its own
immediate and narrowly selfish “corporate” interests before it can move on. Thus in
addition to championing the ideas and aspirations of the particular social group and
would-be ruling class,
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States Machiavelli: “The parable of this semi-animal, semi-human teacher is meant
to indicate that a prince must know how to use both natures, and that the one without
the other is not durable” (Machiavelli, 1532/1935/1952, Ch. 18, p. 92).
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hegemony also presupposes account be taken of the interests and the tendencies
make^acn ficL of a
formed-,n other words, that the leading group shouldK sa tices n economic-corporate kind (PN, p. 161).
Thus, as with the Jacobins in the French Revolution, the fundamental group must
represent “the revolutionary movement as a whole, as an integral historical
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development.” This leading group must represent “future needs as well, and, once
again, not only the needs of those particular physical individuals, but also of all the
national groups which had to be assimilated to the existing fundamental group” (PN, p
78). Sacrifices and compromises, however, have their limits which must be strictly
observed, “for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must
necessanly be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the
decisive nucleus of economic activity” (PN, p. 161).
But while protecting its fundamental economic basis, it is the duty of the ruling
class [that social group which has achieved domination of the state apparatus] to push
for Its own expansion, i.e. an ever more extensive ruling class. In the case of the
Moderate Party in Italy after 1848, Gramsci notes that their policy of “transformism”
involved the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which
varied in their effectiveness, of the active elements produced by allied groups—
and even of those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed
irreconcilably hostile. In this sense political leadership became merely an aspect
of the function of domination—decapitation, and annihilation often for a very
long time (PN, pp. 58-9).
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The Jacobins (named for the monastery in which these political activists met;
Jacobins was the Parisian name for the Roman Catholic Order of Preachers, otherwise
known as the Dominicans after its founder Dominic Guzman, aka; St. Dominic) were a
radical political club, comprised mostly of bourgeois elements, which heavily
influenced the French Revolution of 1789.
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Gramsci attnbutes this policy of the Moderates to the making of the Risorgimento (i.e.
the 1 9th century movement for Italian political unity) possible in the form in which it
curred, as revolution without a revolution’, or as ‘passive revolution’” {PN, p. 59).
Furthermore, this policy indicates how ineffective leadership is based on force alone.
The term “passive revolution” was taken by Gramsci from the early nineteenth-centuiy
conservative thinker Vincenzo Cuoco who argued that revolution “must at all costs be
avoided, since it was a destroyer of the ‘traditions’ on which civilisation is based.” The
central aspect of passive revolution was therefore the implementation of “reforms in
order to prevent revolution on the French model” (see footnote #1 1 in PN, p. 59).
In the case of the Italian Risorgimento, the north Italian state of Piedmont led
by a monarch—played the function of a ruling class. The fact that leadership was left
up to a state and not a social group, Gramsci writes, was because the nuclei of several
groups in favor of the new liberal order, who were heavily nationalistic, merely wanted
their interests to dominate but not their persons; more importantly, none of them took it
upon themselves to in fact lead. This fact is significant, noted Gramsci, for it was not a
unified social group which led other groups, but rather a state which “‘led’ the group
which should have been leading”—i.e. the Moderate Party—“and was able to put at the
latter’s disposal an army and a politico-diplomatic strength” {PN, p. 105). In effect,
passive revolution in Italy from 1860 to 1900 involved first the incorporation of
individual political figures from democratic opposition parties into the conservative-
moderate ‘political class’, which was against any intervention of the masses in state life.
After 1 900, whole groups of leftists passed over into the moderate camp. What is key
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for the present study, however. ,s the faet that a state led a struggle for renewal. As
Gramsci notes.
W thou tha O^ which these groups have the funetion ofdom.nation”wi ho t t of leadership
: dictatorship without hegemony. The hegemony
wi be exercised by a par, of the social group over the entire group, ai”ythe latter over other forces in order to give power to the movemenh radicahse itetc. on the Jacobin” model {PN, p. 106). ’
The liberals of nineteenth century Italy are thus embryonic of the psychological
disposition of most NED-supported pro-capitalists today, in that most would be
reluctant to act—as many failed to act during the Cold War—were it not for the
monetary, military and political backing of a strong state which can bring power and
resources to bear against any would-be opponents.
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In the present case of examining the export of U.S. democracy abroad, reformist
duals and groups within targeted countries, contemporaneously referred to as
"comprador elites” amongst many marxist and dependency theorists or, m tlte decade of
the 1 990s with the U.S. leading a worldw.dc movenent for cap.tahst democracy, as
“democrats”, play the role of the Italian Moderate Party in that they seek the imposition
of liberal democracy in their own countries."'^ The role ofleadership or hegemony.
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In an August 9, 1999 radio interview with Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov
concemmg Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s replacement (the fifth prime minister
c ange m 18 months) of Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin with Vladimir Putin, the
Russian Communist Party leader derisively stated;
As for [newly-appointed Prime Minister Vladimir] Putin, there is no
real difference between Putin and Stepashin. Both are from Leningrad;
both are from the same democratic gang, both unreservedly support
Yeltsin and his policy; both are from power-wielding ministries; neither
has any experience of the economy; neither has any party or movement
base, or any solid support anywhere. Both are forced to serve a man who
is not in control of himself (Buntman, August 9, 1999)(italics are mine).
In Bulgaria, the main recipient ofNED aid is the anti-communist political coalition
which calls itself the United Democratic Forces whose members are referred to
colloquially as “democrats” (see “Hoods Against Democrats” by Robert D. Kaplan in
the December 1998 Atlantic Monthly). Or see “The Case Of Yugoslavia: Why The
Democrats Failed ’ by Miljenko Dereta in Uncaptive Minds (Summer-Fall 1997, vol. 9,
nos. 3-4) published by the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE), an NED
recipient. One of the most virulent denouncements of western-sponsored “democracts”
can be seen in Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s speech to the nation on
October 2, 2000, in which he asserted:
A grouping has for a long time now been present in our midst which,
under the guise of opposition political parties of democratic orientation,
represents the interests of governments which are the protagonists of
pressures against Yugoslavia, and especially against Serbia. That
grouping appeared in these elections under the name Democratic
Opposition of Serbia. Its true head is not its presidential candidate. Its
head for many years has been the president of the Democratic Party and
collaborator of the military alliance which waged a war against our
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1-owover, is reserved for Ihe U.S. whielv ihrm.gh organizaiions l.ke .he NkD w,ll
prov.de the direction, the means, and provide the watchdog or enforcement ftmctio.i to
see that such transitions occur as planned, are stabilized, and arc not temporary
phenomena. Consec|ucntly, democracy promotion as a practice becomes, in effect, the
ethical-political basis t.pon which Ihe extension of U.S. hegemony is this era of
globalization rests.
country. He could not even conceal his collaboration with that alliance.
In fact, our entire public knows of his appeal to NATO to bomb Serbia
for as many weeks as necessary to break its resistance. The grouping
organized in this manner for these elections therefore represents the
armies and governments which recently waged war against
Yugoslavia.
... At this moment ahead of the run-off elections, because
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia doubts it can achieve the result it
needs, leaders of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia with money
introduced into the country are bribing, blackmailing and harassing
citizens and organizing strikes, unrest and violence in order to stop
production, all work and every activity (Federal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Yugoslav Daily Survey, October 2, 2000 Belgrade
<http://tanjug.co.yu/Arhiva/2000/Oct%20-%2000/03-10e04.html >).
This was followed by another strident speech denouncing Yugoslavia’s pro-democratic
leaders as “traitors” following ex-President Milosevic’s reclcction as head of the
Yugoslavian Socialist Party on November 25, 2000 in which he “described those who
sought his removal as ‘paid Western spies’ who are aiding the ‘occupation’ of the
country (“Defiant Milosevic Re-Elected Party Leader”, Associated Press & Reuters,
November 25, 2000, CNN.com <http://europc.cnn.eom/2000/WORLD/europc/l 1/25/
yugoslavia.miloscvic.02/index.html>).
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In a 1994 report, the GAO noted that “there is no central U.S. pohcy regarding
U.S. govemnientwide democracy program, no overall statement of U.S. policy
regarding U.S. objectives and strategy for democratic development, no specihc and
common definition ofwhat constitutes a democracy program, and no specificity
regarding the roles of the foreign affairs and defense agencies in promoting democratic
processes” (GAO/NSIAD-94-83. 1994, p. 1). However, in that same report, the
following policies, programs, and area-specific activities instituted by different U.S.
foreign policy agencies to promote democracy abroad were detailed and indicated that
the USIA, AID, DOD, and the State Department each had implemented such programs
and were in the process of shifting resources and organizational support towards these
efforts.
U.S. public diplomacy programs funded through the U.S. Information Agency
(USIA) consists of foreign information programs, international broadcasting, and
publicly funded educational and cultural exchanges including the Fulbright Exchange
Program, the Edmund S. Muskie Program, the Mike Mansfield Program, Voice of
America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio and TV Marti, Worldnet TV, the
East-West Center, the North/South Center, and the National Endowment for Democracy
(GAO/NSIAD-96-179, 1996, pp. 14-19). Estimated expenditures on USIA democracy-
promotion activities between 1991 and 1993 amount to $936 million.
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“Democratic development” constitutes, since 1993, one of the four mam areas
where the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) now concentrates its
programs, with direct support of activities ranging from “the conduct of elections to the
administration ofjustice, enhanced participation of beneficiaries m development
programs, and the management of municipal govermnent ” Between 1991 and 1993,
AID spend $703 million to promote “democratic development” abroad (GAO/NSIAD-
94-83, 1993, pp. 11-13).
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) established its Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping in July of 1993 with the purpose
“to develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy and plans for matters
related to the promotion of democracy and democratic values.” As of 1994, the DOD’s
Office of Democracy identified the following programs and activities as having
“democratic development elements”: Military-to-Military Initiatives in Africa,
including the African Regional Military Assistance Program and the African
Democracy Support Program; CINC and Nunn-Lugar initiatives, including
humanitarian/civic assistance; Expanded International Military Education and Training
Programs, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies at Garmisch, Germany;
Military-to-Military/joint contact teams; and Professional military education exchanges.
Between 1991 and 1993, the DOD spent $166 million on its activities of “promoting
democracy and democratic values” (GAO/NSIAD-94-83, 1994, pp. 14-19).
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The U.S. Department of State’s democracy promotion activities include
‘•conducting diplomatic initiatives and exercising statuatory authonty for program
direction or for assisting in administering programs funded by other agencies. Its
initiatives also include contributions to The Asia Foundation.” In 1 996, the State
Department redesignated its Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs as the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and charged the new bureau with
coordination of U.S. government policy and programs for democracy promotion abroad.
Slate Department officials estimated that between 1991 and 1993, State spent $431
million on “democracy promotion ” abroad. State officials point out that these figures
do not include the U.S. contribution to the United Nations or for its peacekeeping
activities. State officials also indicate that its expenditures on international narcotics
matters and on anti-terronsm activities “could arguably be attributed to democracy
promotion” (GAO/NSIAD-94-83, 1994, pp. 19-21).
Specific legislation authorizing U.S. assistance for democratic development is
contained in the following legislative Acts:
• United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended;
• Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended;
• Foreign Assistance Act of 1 96 1 , as amended;
• National Endowment for Democracy Act ( 1 983);
• The Asia Foundation Act (1983);
• International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1 985;
• Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1 989;
• Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1 990;
• National and Community Service Act of 1 990; and
FREEDOM Support Act (1992).
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Why such a practice of promoting capitalist democracy abroad should come
about under present historical conditions and exh.bit a certain degree of success requires
an examination of the historical development of the modem states-system as it has
evolved from its genesis in the development of the nation state to the currently
unfolding global capitalist system complete with supporting practices and institutions,
which likewise have generated their own antisystemic tensions.
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II. FROM WESTPHALIA TO GLOBALIZATION
Globalizat.on and the cun-ent backlash against its corporate-dominated form is
the context in which the U.S. attempts to export its brand ofdemocracy abroad in the
1990s and into the twenty-hrst century.'^ It is true that the NED predates the current
focus on globalization and, indeed, the end of the Cold War was a necessary condition
for the forces of globalizing the rule of capital to ensue. But the political program of the
NED and the economic goals of capitalist globalization are closely intertwined.
Operating under the catchword of “liberalization”, the forces of organized capital seek
to dismantle national controls to trade so as to allow for the free and unhindered
movement of capital. While uniting peoples from all over the world in one giant
marketplace for the relatively easy extraction of profits and movement of goods, this
capitalist-oriented globalization is simultaneously causing growing disparities in
income, wealth, and living conditions which have created firestorms of protests against
those implementing it. From the staggering leap in U.S. foreign direct investment to
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Burbach, Nunez, and Kagarlitsky see globalization, not as part of the extension of
U.S. hegemony—which they assert is in decline, but rather as “the integration of the
global economy under capitalist hegemony.” Occurring simultaneously with the
accelerated pace of technological advancement, the end result, they assert, is both an
increasing concentration ofmoney and capital in the hands of the rich and powerful”
which “is leading to misery and marginalization for ever-increasing numbers of the
world’s population.” To survive, they assert, capital must move globally, but in so
doing, it is leading to global disorder and instability (Burbach, et al., 1997, pp. 53-4).
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Protests against the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, and the G8 Summits have been
occurring around the world for the last several years. “Street parties” against
globalization, for example, were celebrated in 35 cities across the globe during the G8
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over two tnllion dollars at market value ,n 1998 from over $51 /. b.Ilion ,n 1966
(Scholl, July 1999, p. 40; “U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad...,” March 12,
1999), to the spread of eleetron.c and fiber-optic technology and satell.te transmiss.on
systems and the proliferat.on of increasingly inexpensive personal computers linking up
into a web of global communication networks, to the expansion of world exports of
merchandise and commercial services to nearly seven trillion dollars by 1997 (“World
trade growth accelerated in 1997...,” March 19, 1998), globalization^r the tying
together of the national economies of the world-is causing many to wonder if the days
Summit in Bimingham from May 15-17 of 1998. Some of these protests witnessedO symbols being burned in Hyderbad, thousands of landless and homeless people
marching against the WTO in Brasilia, and similar actions in Sydney, Toronto, Prague
and elsewhere. Recent actions against globalization include protests against the WTO
at Its meeting in Geneva on November 17, 1999; protests of over 40,000 at the WTO’s
Third Mmistenal meeting in Seattle—the so-called “Battle in Seattle”—from November
30 through December 3, 1999 with similar protests dunng this same time period around
the world m Holland, Canada, Columbia, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and elsewhere;
protests of over 30,000 in Washington, DC from April 15-17, 2000; protests on May 31,2000 of IMF austerity programs by 80,000 people in Buenos Aires; protests of 50,000
persons in Millau, France against globalization and in support of Jose Bove and his ten
collaborators on tnal for the tearing down of a McDonald’s restaurant in the town, as
the U.S.-based restaurant was said to symbolize the American dominance of and main
force behind globalization; and protests of over 25,000 persons at the July 21-23, 2000
G8 Summit in the K>aishu-Okinawa region of Japan which included not only anti-WTO
slogans but as well calls for the removal of U.S. military bases from Okinawa. Newer
targets for anti-IMF, anti-WTO, anti-World Bank, and anti-G8 protests include the U.S.
Republican National Convention in Philadelphia from July 31 to August 3, 2000 where
over 430 protesters were jailed; the U.S. Democratic National Convention in Los
Angeles from August 14-17, 2000; the September 6-8 United Nations Millenium
Summit in New York city; and the September 26-30, 2000 55‘” annual conference of the
IMF and World Bank in Prague. In addition, many web sites have sprung up on the
internet in opposition to this capitalist-oriented globalization including, amongst others,
<http://www.al6.org/>, <http://www.globalexchange.org/wbimf/links.html>,
<http://www.50years.org/>, and <http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/main.html>.
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of the nation-state are numbered.-' TIu.s, global.zat.on, in contrast to tradit.onal
international rclat.ons ,IR) theory, inconrorates the pohtical. economic, social, and other
international domains in a system which violates the traditional demarcahon between
internal and external units, where those units arc understood to be independent
sovereign states. Indeed, where theory assumes a priori this basic intemal/extemal
demarcation (cf. Waltz 1979), then whatever can be said of the international system
usually excludes national or internal forces and developments and the impact of these
internal forces on the system itself. Once the state is taken as the basic unit of the
international system, then a condition of anarchy^where “the units are functionally
similar and tend to remain so” (Waltz, 1 979, p. 1 04)-is postulated as the characteristic
nature of the international environment. “Self-help” and “balance-of-power”, taking
into account the differences m capabilities amongst states, become the defining actions
of the international system. With this basic, so-called “Realisf’, understanding, it
becomes characteristic to assert that the “enduring anarchic character of international
politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the
millenia” (Waltz, 1986, p. 53) or to suggest that “the nature of international relations
has not changed fundamentally over the millennia” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 21 1) or to claim
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Direct investment
,
states Dicken, “is defined as the investment by one firm in
another with the intention of gaining a degree of control of that firm’s operations.
‘International’ or ‘foreign’ direct investment is simply direct investment which occurs
across national boundaries, that is, where a firm from one country buys a controlling
investment in a firm in another country or where a firm from one country sets up a
branch or subsidiary company in another country” ( 1 992, p. 87). Foreign Direct
Investment is channeled primarily through transnational corporations; in fact, he argues,
the TNC is the single most important force creating global shifts in economic activity”
(Dicken, 1992, p. 47).
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that
“[i]ntemational politics is the realm of recurrence ami repetition” (Wight, 1966a, p.
26).
But the existence and effects of globalization continue to transform the
international system at the dawn of the twenty-first century and thus call into question
long-held beliefs in IR theoiy which either deny such a transfonnation of the states-
system (cf. Waltz, 1979, p. 95) or fail to account adequately for change within the
system. The persistence of the realist perspective of international relations is
understandable given that international theoiy as taught in the United States and
Western Europe for most of the last century located its origins in the European states-
system which arose out of the 1 648 Peace of Westphalia following the Thirty Years
49
ar. An alternative view marks the origin of the states-system with the 1454 Peace of
Lodi and the Most Holy League of Venice which “founded the Italian Concert and the
first system of collective security” (Wight, 1977, p. 1 1 1). However, as Martin Wight
notes. It was the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which denotes “the legal basis of the states-
system (Wight, 1977, p. 1 13). The states of this new political system were qualified by
the establishment of standing armies, the use of conscription, the professionalization of
diplomacy with the establishment of foreign offices and the systematic arrangement of
means to finance war. “In retrospect,” states Wight
Westphalia was believed to mark the transition from religious to secular
politics, from ‘Christendom’ to ‘Europe’, the exclusion from
49
Wight states that “international theory may be supposed to be a tradition of
speculation about the society of states, or the family of nations, or the international
community. Noting that “speculation of this kind was formerly comprehended under
International Law,” Wight writes of the paucity of international theory and pejoratively
asks: “What international theory, then, was there before 1914?” (Wight, 1966a, p. 18).
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mtemational politics of the Holy See, the effective end of the llolvRoman Empire by the virtual recognition of the sovereignty of its
Neth^T^’n T United Provinees [of theherlands) and the Swiss Confederation to the family of independent
I977"p in}
of"'" ‘"""nee of power (Wight
The existence of “a multitude of sovereign states," writes Wight, marks the
minimum condition ofastates-system” (Wight, 1977, p. 129). This condition, he
asserts, is satisfied by the 1414-18 Council of Constance, which is why Wight chooses
this 1 4 1 4- 1 8 date as the origin of the states-system rather than the conventional 1 648
Peace of Westphalia. “At Westphalia,” he writes, “the states-system does not come into
existence: it comes of age” (Wight, 1977, p. 152). Specifically, as Wight notes, the
“modem secular sovereign states-system arose from the ruins of the medieval
international papal monarchy,” which itself was the bridge between the Roman empire
and modernity. Indeed, the prior framework out ofwhich the present states-system
arose was not “international” in nature, argues Wight, but rather “ecumenical,” for the
Church provided the anchor around which the Middle Ages, its peoples and their
relations pivoted. The event which demarcates the alienation of several nations from
the previous unity which Christendom provided “is clearly marked by the Council of
Constance” [1414-18] whose “chief aim.. .was to heal the Great Schism” which “had
divided Latin Christendom into two—and later three—obediences under rival popes”
(Wight, 1977, pp. 131). With the dismantling of the universal government of the
papacy, national churches arose (later to be replaced by kings) which henceforth
conducted their relations with each other and the papacy on an equal basis through the
diplomatic instrument of the concordat (Wight, 1977, p. 28). From its birth at
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Constance, the sta.es-system developed, firstly, with the adoption of the principle of
CUJUS regie ejus reUg.o in the 1555 Treaty of Augsburg whereby each man was to
adhere to the rel.gion of his prince.™ This principle not only promoted the idea of
difference among the several principalities in Germany but, more importantly, stirred
opposition to the dictates of the Church and the Holy Roman Empire throughout
Europe. Construction of the states system was further consolidated at the Treaty of
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As part of the Protestant Reformation, the German princes’ claim to dictate a religionto their subjects came to be known as they,« reformandi, and gave rise to the maxingCUJUS regw ejus religw. where the idea was that the one who had the power had the
’
nght to say which was the right religion, which at the time was a choice between
Catholicism or Lutheranism {New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967, V. I, p. 1040). With
the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, this maxim received a more formal kind of imperial
sanction with the establishment of the principle of cujus regio illius et religio: “the
lord of the land shall be also lord of religion. And accordingly territorial limits became
religious limits within which the inhabitant had to profess and practise the faith imposed
on him by the ruler” {New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967, V. XIV, pp. 886-888- New
Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, 1 9 1 3/1996,
<http://www.knight.org/advent/cathen/07256b.htm>.
The 1555 Peace of Augsburg was concluded between Holy Roman Emperor
Charles V (1500-1558) and the princes of the Lutheran southern German principalities,
which, emboldened by the Protestant Reformation initiated by Martin Luther, sought
autonomy for their states. The 1552 Peace of Passau allowed the Lutheran states the
exercise of their religion, and this was reaffirmed in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg {New
Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967, V. I, p. 1040). However, and as indication that this was
not to be the final battle on the matter, Schiller noted:
Whatever may be said of the equality which the peace of Augsburg was
to have established between the two German churches, the Roman
Catholic had unquestionably still the advantage. All that the Lutheran
Church gained by it was toleration; all that the Romish Church conceded
was a sacrifice to necessity, not an offering to justice. Very far was it
from being a peace between two equal powers, but a truce between a
sovereign and unconquered rebels (Schiller, 1901, p. 17).
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Westphalia in 1648 ending the Thirty Years' War/' Besides effectively excluding the
papacy from future treaty-making, the Westphalian treaty also marked the beginning of
an international society in that the practice of resident diplomacy appeared, rules ofwar
were developed, along with rules of trade and commerce, ideas of a balance of power,
and the idea of multilateral negotiations." Yet it was not until the Congress of Utrecht
in 1712-13 that the present states-system gets fully articulated, having the following
charactenstics: “first, sovereign states; second, their mutual recognition; third, their
accepted hierarchy; fourth, their means of regular communication; fifth, their
This religious war was fought between Protestant German princes against the
Catholic sovereigns of the Austrian Habsburg empire. Begun in 1618, the war officially
ended on October 24, 1648 with the signing in Munster of the Peace of Westphalia The
1648 Peace of Westphalia enlarged upon the 1555 Peace of Augsburg by allowing
Calvinist states, in addition to Lutheran and Catholic states, to practice their own
religion. As such, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Holy Roman emperor’s wish to
restore the hegemony of Catholicism thoughout the empire. Indeed, the empire itself
fragmented into a number of virtually independent states.
Noting the description given the Peace of Westphalia as “marking an epoch in
European history,” a disagreeable Wedgwood writes that the Peace “is supposed to
divide the period of religious wars from that of national wars, the ideological wars from
the wars of mere aggression.” This “demarcation,” she asserts, “is as artificial as such
arbitrary divisions commonly are. Aggession, dynastic ambition, and fanaticism are all
alike present in the hazy background behind the actual reality of the war, and the last of
the wars of religion merged insensibly into the pseudo-national wars of the future.”
And though she notes that [t]he war hastened the development by leaving the princes
as the only power to whom the disorganized people could turn,” Wedgwood is unable to
link this shattering of dynastic empire and the feudal system it rested upon with a
growing diversity in freedom of speech and thought reflecting the growing diversity of
private capital in competition, along with the growing dominance of the new capitalist
mode of production (Wedgwood, 1938/1969, pp. 501, 505).
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framework of law; [and] sixth, their means of defending their eomnton interests”
(Wight, 1977, p. 129)”
Taking issue with Wight, Rosenberg (1994) argues that Wight’s periodization of
the origin of the stales-system tn 1414 “is constraeted not as a htstorieal explanation of
how the modem system arose but as a bare dating of when one of its descriptive
attributes appears” (p. 44). Moreover, rather than an internal transformation, Rosenberg
argues that the division of feudal Europe into discrete political entities is an external
fact. Wight’s theory, he argues, is “firmly locked inside the familiar realist straitjacket”
such that It “sees only what appears to be the timeless mechanics of an anarchical states-
system” (p. 44). Alternatively, writes Rosenberg, ifwe view the international system
not as a separate, autonomous realm, and thus dispense with realist assumptions, then
we must look precisely to the type of societies involved in this transformation, to their
“core institutions and practices comprised in their material and political reproduction”
(p. 45). Instead of taking a condition of anarchy as our starting point, we must instead
look at “what is distinctive in the social forms of modernity” (p. 46). The “historically
specific structures of social relationships involved in their stable reproduction over
time is, argues Rosenberg, how we must proceed to understand societies and their
transformation. Moreover, we must “rehistoricize the study of international relations by
identifying continuities between domestic social structures and geopolitical systems” so
as to see the states-system as part of “a wider social totality” (p. 55). To accomplish
Hedley Bull limits the essential aspects of the states-system to three; 1) a plurality of
sovereign states; 2) a degree of interaction among them, in respect of which they form a
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this, Rosenberg elaborates a h.stoneal nraterialis, explanation winch focnses on the
dominant capital, st relat.ons of production which distinctively separates the modem
states-system from its feudal predecessor. Marx’s insight from the third volume of
Capital regarding the relation of workers to the owner of the means of production
provides the basis for Rosenberg’s method. Quoting Marx, he notes:
It IS always the direct relationship ofthe owners ofthe conditions ofP^^onto the direct producers.
..which reveals the innermost secret,
the hidden basis ofthe entire social structure, and with it the political
torm of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short the
corresponding specific form of the state” (Marx, Capital, Vol. Ill Ch 47
quoted in Rosenberg, 1994, p. 51).
’ ’
IfMarx IS correct, he notes, then in conceiving of the modem international system, or
any social formation for that matter, then “we need to understand how its political
dimension—in this case, the sovereign states-system itself—is of a piece with the basic
social stmctures which distinguish modem societies” (Rosenberg, 1994, p. 57). Rather
than delving here into what a historical materialist perspective would look like, such an
inquiry will be explored separately below, but at present we must flesh out in greater
detail the traditional realist understanding of IR before alternatives to it are presented.
In this regard, we return to Wight’s sixth and last characteristic of the present
states-system ‘their means of defending their common interests”, as it indicates that
the novice states of Europe shared a foremost concern over their own stability. As
Hedley Bull emphasizes in The Anarchical Society, “[t]he maintenance of order in
international society has as its starting-point the development among states of a sense of
common interests in the elementary goals of social life” (Bull, 1977, p. 67).
system; and 3) a degree of acceptance ofcommon mles and institutions, in respect of
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Specfically. the modem states-system shares three principle goals which, Bull argues,
include, first, the preference of a society of states over “such altemattve ideas as that of
a universal empire, a cosmopoittan community of individual human beings, or a
Hobbestan state of nature or state of war. as the supreme normative principle of the
political organization of mankind” (Bull, 1977. pp. 67-8). Secondly, states share certain
minimum rules of coexistence which include the limiting of violence solely to sovereign
slates tn the act of war, limitations on the causes, conduct and geographical spread of
war, and mies governing the interaction of states-e.g.pacms„„, servanda (the
keeping of agreements) or reh,s sic stantibus (their annulment under changed
conditions). Likewise rules of coexistence include those governing the control or
jurisdiction of each state over its own persons and territory, including the central
pnnciples of respect for each state’s sovereignty, nonintervention, and equality in
enjoyment of the rights of sovereignty. Thirdly, a complex of rules exists which
regulates cooperation among states beyond what is needed for mere coexistence. These
include mles facilitating cooperation in political, strategic, economic and social areas,
that IS, mles of presenptive behavior appropriate to “goals that are a feature of an
international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of
objectives than mere coexistence” (Bull, 1977, pp. 67-70). To the degree that there was
room for agreement on basics among the nascent states of Europe in the eighteenth
century points to a certain shared identity in their composition.
In addition to these two Realist, and complementary, accounts of the origin of
the states-system, several alternative traditions held sway in western IR scholarship
which they form a society (Bull, 1977, p. 233).
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which either essent.alized the sovereign dontinance of,he state, argued against the
limitations whieh its fundatnental r,nits-i.e. sovereign states- posed to transfontnng
the system, or postulated the mutual interdependence of sovereign states xvithin a
system of recognized rules and norms.’" "The primao' questions of international
theory,” asserts Martin Wight, “coneem the nature of international society and of
international law” (Wight, 1966b, p. 92).” Addressing the then-prevailing perspectives
on these questions, Wight (1966) and Bull (1966; 1977) delimited the range of thought
in western international relations (IR) scholarshtp to three competing traditions. Al the
extremes arc the Hobbesian and Kantian traditions which are irreconcilable on the
questions of international society and international law such that the Hobbesian or
realist tradition “describes international relations as a state of war of all against all”
while the Kantian or universalisi tradition "sees at work in international politics a
potential community of mankind” (Bull, 1977, p. 24). On this Hobbesian view
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Essentialism, as Resnick and Wolff point out, is a specific presumption which
characterizes many theories in that it “holds that any apparent complexity—a person, a
relationship, a historical occurrence, and so forth—can be analyzed to reveal a
simplicity lying at its core. In relation to conceptualizing causality, essentialism is the
presumption that among the influences apparently producing any outcome, some can be
shown to be inessential to its occurrence while others will be shown to be essential
causes. ... The goal of analysis for such an essentialist theory is then to find and express
this essential cause and its mechanism of producing what is theorized as its effect”
(Resnick and Wolff, 1987, pp. 2-3).
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“A society of states (or international society) exists,” states Bull, “when a group of
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull,
1977, p. 13). Wight uses the terms ‘society’ and ‘community’ interchangeably because,
he argues, [sjociologists have not agreed on a satisfactory distinction in usage between
the words” (Wight, 1966b, p. 92).
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inteinational society is “a nction or an illusion ” It is “
and rules which states—the real political
only the sum of the principles
units have agreed to regard as obligatory;
and the basis of international obligation is purely contractuaf Tins is the doctrine,”
argues W.ght, ”of legal positivism” (Wight, 1966b, p. 93). Neither the des.res nor
passions of humanity are, in themselves, a sin, argues Hobbes, nor even their ”Ac,,ons.
that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them” which they
cannot know “till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it” (Hobbes,
1651/1980, Part I, Chapter XIII, p. 187). The Hobbesian tradition thus denies the
existence of international society, proclaiming instead that within the international
anarchy, the ultimate unit of political society-and hence the limit of any possible
society-is the state. By contrast, the Kantian tradition claims thal “Ihe society of states
IS the unreal thing-a complex of legal fictions and obsolescent diplomatic forms which
conceals, obstructs and oppresses the real society of individual men and women, the
civitas maxima" (Wight, 1966b, p. 93). Hence, the essential nature of international
politics from the Kantian perspective “lies not in conflict among states” but rather “in
the transnational social bonds that link the individual human beings who are the subjects
or citizens of states” (Bull, 1977, p. 25). And while the Hobbesian views peace as only
the period of recuperation from the last war and preparation for the next,” the Kantian
seeks perpetual peace in the ideas of world federalism, advocating that without a
federated league of nations the unchecked right of nations will only lead to a “perpetual
peace in the grave” (Bull, 1977, p. 25; Kant, 1795/1983, p. 117).
On the question of international law, the Hobbesian tradition sees this as
constituted purely on a contractual basis which is obligatory only so long as adhering to
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in.en,a.iona, ,aw is expedient ,o s.a.e interests. Free to pursue ,ts goals relation to
other states without moral or legal restrictions and subjee, only to the rules of prudence
and expediency, the Hobbesians assert that the sole basis for moral behavior in the
international anarchy lies wholly within the realm of the state itself and in its own self-
assertion in the international arena. Outside of the state lies a condition of anarchy, of
“warre of everyman against every man.” And in this external condition, writes Hobbes,
“nothing can be Unjust.” ‘The notions of Right and Wrong. Justice and Injustice have
there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no
Injustice. Justice and injustiee, writes Hobbes;
are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is
consequent also to the same eondition, that there be no Propriety no
Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every’ mans
that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it (Hobbes, 1651/1980
Part I, Chapter XIII, p. 1 88).
The Kantian, however, is enjoined by moral imperatives to seek “the overthrow of the
system of states and its replacement by a cosmopolitan society” (Bull, 1977, p. 26)
Only m a cosmopolitan society, the Kantian holds, can the rights of individuals, and
hence the rule of law, be fully guaranteed. In the “already established nations,” Kant
observed, “progress toward full development of man’s natural capacities” is hampered
by “expending all of the commonwealth’s powers on arming itself against others, by the
devastation caused by war, and, still more, by maintaining themselves in constant
readiness for war” (Kant, 1784/1983, pp. 35-6). Hence, for the Kantian, not only is the
community of humanity the central reality in international politics but, moreover, it is
the object of the highest moral endeavor. The consequences of this position for
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mtemational law, therefore, impose a duty on the Kantian to ignore any rule that seeks
to sustain coexistence and social intercourse among states.
Existing between these two extremes, a third tradition of thought in international
relations scholarship
“describes international politics in terms of a society of states or
international society” (Bull, 1977, p. 26). Known as the “father ofintemational law,”
Hugo Grotius (1 583-1645) divided law into two categories: natural law and volitional
law, which, out of the latter, arose the subclassiHcation of the law of nations {jus
gentium). States Grotius:
But just as the laws of each state have in view the advantage of
that state, so by mutual consent it has become possible that certain laws
should originate as between all states, or a great many states- and it is
apparent that the laws thus originating had in view the advantage, not of
particular states, but of the great society of states. And this is what is
called the law of nations, whenever we distinguish that term from the law
of nature (Grotius, 1625/1646/1957, p. 13).
The Grotian or internationalist, or rationalist (cf Clark, 1996/1999, p. 5), tradition, as
this perspective is known, “does not see international society as ready to supersede
domestic society; but it notes that international society actually exercises restraints upon
its members” (Wight, 1966b, p. 95). Thus against the Hobbesian or realist tradition,
the Grotians contend that states are not engaged in simple struggle,
... but are limited in
their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions.” In contrast to the
Kantians or universalists, however, the Grotian tradition accepts “the Hobbesian
premise that sovereigns or states are the principal reality in international politics”—
rather than individual human beings (Bull, 1977, p. 26).
On the question of international law, the Grotians are closer to the Hobbesians
than to the Kantians in their contractual view of international obligation; however.
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unlike the realists, they hold that states “are bound not only by ™les ofpmdence or
expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law” (Bull, 1977, p. 27). And
because of their state-centric perspective, the Grotians disagree with the Kantian moral
imperative on the necessity to overthrow the system of states and replace it with a
federation of free states or cosmopolitan society, opting instead for “the requirements of
coexistence and co-operation in a society of states” (Bull, 1977, p. 27).
The three approaches described above-the Hobbesian, the Kantian and the
Grotian-were delineated as the prevailing traditions of thought in western international
relations scholarship in the late 1960s to mid-1970s by the British IR theorists Martin
Wight and Medley Bull. These three approaches were developed partly in response to
the need to counter the growing Marxist challenge to traditional IR theory in the West in
the late 1960s and early ’70s. but as well it was part of the behavioralist-traditionalist
debate then raging at the time,“ Indeed, “great debates” have been the conventional
manner of retelling the history of international relations in the West. Neumann and
Wffiver, in fact, list a series of four such debates as follows:
1 ) realism versus idealism— 1 940s;
2) behavioralism versus traditionalism—1960s;
Stated Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1980):
At present, as attempts to build a general theory of international relations
in the West have apparently been abandoned[,] this abandoned direction
has coincided, oddly enough, with the shift to behaviouralism. The
choice of level of abstraction or generality and the role played by models
in the analysis of an historical situation are basically of a sociological
nature, but international relations theorists in the West appear at present
to lack a global sociological account of the nature of social phenomena in
general, comparable to that furnished by Marxism-Leninism (p. 9).
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3)
4)
interparadigm debate between realism, interdependence theory and neoMarxism
-mid-70s; and the
confrontation between rationalists and reflectivists spurred on by the
ntinental postmodern” and
“poststracturalist” philosophies- late 1980s
(1997, pp. 8-9).
Since the 1980s, after the Foucaultian and Derridian critiques swept through
western academia calling into question the centered subject while even, in some cases,
killing off the author entirely (cf. Foucault, 1979/1984), some scholars prefer not to
have their work attributed to any particular school of thought or, rather, prefer the
nomenclature “postmodern” or “poststructuralist”. As one survey of new “masters” of
International Relations put it:
Usually, someone working in IR aims at some kind of coherence at the
same time as striving to make complex and novel moves across
established lines. All theorists make personal choices and the ability to
retain an integrated academic persona(lity) is not secured once and for allby picking a ‘position’. The traditional presentation of IR in terms of
‘paradigms’ or ‘schools’ obscures this since the writings of complex
authors are often cut up and treated in separate sections. Only those who
fit unequivocally into one box will be treated as whole persons and
most writers do not see themselves as operating within one of the boxes.
As an academic one would therefore learn more from tracing
other unboxable persons in their trajectories through the discipline
(Neumann and W2ever, eds., 1997, p. 2).
By focusing on how meaning is constituted, how dominant ways of conceptualizing
have been produced, and not least how the ‘academic’ writings of IR participate in the
construction of what they [i.e. IR theorists] take as their independent object:
international relations’,” these reflectivist theorists seek not to gain a better perspective
Wffiver states that this fourth debate remains either unnumbered or is referred to by
some as the "third" debate and cites the following sources: Lapid 1989; Neufeld 1993;
and Holsti 1993 (Wasver, 1997, p. 8).
79
on international rela.tons, for, tndeed, is exactly this c,uest for objectiv.ty, control and
security which they seek to jettison. In thetr attempt to avoid the ideological traps of
traditional IR theory, these rellectivist writers opt out of the paradigmatic debate
clanmng that their debate is not one of incommensurability but rather that the important
aspect to be studied is how the debate is “shaped by the self-understanding about its
character” ( Wtever, in Neumann and Warver, 1 997, p. 22). In this respect, reflectivists
emphasize interpretation and intersubjectivity between institutions, norms, regimes, etc.
and actors which both constitute such phenomena and, in turn, are constituted by them.
Argues Devetak regarding the postmodern theorists, including Richard K. Ashley, Rob
Walker, and James Der Dorian, who arose in the mid-1980s to challenge traditional IR
theories:
Instead of taking for granted issues of epistemology (knowledge claims)
and ontology (claims about being or thinghood), it was now seen as
essential to investigate how such issues had been dealt with by the
competing ‘traditions’ of thought (Devetak, 1996, pp. 180-1).
That the formal western discipline of IR has been transformed since the first
department of international relations was established at the University of Wales in
Aberystwyth in 1919 is unquestioned, in a formal sense. Some, however, may argue
that, substantially, IR still remains essentially dichotomized as it has been since 1916
following the publication of Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage ofCapitalism,
between defenders of the capitalist order and their socialists and communists
antagonists. Nevertheless, many strains of thought have developed on either side of the
economic question during the ensuing years of the twentieth century with much overlap
both in theory and practice amongst both practitioners and theorists. Indeed, the
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developing globalization of the capitalist economy has prompted many IR and
International Political Economy (IPE) theons.s to utilize theoretical methods from both
capitalist and Marxist traditions. And whether we consider Lenin’s New Economic
Program, Keynes advocacy for the socialization of investment, FDR’s stimulation of
aggregate demand (itself based upon Keynes’s theoretical insights), Gorbachev’s
perestroika, or Deng’s reforms of Chinese agriculture, etc., the real world of politics is
much more practical in its use of different theoretical models. The increasing adherence
to dependency and Marxist theories in the mid-1970s certainly reflected the need for
new explanatory paradigms to help make sense of changing world events, but by the
late 1980s and early ’90s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist
regimes in eastern Europe, much of the faddish interest in the radical theories of the
’70s and early ’80s waned while those who continued to adhere to these theories often
deemphasized the Leninist or vanguard political aspects of these theories. Indeed, argue
Burbach, Nunez, and Kagarlitsky (1997),
Marxism-Leninism, erred fundamentally in asserting that a new order
could be ushered in by taking control of the state, thus transforming the
economy and society from above.
To the contrary, they argue:
A new order cannot appear unless beliefs and values are changed in civil
society—at the grassroots level—so that the state becomes a responsive
apparatus rather than the principal agent of transformation (1997, p. 3).
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Still, with the rapid pace of globalizing forces from lelceommumcations^ and
transport to the spread of .he transnational as opposed to the inultina.ionnl corporation
and to the growth and relative autonomy of a multitude of international regimes from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstnietion and
Development (IRBD), otherwise known as the World Bank, to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), many contemporary IR theorists argue that the state-centric focus
either is in the process or has already been eclipsed by forces superordinate to the state
(e.g. Robinson, 1996) ” Thus, it is with a renewed relevance that one of the persistent
questions in IR theory should focus on the level of analyis.
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The revolution in communications technology has allowed for the instantaneous
transfer of mfomation and finances on an unprecedented scale. “One of the advantages
of digital cash, writes Mikkelsen (Summer 1 998/99), “is that transactions could take
p ace without the need for banks to intermediate in international transactions. Instant
transfer of money would not only encourage the development of a free worldwide
rnarket, by removing the present significant barriers to transacting, but also reduce the
abi lity ofgovernments to impose taxation and disclosure obligations on banks (such as
withholding ta) (p. 14). “Twenty-four hours a day,” notes Burbach, Niinez, and
agarhtsky, “365 days a year, trillions of dollars in capital are transferred by electronic
processes ffom one point of the globe to another. In effect,” they argue, “capitalism and
technology are collapsing time and space” (1997, p. 13).
The UN Conference on Trade and Development World Investment Report 1999
estimates the existence of about 60,000 transnational corporations (TNCs) currently
extant, with no less than 89 percent of these companies headquartered in the “Triad”
consisting of the European Union countries (principally France, the UK, Germany,
Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium), North America (i.e. the U.S. and
Canada^ and Japan (Ch. 3, pp. 6-8). “Overall,” states the report, “stability
predominates within the world’s largest TNCs” with “[ajpproximately 85 per cent of
the top 1 00 TNCs list
. . . dominated by firms that have been in the top 1 00 ranking
during the past five years with a substantial part of these TNCs originat[ing] in the
European Union, United States and Japan.” In 1997, states the report. General Electric
held the top position as the largest non-fmancial TNC followed by Ford Motor
Company and then Royal Dutch Shell. Only two TNCs from developing countries
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IheLgeloMnalysis in IntemalCTal Relations Rernn,i,i.„.i
Existing as a subHeld in the discipline of political science, international
relations underlying focus is the species homo sapiens and its niembers’ interaction
with their material environment and with each other. While sharing with other areas of
political science a concern with human behavior predicated on interests defined in ten,is
ofpower, IR has traditionally restricted itself to analyzing power as defined in military
terms at the nation-state level of analysis. Domination in the militaiy sphere was
assumed to guarantee control over rules of behavior in other spheres. Thus, it was the
use of diplomatic and military strategy to attain power which preoccupied many IR
studies (cf Kissinger, 1964). Such a view can be traced back to Thucydides and "The
Mehan Dialogue” where the operative principle, or “safe rule” as the Athenians referred
to It, was “to stand up to one’s equals, to behave with deference toward one’s superiors,
and to treat one’s inferiors with moderation” (Thucydides, c. 460-404
B.C.E./1954/1985, p. 407). This principle need not apply only to the behavior between
countnes, however; indeed, the Athenians were “not so much frightened of being
made it into the top 100 in 1997 and these were Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and
the Daewoo Corporation (World Investment Report 1999, 1999, Ch. 3, p 1)
Dicken (1992) states his preference for:
the term transnational corporation’ to the more widely used term
multinational corporation
,
simply because it is a more general, less
restrictive, term. The term multinational corporation’ suggests
operations in a substantial number of countries whereas Transnational
corporation’ simply implies operations in at least two countries,
including the firm s home country. In effect, all multinational
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conquered by a power which rules over others,..., as of what would happen if a ruling
power IS attacked and defeated by its own subjects” (Thucydides, c. 460-404
B.C.E./1954/1985, p. 402). Hence, in our analysis ofpower in IR, the “level of
analysis” is a significant factor which will affect both the type and the extent of the
conclusions we reach.
In deciding on a level of analysis, one’s underlying theoretical approach must be
scrutinized for possible clues. In this respect, theoty is a guide to study and hence to
action, as well as a proposed explanation for the causal mechanisms responsible for a
phenomenon or a set of facts. And as Hempel stated, “tentative hypotheses are needed
to give direction to a scientific investigation” (Hempel, 1966, p. 13). Notes the Imernet
Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, Hempel:
argues that it is impossible to derive observational statements from a
scientific theory. For example, Newton’s theory of gravitation cannot
determine the position of planets, even if the initial conditions are
known, for Newton’s theory deals with the gravitational force, and thus
the theory cannot forecast the influences exerted by other kinds of force.
In other words, Newton’s theory requires an explicit assumption—
a
provisoe, according to Hempel—which assures that the planets are
subjected only to the gravitational force. Without such hypothesis it is
impossible to apply the theory to the study of planetary motion. But this
assumption does not belong to the theory. Therefore the position of
planets is not determined by the theory, but it is implied by the theory
plus appropriate assumptions
<http://www.utm.edU/research/iep/h/hempel.htm>.
Our level of analysis m the study of IR is arguably thus a consequence of the theoretical
assumptions we hold about how the world works. But whatever theory is chosen as a
guide to study. Singer points out that certain key elements must be present in the model
corporations are transnational corporations but not all transnational
corporations are multinational corporations (pp. 47-8).
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.four subsequent ,eve, of analysts is .0 prove useful eorrecly analyzing Ihe real.ly
one ,s dealing with. First, the theory must “offer a highly accurate JescripHon of the
phenomena under considerat.on ” Second, the theoty must possess the “capacity to
explain the relationships among the phenomena under investigation ” And third, the
theory should “offer the promise of reliable prediction" (S.nger, 1 96 1
,
pp. 78-9). As
such, the methodological assumptions, constmcts. terminology, experiences, etc. we
utilize are variables which determine our epistemological and ontological conceptions
of the world. That is, how we come to have knowledge of the world and what we can
say is real or existing independently of the mind will affect our subsequent analytical
approach and conclusions.
In this respect, we must first focus on the term “International Relations” or
“International Politics,” for these terms prejudge the field of inquiry to an extent by
calling attention to only those aspects of human behavior which have “inter-««na;i-al”
repercussions. As Young stated, “the very notion of international
... subsumes the
postulate of the nation-state as the fundamental unit of world politics” (Young, 1972, p.
126). While states as legal entities are synonymous with ancient Roman and Greek
empires in that they make decisions and enforce rules for their inhabitants, nation-states
have become principle actors in world politics only within the last 300 years. As
opposed to rulers of ancient empires or feudal nobles who claimed ownership of the
state and its benefits for themselves either due to divine sanction, hereditary right, or
conquest, the modem nation-state claims its authority from the consent of the governed,
who likewise participate in the benefits derived from the operations of the state. The
term nation-state itself suggests a growing coincidence over time between states as
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legal cm,,ies and ,he psychological idcminca.ion of people will, particular pieces of
icrrilory- (Kegley, Jr. and Wi.lhopf, 1985, p. 74,. Now whe.her this shared
psychological identification rests primarily on the basis of cthn.eity, a shared language,
cultural homogeneity, territorially demarcated fixed boundaries, or simply collective
subjugation by dominant classes is open to further study; what eannot be denied,
however, is the faet that national entities continue to play a major role in the
mtemational arena as the collect,ve representatives of statistically significant domestic
populations who control state power. The study of IR, therefore, focuses the field of
inquioi so that research concerns itself with relevant aspects of cross-national politics
such that regularities and general tendencies of behavior can be observed. Nonetheless,
if our level of analysis is fixated solely on the nation-state, and ifwe define nations as
unitary and purposive actors, then we will tend to limit IR to the study of foreign policy.
From 1945 and up through the early 1960s, most of the texts published in IR
qualified as studies in foreign policy, and specifically U.S. foreign policy. And in most
of these texts, asserted Singer, “[n]ot only is the world often perceived through the
prism of the American national interest, but an inordinate degree of attention (if not
spleen) is directed toward the Soviet Union” (Singer, 1961, p. 84). Nonetheless, this
state-centne level of analysis provided political scientists with various approaches to
studying international behavior including historical description and analysis, especially
the study of diplomatic history (e.g. Albrccht-Carrie, 1958); legal analysis concerned
with analyzing various legislative provisions of countries, the treaties they entered into
both with other countries and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) (e.g.
Sherr, 1986); numerous balance-of-power studies which examine the coalescence of
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coun,en-a,ling coalitions to check countries embarking on hegcntonistic policies (e.g.
Newnran,
,968); and analyses which focused on official dccision-ntakers of countries as
being of prime importance (e.g. Snyder, et al. 1962; or Janis, 1982/1983).
This preoccupation with the nation-state as the primary level of analysis in IR
can be charted from its origins in the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648 up to the present. Such an histoncal review of the development
of IR is necessary, for, as Wightman stated;
As all human societies are subject to change, they reveal their
charactenstics not simultaneously, but successively over time. To see
them fiat is not to see them at all. A snapshot view will miss the sense of
ircction and movement; it will fail to distinguish what is old from what
IS new, the elements of continuity from the appearance of change
(Wightman, 1984, p. 23).
Prior to 1648, political unity in Europe consisted either of a universal empire, a
monolithic state, or separate city-states whose rulers denved legitimacy as part of a
divine order. Law in each of these forms was derivative from Roman imperial law
which, while universal, had existed side by side with local jurisdictions. Due to the lack
of centralization in the Roman Empire, interpretation and enforcement of law had varied
from province to province. This practice of local jurisdiction continued with Rome’s
conquerors and dominated political thought in feudal Europe. With the triumph of
Christianity m medieval Europe, legitimacy of the universal order gained divine
sanction with the Pope as God’s representative on earth (Mansbach, et al., 1976, p. 9).
It appeared as if knowledge of the Mayan or Incan Empires or universal empires in
China, India, Africa, and the Arab World were largely unknown to the Europeans and
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hence posed no threat and presented no opportunit.es to their agricultural-based
economies (Finlay & Hovet, 1975, p. 271).
However, as Abu-Lughod (1989) has recently demonstrated, there existed prior
to the European world-economy which came to dominance by the sixteenth century, a
number of world-economies or trade systems which, in the thirteenth century, joined the
Middle East (including North Africa), Indta, and China. The
.nteract.on between these
regions “stretched through the Mediterranean into the Red Sea and Persian Gulf on into
the Indian Ocean and through the Strait of Malacca to reach China” (Abu-Lughod,
1989, p. 12). Without the existence of these various preexisting world economies,
asserts Abu-Lughod, “when Europe gradually ‘reached out,’ it would have grasped
empty space rather than nches” (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 12). In fact, she concludes, it
was the “Fall of the East” which preceded the “Rise of the West.” Rather than viewed
as a simple takeover of a prior economic system or attributable solely to the internal
characteristics of European culture, Abu-Lughod argues, Europe’s subsequent
predominance can be attributable to two paradoxical forces; 1) “pathways and routes
developed by the thirteenth century were later ‘conquered’ and adopted by a succession
of European powers,” and 2) “the new European approach to trade-cum-
plunder.
. .caused a basic transformation in the world system” (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p.
36 1 ). More specifically, Abu-Lughod writes that it “was not so much the Portuguese
takeover of the ‘old world’ but the Spanish incorporation of the ‘new world’ which had
a decisive influence on why Europe’s world economy became the center of world
gravity in a decisive manner”; moreover, it provided “the windfall of wealth that
eventually were spun into industrial gold” (Abu-Lughold, 1989, p. 363). In this sense.
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the wealth derived from the plunder of silver and gold from the Amertcas provided the
pnmttive accumulation necessary for Europe’s industnal revolution, and this, she says,
“IS why European scholars have ,n the last analysis been ftxated on the sixteenth
century” (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 363).
It IS nonetheless true that following the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, fairly well-
defined nation-states resulted from the casting off of feudal traditions and their
replacement with statist tendencies and administrative capabilities that emphasized
territoriality and the centralization of legitimate authority and military power in the
state. Legitimation was based on the doctrine of sovereignty which championed the
right of each state to make and execute laws within its own territory. Beyond these
borders, however, existed “an international system of shared authority and decentralized
power” (Mansbach, et ah, 1976, p. 17). The feudal economic base which had tied
agricultural production in the countryside with the craft guilds organized in the feudal
towns was replaced by the domination of mercantilism and the notion that the economic
interests of the nation transcended individual or group interests. With the discovery of
America by Europeans and the opening up of the world market, the context was set for
the first wave of European imperialism with absolutist states seeking to increase their
power through the acquisition of gold and silver. The related theoretical cataclysm
resulting from the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment aided in this economic
transformation by separating the political system from the dominant influence of the
Roman Catholic Church. And as the closed guild system gave way to manufacturing in
the realm of production, so too in the realm of thought did free competition gain
expression in the fomis of religious liberty and freedom of conscience, noticeable
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advances capitalism had over feudalism (Marx & Engels, 1848/1948/1998, p. 29).
Legitimacy based in divine sanction thus gave way to polittcal att.horiiy presented in the
form of a social contract, and nationalism, or the doctritte of supreme loyally to the
State, became the unifying rallying call.
Afier the Peace of Westphalia, besides the Dutch and British who exercised
hegemonic leadership over Europe in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries
respectively, no state politically, militarily, and culturally dominated Europe until the
attempt by France under the leadership of Napoleon at the beginning of the eighteenth
century. But his defeat at Waterloo enabled the 181 5 Congress of Vienna to achieve a
quasi-institutionalized acceptance of a “balance” offerees among the European powers.
In this respect, states’ internal politics became subject to international sanction if
domestic policies encouraged hegemonistic threats to other European powers. It is in
this regard that Britain’s hegemony in the nineteenth century is said to have taken the
form of a “balancer” to counter hegemonic threats to the European states-system. This
arrangement provided stability for the European state system and held its principal
actors together until 1914 and the outbreak of World War 1. In the interim, however, the
nineteenth century witnessed the creation of independent states in South America along
with the colonization of Africa and Asia in the latter quarter of the century. The basis
upon which power was constructed in both of these movements rested on the
establishment of territorial borders formally represented by nation-states.^^ Thus, by the
Although the colonization of Africa and Asia resulted in states which were formally
referred to as nation-states, it must be noted that many of these state boundaries
transgressed and divided traditional tribal and/or ethnic areas.
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end ofWWI, the recognized legitimacy of nation-states gave impetus to the
power and credibility due
organ,zation of the League of Nat.ons. Lacking enforcement
.o the refusal of the U.S. to join, however, the League was unahle to halt the conHict
whtch led to WW„. W„h the defeat of the Axis powers, the new cotrelat.on of forces
aner the second world war gave way to a bipolarity between the two great supenrowers
and their attempt to coalesce and control the fomter colonies who were now emerging
fonnally as independent states. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945
constituted a significant symbol of this post-war paradigm, and. unhke its predecessor,
the UN had the two major post-war powers as members (i.e. the United States and the
Soviet Union). Though promoted as a community of sovere.gn nations, this mult, pi,city
of states and their nominal independence were, it should be noted, more form than
substance as they were subjected to the constant control and manipulation by their
superpower sponsors. And from this history and within this modem framework, the
still-prevalent orientation toward the state as the primary level of analysis remained
fixed for a large part of the twentieth century.
The distinguishing characteristic of the post-WWII period, however, was, and
continues to be, the overwhelming qualitative transition in military power associated
with the development of nuclear weapons. As nuclear stockpiles proliferated, national
boundaries become obscured and insufficient walls behind which to hide. The security
provided by the temtonally-inscribed boundaries of nation-states offer little protection
in this new era characterized as a “balance of terror”, a new concept mentioned by
President John Kennedy in a 1958 speech and later expounded upon by his Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara and others (see, for example, an article by Albert
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Wo,,,s.e„.en.,e..HeOenc.eB.anceorw...o™^
' 959,. Hence, rehance on power is increas.n,,, rendering
.rrelevan,
,ha. which
d was
.nean,
.o defend, viz. the na.ion-s.a.e. Similarly, while diseases from Acc|nirod
.nrmunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Ihe Wes, N,le and Ebola viruses know no
slale bonndar.es lo which Ihey are res.ricled, environmenlal des.rnclion from polhn.on
and deplelion of non-rcpienishable resources culs across national boundaries and
national concerns. As such, the tragedy of the commons becomes the common tragedy
With perhaps less disastrous consequences albeit more far-reaching effects,
however, technological revolutions in areas of commun.cations, produCon,
transportation, and most especially the development and rennemcn, of computational
tools-specincally the computer, the Internet, and the World Wide Web-render the
geographical and cultural differences in the world increasingly more manageable.
Construction of large centralized production facilities have been rendered unnecessary
with increased efficiency and advances in transport, the latter which can no, only
quickly supply a company’s or an individual’s needs but, moreover, such products can
accurately be tracked via the internet while they are in route. Diffusion of production
facilities along with rapid and reliable means of communications and transport thus
establishes a web of resources able lo meet the needs of a global market. Global
diversity therefore, in theory, becomes less a tool for jingoistic manipulation as peoples
61
The concept of the tragedy of the commons refers to the depletion or degradation of;
resource, usually referred to as a common property resource, to which people have free
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come to identify with and relate their interests with the well-being of others in different
areas of the globe. Human exchanges and concerns begin to cut across national and
cultural boundaries on a scale unprecedented in human history. And the necesstty for
unified actton to address global concerns becomes more pronounced and possible.
To analyze and understand the development of these new factors which were
only then ,n thetr infancy, a new paradigm arose in the 1950s-1960s seeking to place the
level of analysts at the global level. This change in analytical approach renected the
change in world pol.tics which saw the ascendancy of a global intemat.onal system in
place of the Eurocentric system which had lasted from the Peace of Westphal.a until
WWll. And the pnmary determinant of this change was the global diffusion of
technology (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr.. 1981, p. 137). The practitioners ofgene™/
sysreiiis ,keory argued that the observer is always confronted by a system or its sub-
systems and though the cluster ofphenomena to be observed can range from the minute
to the universe itself, the choice of which phenomena to focus on cannot be a function
ofwhim or caprice. Systems theoty, therefore, “assumes the interdependence of parts in
determinate relationships, which impose order upon the components of the system”
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 1981, p. 141). Systems, Holsti pointed out, are
distinguished by: a) boundaries which designate the line between interaction and
environment beyond which political units have no environmental affect and
environmental conditions pose no political affect; b) the main characteristics of the
political units in the system; c) structures of power and influence or persisting forms of
and unmanaged access. It is a concept derived from a 1968 article in Science magazine
by Garret Hardin that was entitled simply “The Tragedy of the Commons”.
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dom,na„. and subordinate relationships within the systent; d) contnron forms of
nteraction (e.g. diploma,to, trade, types of nvalnes. and organized violence or
warfare); and e) expl.ci, or implicit rules, customs, and values which govern relat.ons
(Holstt, 1967, pp. 28-29). Inputs and outputs are the key components of systems theory
whtch interact in a contmuous feedback loop whtch allows for self-adjustment by the
system. Some of the inittal approaches which developed from this systems-onented
perspective included Parson’s Action System (cf Parsons and Sh.ls, 1951), Structural-
Functional Analysis (Levy, Jr., 1952), Input-Output Analysis (Easton. 1953, p. 129),
and an ecological systems approach (e.g. Sprout & Sprout, 1971).
The systems level of analysts permits the examination of IR as a whole. But. in
practice, stated Singer, it lends to “lead the observer tnto a position which exaggerates
the impact of the system upon the national actors and, conversely, discounts the impact
of the actors on the system” (Singer, 1961. p. 80). Autonomy and choice are thus
downplayed among systems level theorists who tend to gravitate toward a more
deterministtc orientation which emphasizes structure over its internal units (cf. Waltz,
1979). Moreover, ifwe postulate a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policies of
national actors, then the scant room we allow for divergence amongst state actors may
lead us to assume that “statesmen think and act in ternis of interest defined as power”
(Morgenthau, 1960, p. 5). The systems-oriented approach thus often discounts or denies
differences among states or in their internal workings and “concludes with a highly
homogenized image of our nations in the international system” (Singer, 1961, p. 82).
Structural approaches alone, therefore, tend to be static and empty and provide little
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or.ow c,.n.e occ.
.He
,„.en.a.,ona, s.s.en. To
.He e.e...
.Ha.
.He.
do expla,n cHange, they
.end largely
.0 be wholly de.em.inis.ic.
Thus faced wi.h
.he func.ionalis. cons.rain.s of .he sys.en.ic level of analysis
Which leads
.0 de.em.in,s.n and
.he reduc.ionis.
.endency inhere,.. ,n .He dominan. view
of.he s,a.e as .he primary level of analys.s. IR
.heoris.s con.inued ,0 seek ou. new
paradigms wh.ch can un.ie bo.H s.ruc.ures wi.h human prac.ices, and hence cho.ce, and
still provide a coheren. explanation of social relations a.
.he in.emat.onal level. Three
aspects are necessa^, for
.he vahdi.y and hence usefulness of such a framework. Kirs.,
the genera, theory should be logically cons.s.en, wi.h its parts and every par. should be
explainable in relation
.0 .he totality. Second, there must be some way .0
.es. and
validate the knowledge cla.ms of.he theory. And third, any such general theory of IR
must possess, as Maclean argues, “an adequate account of change” (Maclean, 1981, p.
47).
Two related and yet opposing globalist paradigms which became prominent in
the ,970s in western IR scholarship are theories which have developed mainly ou.srde
of American academic thought. And both of these theories have reluctantly been
accepted into the American field of IR owing only to the inadequacy of much of the
prevrous analyses. These two alternatives, and often conflicting paradigms, are
Dependency Theory and Imperialism, and both have historical roots which are much
older than the current academic interest in them. Comparing and assessing the central
tenets of these two theories’ propositions will help elucidate their respective level of
analysis.
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Before venturing into a contrast between Dependency and Iniperiiilist theories,
must be made. As Viotti and
however, some general remarks about global, st theories
Kanpp. ( 1 987) point out, there are both Marx.sts and non-Manrists who work witb.n the
globalist paradigm. What unites them, however, is that these theorists
-see the world
capitalist system as the.r starting point or who focus on dependency relattons within a
global pom, cal economy-
,p. 399). Moreover, they assert, global, sts are gutded by four
key assumptions;
1 )
2 )
3 )
4)
Global context^-Globalists argue that to explain behavtor at any and alllevels of analys.s-the indiv.dual, bureaucratic, societal, and bleen statesbetween societtes—one must first understand the overall stracture of theglobal system wtthm whtch such behavior takes place.”
tstortcal analysis—“Only by tracing the historical evolution of the systemS I possible to understand its current structure. The key historical factor andining characteristic of the system as a whole is capitalism. Thisparticular economic system works to the benefit of some individuals statesand societies but at the expense of others.”
’ ’
Mechanisms of domination-“[G]lobalists assume that particular
mecimmsms ofdommaUon exist that keep Third World states fromdeveloping and that contnbute to worldwide uneven development ”
Economic factors—
“[GJIobalists assume that economicfactors are
absolutely cntical in explaining the evolution and functioning of the world
capi ahst system and the relegation of Third World states to a subordinate
position” (pp. 399-400).
Beanng these four assumptions in mind, an examination will first be made between
Dependency and Imperialist theories and, following this, an analysis of an alternative
globalist paradigm. World Systems Theory, will be presented.
Dependency theory is sometimes referred to as the theory of underdevelopment,
and, as one would expect, the underdevelopment refers to areas in Latin America,
Afnca, and Asia where traditional colonial ties have continued in different fomis despite
the formal independence of these previous colonial states. Most of the thought on
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dependency ,heo^
,ee„ developed hy Ln.in A.nenca„s wi.l, ,„e ong.na, argn.nenls
for dependency Iheoo: ong.nat.ng will, ,he chief econcnisl, Raul Prebisch. of,he
Un,.ed Nafons Econonric Connniss.on for La, in A,ner,ea (ECLA, aRer WWIL
Prebisch pictured a divided world consishng of a ccner of industrialized countnes and a
penphery of underdeveloped countries. Prebisch argued that underdevelopment
caused by unequal terms of trade which led to a decline it
remedy these effects, Prebisch asserted that
was
n exchange earnings. To
governments in the periphery needed to
subsidize the development of the, r own infrastructures, enact protect.ve tanff measures
and gear domestic production toward import substitution (Chilcote, 1981, p. 12). At the
same ttme, Prebisch called for external funding from the industrialized developed
countries in order to buttress domestic capital formation needed for development.
Prebtsch s lament (1971) is sttll relevant today concerning the insufficiency of such
financial resources and the heavy deb, burden accompanying such transfers.
The amount of financial resources transferred has been inadequate and
the burden of the corresponding service payments excessive.
... In
combination with the deterioration of the terms of trade, they [i e heavy
service payments] have had a highly prejudicial effect on the
mobilization of domestic resources and on investment (Prebisch 1971
pp. 234-5).
Central to Prebisch’s and later dependency theorists’ arguments, therefore, is
that desarrollo or development in the periphery (the primary producing countries for
food and raw matenals) is stifled by control from the center (areas of industrialization
consisting of both developed market economies and centrally planned economies). And
by “development,” dependency theorists mean capitalist development. What is needed,
the dependency theorists argue, is state planning and reform to promote autonomous
97
nanona, developnaen,. Th.s naove^en, would ,a.e ,he fonu of a Cass all.ance „e.ween
.he nadona, bourgeois, and .he nrasses ,o oppose donunaUou fron. ,he
.ndus.nalized
eemer while supporting eapi.alis. development in the underdeveloped penphery
(Sunkel. 1972; Furtado, 1963). In.ental development is faeed with similar problems, for
the same conditions ofuneven development and tradit.onal colonialism are found w,.hi„
countries also. Hence the forma.ton of a national bourgeots.e and domestic capitalist
development is seen as a remedy to “mtemal colonialism” (Gonzalez Casanova. 1970)
and “poles ofdevelopment” (Perroux. 1968; Andrade. 1967). Thus, the central question
ofdependency theory is: “Is capital.sm possible in the penphery?” (Blomstrom and
Hettne. 1984. p. 75). The answer is affirmative if one believes in the neo-classical
theory of trade which operates under the rubric of “comparative advantage” (cf Rostow.
1 960). Such a perspective argues for an international division of labor operating under
the assumption that
any two nations will benefit if each specializes in those goods that it can
produce relatively cheaply and exchange for goods that it can produce
only at a higher cost.... Thus, when trade is unfettered by nonmarket
forces or politically imposed barriers, all nations stand to share in the
benefits and to grow more rapidly than they would when faced with
barriers to free trade (Kegley, Jr., and Wittkopf, 1985, p. 172).
The problem, however, claim the dependentistas, as the adherents of this school
are sometimes known, is that the terms of trade and most of the profits benefit only the
industrialized countries. This is due to technological progress in the center which
reduces costs and hence increases profits, but this rarely leads to price reductions on
goods sold in the periphery due to “the high degree of monopolization of the factor and
goods market there” (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984, p. 41). This in turn leads to the co-
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opting of labour unions in the center which could
bargaining power to claim their cut of the i
use their strength and hence
ncreased profits resulting from the
and workers profit in the center, and the former
over the periphery as long as workers in the
can maintain the unequal terms of trade
center receive their share of the spoils.
Some wnters have emphasized a neo-Marxist mtenrreta.ion of dependency such
as Baran and Sweezy (1966) who argue that corporate capital controlled by
multinational corporations has replaced finance capital controlled by banks as the
dominant form of capital accumulation in the world today. Baran and Sweezy
emphasize the division of nch and poor countries based on the extraction of a suiplus by
multinational coiporations with profits repatriated to the nch countries. Frank echos
this idea ofcommercial monopoly in his theory of the “capitalist development of
underdevelopment” in which he argues that “underdevelopment is in large part the
historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations beUveen the
satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries” (Frank, 1966,
p. 1 8). The agents of penetration in the Third World in Frank’s schema are
multinational corporations who seek to satisfy capitalism’s need for external sources of
demand and profitable investment outlets. What results is teclinological dependence,
cultural imperialism, and a transfer of profits from the periphery to the center. Thus, in
contrast to the developed economies, “the development of the national and other
subordinate metropoles is limited by their satellite status” within a capitalist world
framework (Frank, 1966, p. 23). Cardoso contended with Frank’s development of
underdevelopment thesis which alleges that the national bourgeoisie is unable to
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mulate capital and offers instead his view of
“associated dependent development”
W.CH a,.es
.Ha. Ho..,eois-ae™oc.a.ie
.evoH,.,o„s
.He penpHe, a.
„.po.,H,e
.H.e
.0 .He pe„e..a.io„ of .He i„.en.a..o„a, capHaHs. sys.e. penp,... econonHes
(Cardoso,
, 973). Capi.a, acc„„u,a.io„
,s unable
.o co^ple.e i.s cycle ,n .he penphery,
because indus.riaHza..on in .he Third World produces goods no. for „ass consun,p.,o„
bu. for consu™p.,on by
.he local bourgeoisie. Nonelheless.
,He s.ruc.ure of .he
in.ema.ional d, vision of labour by nrul.ina.ional conrorabons allows pan of dependen.
ccononries
.o benefi. fronr produc.ive inves.nren.. Thus,
.hrough
.his .ype of gradual
developnren., Cardoso favored
.'refonnis. polices and an evolu.ionary ra.her
.Han a
revolulionaor approach
.0 developnren.”(Chilco.e, 1981, p. 47). Dos San.os offers an
allemalive 10 Frank’s emphasis on surplus ex.rac.ion and argues
.ha. in.ema.ional
relalionships after WWII crea.ed a new form ofdependency charac.erized by
‘•technological-induslrial dependence” which conditions internal structures in the
penpheo^. Foreign capital controls the marketing of exported products which
maintains the dominance of the traditional landed bourgeoisie in dependen. countries.
The conservation of agrarian or mining export structures generates a link between
metropolitan areas and more advanced economic centers that extract surplus value from
more backward sectors. Thus, the “unequal and combined character of capitalist
Frank has since switched his adherence from Dependency Theory to World-SystemsTheory with initially, his The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?
edited with Barry Gills (1993) but most recently with his work ReOrient: Global
Economy m the Asian Age ( 1 998), the latter which challenges the Eurocentric origins of
the modem world-system asserting instead that Europe’s subsequent domination of the
world-system did not occur until the eighteenth centuiy and was preceded by an
Afroeurasian world-economy which revolved around China.
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development at the international level
Santos, May, 1970, p. 234).
is reproduced internally
,n an acute fonn” (Dos
What ,s suggested in these views, as in nearly all dependency theory, is that
eapttalisnr develops pnmanly on the basis of the exploitation of countries rather than on
.he explo.tation of workers. Moreover, dependency theory understands industrial
development to be dependent on export earnings. Industrial development in the
periphery is thus undenn.ned by balance ofpayment deficits due to developing
countries' inab.lity to compete in a monopolized international market, control the
repatnatron of foreign profits by multinational corporations, and break free of their
dependence on foreign capital to finance development.
Dependency, therefore, promotes the idea of inferiority of the periphery by
suggesting that Latin Amenean, African, and Asian countries depend technologically
and financially on centers of industrialization and finance. Hence, the level of analysis
in dependency theoiy is at the point of the circulation of commodities, market relations,
and the unequal exchange of surplus value. But as one critic writes:
In this light capitalism always appears impossible to attain, for one is
seeing things through the perspective of the underdog capitalist who can
never seem to make it imperialistically big (Johnson, 1983, p. 84).
Regarding the current analysis of the NED, the dependency approach fails to provide a
motive for the U.S. export of democracy, for if the countries of Asia, Afnca, and Latin
Amenca are permanently dependent on what happens in the core industrialized
countnes and, hence, are permanently disabled and unable either to compete with the
core countnes either in the production and export of commodities or in completing the
cycle of capital accumulation, then why should the U.S. even bother with promoting a
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populist soiinciing political
U.S. capital accumulation,
cannot escape?
sysicm, namely
“dcnocrncy”, alluncd lo Ihc cicman.ls of
ifthese countries are locked into ia system from which they
P 1 lor Ihc IXpcmIcncy Ihcorisis, asserts Johnson, is lhal they c|ncslion
why the connirics in the periphery aren’t i.nperiahst, and the answer (hey arr.ve at
points to their domina.ion hy intperiahsm (Johnson, PJ83, p. 85,. Johnson, as a
representative of the Imperialist school ofthonght, therefore, ohjeets to an ahsenee of a
l.islorieal
.naterialist explanat.on of social relations represented hy the concept of
clepentleney, and hence objects to the
,tcrcn,le,,,,su,s ’ level of analysts. Analysis, the
imperial, St paradign, holds, ’hnnsl he n.aintained at the level and moment of
protlnetion/appropriation” (Johnson, 1 983. p. 8h,. h is the theoty oflmperialism which
rests its ntethodology „„ a historical materialist analysis which will he explored helow.
Impcrtalism as an alternative paradigm in IR has its roots in (he Greek and
Roman empires, bnt its modem forms date from the period of mercantile capitalism.
winch corresponded with the establishment of colonies and (he guest by European
powers for gold and silver and other sources of raw materials, to (he beginnings of
industrial capitalism, a |,criod which Magdoff(l978) divides into three phases:
1 ) end of nneenth century to 1 65(f- marked by Europe’s overcoming of the
S ippmg blockade of the Ottoman Empire, opening up of the Americas to
p under, particularly of gold and silver resources and the use of cannon
power to take over trade routes previously dominated by Asians and
Africans;
2) 1 650-to late eighteenth century^ emergence of British dominance on the
seas with the “political triumph of commercial capital” resultant upon the
class struggles which brought on the English revolution in addition to the
establishment of plantation “white-settler colonies” which built up demand
for British manufacturers “to meet the needs of the settlers” as well as the
utilization of slave labor on sugar plantations in addition to “the boom of
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p°-s;rnd'poIiratdo^ “ war, control of
3) late eighteenth century- 1870<; tn r^’ PP- ^^3-4); and
based on merchant capital to one blsedmi “'r'"'the Industrial Revolution and the rise of ind"
European powers penetrated into colonLi in^"
materials and food production and in,n
' control over raw
productton in coJal
in land; extending the use of moneyTnd Ixch'anotrim"labor and recruitment of a labor force deneni
‘mposttton of forced
competitive native industry; creating a nL rt ®T ‘’'=""''’>'''’8
fostering ofnew elite groups as political d
including
mperial powers; imposition oftLculttIre”ofZ"°T''^''r''
with racism and other socioDsvchnln„ t i
* metropolitan centers, along
rule” (Magdoff, 1 978, pp. 1 06-7)
’aractenstics of minority foreign
.. was tn this third stage of impenahsm, wn.es Magdof, whereby
”Europea„ nations
spread their control...from 35 percent of the globe’s land surface in 1800 to 67 percent
n 1 878” (p. 1 08). As such, argues Chilco.e (2000), this new impenahsm in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which was advanced initially by Bn,am and then
later by the United States:
signified a shift from dominance over trade to control of industrialtransformation associated with the indus.nal revolution and thTpih ofurope toward manufactunng which necessitated extraction of rawmatenals the periphery and expansion of the world market (p. 14).
By WWI, notes Magdoff, the
“near-completion of the territorial division of the world”
was accomplished “among the leading capitalist nations (from the 67 percent of the
earth controlled by the Europeans in 1878 to 84.4 percent in 1914” (p. 108). After
WWII, it ts the successful “challenge by the United States to the financial hegemony of
Britain” which distinguishes this period (Magdoff, 1978, p. 109) although tmperialism
was continued anew by transnational and multinational contora.ions who exerted their
influence “beyond the national borders of the dominant nations” (Chilcote, 2000, p. 14).
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W,.h
.he nse of „.anufacU.„ng and
.he expans,on ,n.o
.nd..s.nah.a.ion hy
.ho
late nine.een.h cen.ury new
.narke.s were needed for produe.s, for ovenrrodne.ion and
undereons..nrp.ion in .he don.es..c nrarhe. were sa.d
.o sp.,r
.he
.novenren. of eap..a,
and henee i^pena, con.rol
.o foreign nrarhe.s (Hobson,
,902). Two Marxis. wn.ers
Hilferd.ng (.9.0/, 98,) and Len.n
„9.0/.982),
.ooh exeephon ,o Hobson's Cainrs of
underconsumphon as .he cause of Bn.ish
.n,pena. expansion in .he nine.een.h een.ury
,0 o.her par.s of .he wor.d and ins.ead argued
.ha. capi.aiism had reached a new s.age of
monopoly capi.aiism wi.h finance capital, ,ha, is cap.ial controlled by banks and
employed by industrialists, as its basis. Lenin expanded
.his argument and saw
.he
poLtical implications of this monopoly s.age of cap.talism as imperMism, which he
argued was ,he apex of cap.talis. development
.ha. would set .he s.age for .he eventual
transition to socialism.
The theory of Imperialism has its roots in Marxism and the subsequent
development of this thought by Lenin and others. As Linkla.er notes, recent years have
seen a “more balanced view of .he strengths and weaknesses ofMarxism” which “has
replaced the stereotypical representations of the doctrine which once prevailed.”
Concerned with developing a critical theory of international relations, its “impact is also
clearly evident in efforts to construct a political economy of international relations
which analyses [sic] the interplay between states and markets, the states-system and the
capttahst world economy, the spheres ofpower and production.” Moreover, Linklater
argues that Marxism’s relevance for international relations has increased since the
ending of'the age of bipolarity and with the heightened impact of globalization,” for,
he writes, Marxism is “intrigued by the processes which are unifying the human race—
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by globaliza,.on
,n the contnton parlance-and rightly ide„,,ne[s] capital,sn, as the
main driving force behind the unprecedented level of international interdependence”
(1995/1996, pp. 119-120)“
The melhodology behind Marx’s understand.ng of socio-h.storical relations is
dialectical ,n orientat.on while his epistemology combines dialectics with a
.nater.alist
outlook. Marx’s whole purpose was to develop a theory of social change, for he
sought to resolve Ihe dualism between consciousness and reality wh.le reserving the
mdependence of consciousness from external being. In what Maclean refers to as the
“empirico-analytic tradition,” one sought to “distinguish between object,ve facts, and
non-objective, evaluative statements” (Maclean. 1981. p. 54). The consequence of this
view, asserts Maclean, is that it both disallows “the poss,bility of coping with
significant change” on the one hand while postting the construction of socal reality “as
independent of persons activities within it” on the other (Maclean, 1 98 1
,
p. 54). In this
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In an interview published in the Chicago Tnbune on January 5. 1 879, Marx spoke ofin emafional relattons as ansmg between workers when asked by the reporter “Whathas socialism done so far?” “Two things,” he replied.
Socialists have shown the general universal stniggle between capital
and labor.
. .and consequently tried to bring about an understanding
between the workmen in the different countries, which became more
necessary as the capitalists became more cosmopolitan in hiring labor,
pitting foreign against native labor not only in America, but in England,
France, and Germany. International relations sprang up at once between
workingmen m the three different countries, showing that socialism was
not merely a local, but an international problem, to be solved by the
international action ofworkmen” (Marx, January 5, 1879, Chicago
Tribune) (italics mine).
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See Chapter 5 below “The Imperative of the Market & Its Democratic Cover” for a
discussion on the distinction of Marx’s dialectic from that of Hegel.
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respec., ,he ,nd,vidua, ex.s.ed «,e world bu. was no, of ,he world, and wb„o soca,
realdy was seen as natural and unchang.ng, practical questions ofcbange were couched
tn mechanical and deterministic terms. The epistemological dilennna which Marx
sough, ,0 correct, therefore, was the contradict.on between tdealism and mechanistic
materialism.
Marx’s starting point for the process of change and the means of change was his
understanding that all societies must reproduce themselves and this requires that they
to transfonn
engage in material production. The practical aim of this activity is thus
natural objects of little or no use in their original form into a condition where they can
satisfy human needs. And these needs, like the abilities required to satisfy them, are
themselves historically produced and transfomied. Thus, by production,
-what is mean,
is always production at a definite stage of social development-production by social
individuals” (Marx,
,857/,953/,973. p. 85). Matena, production, or the
-practical
construction of an objective world, the manipulation of inorganic nature, is the
confirmation ofman [and woman] as a conscious species-being; i.e. a being who treats
the species as his own being or himself as a species-being” (Marx, 1 843a/1964, pp. 127-
28). And humans, unlike animals, are not one with their life activity, for it is conscious
life activity itself which “distinguishes man [and woman] from the life activity of
animals.... Only for this reason is his [or her] activity free activity” and thus an object of
his [or her] will and consciousness (Marx, 1843a/1964, p. 127). Reality, therefore, is
“not merely objective datum, external to people, but is shaped by them through
consciousness” (Maclean, 1981, p. 55). At the same time. Marx maintains that there
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does always exist a natural material sub-stratum
Cognitive action, therefore,
lotheaetivityofhumaneonscousness.
."2 it
“ *" “
'“"ttotitg""''
«i.«,
i,
,
Change it and in this process change themselves. Staled Marx,
mys“e?pm;,hTra;l^al»^
The search for a deterministic causality based on the laws of nature itself is thus
abandoned for a perspeettve which sees causai.ty as directly related to the actions of
individuals upon nature (Chilcote, 1981
,
p. 184).
Historical change from this perspective is the result of connici between a
society sforces ofproduction and its relations ofproduction. While the fomier consist
of the sum of the material conditions of production including the raw materials, tools,
machines, etc., as well as the human beings themselves, with their knowledge and
experience, the latter are understood as the relations between human beings during the
process of production and the exchange relations of the material products in a society.
Together, the forces and relations of production form the mode ofproduction which
constitutes a society’s economic stnicture which is the delemiining factor in historical
development.
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From a diaiec.cal perspeCve. the forces and relations of product.on interact
with each other and changes the fomrer require adjustments in the latter. But, Marx
argued, society heretofore has been organi^ed into classes conform.ng to people’s
relationship to the means of production, and those ,n a class society who benefit from
obsolete productton relations will not voluntarily relinquish their privileged positions.
The consequent struggle between the different classes in society thus results either in
the defeat of the contending class or the overthrow of the previous ruling class. The
state from this perspective acts in the interests of the economically dominant ruling
class and ensures that all other societal interests are subordinated to those of the ruling
class. Under capitalism. Marx and Engels asserted, the “modem state is but a
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx &
Engels, 1848/1948/1998. p. 11 ,. In this respect, the state mediates the interests of the
bourgeoisie but in no way reconciles class conflict. As Lenin outlined Marx’s idea of
the state, he noted;
The state is the product and the manifestation of the irrecoticilability of
class antagonisms. The state arises when, where, and to the extent that
the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled. And
conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms
are irreconcilable (Lenin, 1917/1971, p. 8).
Class, therefore, is the basic unit of analysis from a Marxist perspective and
hence m the theory of impenahsm, but its meaning is void unless one is familiar with
the elements on which classes rest. For example, in the capitalist epoch, one must
understand the relationship between wage-labour and capital. Capitalism, Marx stated,
simplifies class relations pitting the bourgeoisie or owners of the means of production
or, more specifically, those who appropriate the surplus labor in the form of surplus
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value as well as
.hose capi.ahs.s („,ercha„.s os nsoneylendess) who psovi.e fos
co,K,i.ions of ex,s.e„ce for ,hc funhan.en.a, class process-agains,
,hc ranks of .he
prolcana. or . Cass of lahorers, who hve on, so long as .hey n,. work, anri who Hnr
work only so long as .he.r labor
.ncreases capl.al” (Marx & Engels, 1848/1948/1998, p.
1 5)." Under capdalisnr, ,he value of a conrnrodi.y produced exceeds
.he sun, of .he
value of labour-power and nreans of produCon consruned in Ihc process. This is
possible only because
.he exchange value of labour-power is less
.ban i.s use value in
Ihc means of produclion. Unless the use value of labour
value, no surplus value is created. Thus labour-r
-power exceeds its exchange
-power IS the only commodity whose use
adds value ,o other commodities and, consequently, is .he source of all value. The class
confromation in capitalism thus arises out of the fact .ha, .he prole.aria, is lirs, forced ,o
sell Its labour-power to the bourgeois owners of production for a wage in order to
subsist, and secondly, the workers must produce more value than they are paid in
wages. Thus conHicts over the intensity and conditions ofwork characterize the
antagomstic class conflict of capitalist production and structure the technical and social
aspects of that production (Bottomore, et al., 1983, p. 266). The level of analysis from a
Marxian perspective, as a result, must always concern itself with the mode of
production.
To understand the political economy of capitalism, we must, therefore, begin
with commodities from the moment products are exchanged one for another. These
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For a fuller explanation of “fundamental” and “subsumed” class processes as well as
distinctions between various types of capitalists, see Chapter 5 below “The Imperative
of the Market & Its Democratic Cover”.
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products exchanged are contntodh.es
,n so far as they represent a relationsh.p between
two persons or conrnrnntt.es. The thing or product thus represents the relat.on between
producers and consumers who are no longer, as in feudal, snr. un.ted in the same person.
Economics, therefore, deals not with th.ngs but with relat.ons between persons and. in
the last resort, between classes' vet the^p rpiatirx i, y se relations always are attached to things and
appear as things.
While commodity production brought together propertyless workers w.th
property-ownmg capitalists, it possessed certain
.ntemal contrad.ctions which Marx saw
as the basis for its transfomration. Capitalists engaged m commodity production in
order to accumulate capital. As such, capitalists do not seek to raise the standard of
living of the masses, for this would mean a lower rate of profit. Surplus capital.
therefore, will always be used for the purpose of increasing profits. This process of
accumulating capital, however, led toward the increasing concentration of the means of
production and command over labour-power m the hands of a few capitalists, which in
turn, as Marx pointed out, widened the basis for large-scale production. By the late 19th
century, the tendencies to greater concentration of capital, and hence larger-scale
production, developed to the point where monopolies formed which subjugated free
competition to capitalist monopoly. The results of this inherent contradiction between
monopoly and the subjugation of the fundamental characteristic of capitalism of free
competition were “cartels, syndicates and tmsts, and merging with them,” wrote Lenin,
“the capital of a dozen or so banks manipulating thousands of millions” (Lenin,
1916/1982, p. 88). Monopoly, therefore, contradicts free competition, and by repressing
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.he
.a„er sets the stage for the trans.t.on fro. cap..a„snr to a higher syste. of
production, turning laissez-faire capitalism into its opposite.
Capitalism must ever strive for the accumulation of capital, but the qualitative
leap in large-scale production along with the tremendous concentration of capital
erected a bamier to the continuation of capital accumulation on the national market
alone. Surplus profits, therefore, had to be exported abroad to, what Lenin called, the
“backward countries” (Lenin, 1916/1982, p. 63). Thus, it is monopoly which fonns the
basis for the qualitative leap m the socialization of production, and the focus of
socialization now concentrates on integration of this process on a global scale. The
tremendous significance of this socialization of production, wrote Lenin, is that:
Capitalism m its impenalist stage arrives at the threshold of the mostcomplete socialisation of production. In spite of themselves, the
capitalists are dragged, as it were, into a new social order, a transitional
social order from complete free competition to complete socialisation
Production becomes social, but appropriation remains privateThe social means of production remain the private property of a fewThe general fr^ework of formally recognized free competition remains,but the yoke of a few monopolists on the rest of the population becomes
heavier, more burdensome and intolerable (Lenin,
1916/1982, p. 25).
War, therefore, m the stage of imperialism is the only means to break through
the obstacles of continued capitalist accumulation and export of capital and
commodities and to set a new framework for accumulation.^^ War becomes a necessary
66
In his classic defense of the pacific nature of capitalism, Schumpeter (1951) argues
to the contrary and asserts that modem imperialism is merely a residual effect from the
precapitalist autocratic state. “Imperialism,” he argues, “is atavistic in character” (p.
84). Modem capitalism’s detrimental aspects including “export monopolism”, the use
offeree to break down customs barriers or to secure control over foreign markets, or
overt colonization and the suppression of native labor, are all the product not of the
and centra, eletncn. to the workings of the whole systen, ntore so than at the earlier
stages of capita, acetnnulatton. Thus, the poiittca, d.vts.ons between countries hccotne
itnportan, in the sense that states, winch represent the power and interests of different
ntling Casses, must mediate the potential co„niet of ruling Cass interest. This conHict
can take the fonn either of
.nter-capitalist rivalry or nva,^ between a capitalist t.nd a
pre-capitalist state. Whatever fonn the rivalry takes, however, will rcstdt in the
territonal divis.on of the world among the great capitalist powers, and production and
distribut.cn will become centralized in tn.enta, capitalist monopol.es, trusts or cartels.
It is thus in this fundamental histoncal materialist thesis where the Imperialist
paradigm disagrees most with the Dependency theorists, for the lutpcrialis. school
asserts the paras, tic nature of capital on labour in general and no, merely between
nat.onal capital. Thus imperialism refers not to the “oppression and
‘exploitatton' of
weak, impoverished countries by powerful ones” but “to the process of capitalist
ACCUMULATION on a world scale in the era of MONOPOLY CAPITALISM, and
the theory of imperialism is the investigation of accumulation in the context of a world
market created by that accumulation” (Bottomore, et al., 1983, p. 223). The
present but, rather, of past relations of production.
he social structure, m individual, psychological habits of emotional reaction...mustpadually disappear” with the fuller development of capitalism (p. 85) Modem
mipenahsm, he argues, is “a heritage of the autocratic state, of its stmctural elements
organizational fonns, interest alignments, and human attitudes, the outcome of
precapitalist forces which the autocratic state has reorganized, in part by the methods of
early capitalism” (p. 128). “A purely capitalist world,” he writes, “can offer no fertile
soil to impenahst impulses.” Indeed, Schumpeter argues, “we must expect that anti-
imperialist tendencies will show themselves wherever capitalism penetrates the
economy and, through the economy, the mind ofmodem nations” (pp. 90-91).
“[MJodem pacificism,” he writes, “in its political foundations if not its derivation, is
unquestionably a phenomenon of the capitalist world” (p. 92).
Dependency school, by bas.ng i,s enhre theorcical argunKn, on ,he
.echnologica. and
nnancal dependence of La.in Anaerica. Africa, and As, a on comers of ,ndns,nal.a.ion
l.ke ,he Un.,ed Stales or Great Britain, thus mainta.ns the ntysttfication of the power of
capital and technology as the remedy to ‘•development,” while the class contradiction of
production and appropnation is all but ignored. States Johnson,
They distract attention from the essential Mantian concept (and
matenahst point) that labor power alone is the creative force of socialhmtory and of technology and capital), while capital is but a mere fonnsocial relations, a product itselfof that labor power (Johnson, 1 983 p
In this respect, the dependency perspective is criticized for its underemphasis on class
analysis and its overemphasis on external determination to the neglect of offering
matenalist explanations of the sociohistorical relations which exists.
Underdevelopment, therefore, cannot be totally attributed to capitalism which
forces a uniform mode of production on countries in the periphery. The historical-
structural struggle between classes must be examined in particular. While the drive for
accumulation on a world scale structures territorial classes into subordinate
relationships, it must not be forgotten, as Marx pointed out, that people “make their own
history but they do not make it just as they please” but rather “under circumstances
directly found, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1852/1978, p. 595). The
historical imposition of capitalism on the Third World appropriated “other modes of
production and/or division of labor, dominant classes, or religious beliefs to facilitate or
guarantee its dominance and reproduction” (Chinchilla, 1983, p. 160). Hence, the pace
and development of capitalism will vary according to other modes of production with
which It interacts. The contradictions engendered by these conflicting modes of
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production and the process ofchange ntust be understood therefore not as a hnear
evoiutionisnt but as dialectical and interactive. Thus n. articulattng modes of
production as the basic level of analysis, it is first necessa^ to be cognizant of
conflictual relationships between different modes of production and with their own
internal contradictions emanating either in the forces or relations of production. And
secondly, focus,ng on modes of production as the primary level of analysis is done in
order to understand the matenal basts and work.ngs of the basic unit of analysis in
Marxian thought which is class or class alliances.
In recognizing relations ofdependency as a product of stmctural heirarchies
beholden to monopoly capital, one understands the material basis for this situation as
arising out of the struggle between the contradictions of social production and private
appropriation which “one must be able to link up the ideological theses within the social
sciences with specific class needs at particular moments in histoiy” (Johnson, 1983, p.
91). Only from this material contradiction, asserts Johnson, “can one understand
Marx’s political conclusions about the historical need for socialist revolution” (Johnson,
1983, p. 93). Lacking this basic materialist understanding, the dependenlislas propose
ideas of socialism which tend to isolate the local dominant classes thereby isolating
workers while encouraging “petty bourgeois intellectuals into isolated acts of guerilla
violence” which have little short-term effects and “monopoly capital (imperialism)
remains untouched in the end” (Johnson, 1983, pp. 95-96). And these conclusions are
the direct result of the depemlenlislas positing their level of analysis at the point of
market and exchange relations and the circulation of commodities, capital, and labour.
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In analysing nation to natton relations, therefore, tite ideologieal theses of the
dependency school concludes as follows;
First, the United States (monopoly capital) denefuh on t a
countries (eot.petit.veeapitairfor^heVo?h;^o::t:^
^ Amcncan countries depend on the UnitedStates for finance capital and technology, given the historinl r iv
oftmperialis^-seontroloverthenteantfV::;*^^
0.rd, the United States and Latin Anterican eountnes (interXt; of,one another, given the international division of labor and the system ofcapital production (Johnson, 1983, pp. 87-88).
Had they located their level of analysis in the mode of production, the
dependency theorists would have reeognized the determining eontradietion of soeialized
production and private appropriation and thus of the parasitic nature of eapital on labour
in general and not merely between national capitals. From this materialist level of
analysis, they would have been able to reverse their scientific theses, which justifies
continued imperialist domination, and linked them with the historical needs of the
proletariat, to read as follows:
First, the United States is independent of Latin American countries,
given Its control over the means of production, its own labor forces, and
its control over capital accumulation; second Latin American countries
are independent of the United States, given their productive, creative
potential to construct their own historical process; and third, the United
States and Latin American countries are independent of one another
based on each other’s relative position of autonomy within the
international division of labor, and so on (Johnson, 1983, p. 88).
From this matenahst understanding, derived by basing one’s level of analysis in a
society’s mode of production and analyzing the contradictions which therein arise,
Marxists claim to be able to posit a coherent theory of IR which understands the
imperialist nature of monopoly capitalism thus avoiding the dependency theorists’
fixation with surplus value exchange which has left them “unable to combat the very
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relations they explicitly hope to eliminate: the impenahst relations of production and
appropnation of capital” (Johnson, 1983, p. 90).
Many of these debates between the Dependeney sehool and the Impenahst
school tmpacted upon the development of World-Systems theory whtch first arose out
of Immanuel Wallerstein’s TJ,e Modern World Sys.en, (1974). World-Systems theory,
as an altemat.ve globalist paradigm, is primarily a response to the stntctural-
functtonahst approach dominant in the U.S. from the 1940s through the 1960s which
postulated a universal model of societal development known as “modemization theoty”,
Countetposing traditional
“undifferentiated” societies with a hm.ted number of
institutions (oriented pnmarily around family and kinship) to modem industrial
“differentiated” societies-with differentiated institutions, both public and private,
being the key to development and societal survival-modernization theory held that all
socteties have already or will shortly develop through a similar developmental process.
Lack of development in Third World societies was thus “simply the result of ‘historical
backwardness’.” Once traditional societies overcame their backwardness by revamping
thetr social structures, cultural values, and political institutions,” then “these societies
would be in a position to take advantage of transfers of industrial technology from the
West and to begin improving their economies” (Shannon, 1989, pp. 4-5). Key to
modernization theory was the necessity to copy institutions of the advanced states in the
West and, with Western educational and technical assistance and training, speed up the
process of development. The motivation for Western industrial societies to actively
participate in this program of assistance to developing countries was in part to counter
communist influences in these “backward” countries. States Shannon:
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If modeniization was nol encouraged and shaped by Western efforts tt,onstng discontent that derived from the breakdown of trad“ uesystems and institutions and from increased expectations long the
rlolril^ Communist-inspired
Wel; i 9i;p bl dictatorships hostile to the
While criticism of modernization theory was varied and included castigation of
its ahistoncal approach, its lack of concern with the particulanties of different socteties,
Its assumptions of orderly change and preference for stability, the major criticism by
World-Systems theorists dealt with modernization theory’s attnbu.ion of the problems
and lack of development in the so-called backward countries as an internal factor owing
to these societies’ preference for traditional institutions. To the contrary, argued
modernization theory’s erities:
such a view ignored several centuries of cultural contact, trade
colomzation, and political-military intervention by Europe and (later) by
the United States. Hence, satd the critics, these countries stopped being
true tradittonal soctettes well before the twentieth century. Rather, theyhad been changed into new kinds of societies that fit neither the
traditional nor modem categories of modernization theory (Shannon
1989, pp. 6-7).
’
Histoncal backwardness in developing nations was thus the result of a system of
exploitation emanating from the relatively developed industrialized societies in the
world system.
Influenced by the work of Fernand Braudel (1981, 1982, 1984) and the concerns
of French historical thought associated with the Annales school and its journal,
Wallerstein was initially interested in the colonial structures as they applied to Africa
but was unable to account for general attributes of this situation without focusing on the
world-system itself. After jettisoning states as an appropriate unit of analysis in his
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concluded that tlic world-system which had arisen out of Europe in the
sixteenth eentury and spread aeross the globe was the only nsefni level ofanalysis for
hispuTToses. He states: -1 had one type of unit rather than units whhtn units. I eould
explain ehanges in the sovereign states as eonseeptent upon the evolution and interaetion
of the world-systenr-
, Wallerstein, 1 074, p. 7,. This decision then led Inn, to focus ,n
on what he felt was a fundanrental discontinuity or break ,n the historical process which
protluced this world-system. The “rupture” in the historical process, he concludes,
occurred in Europe
in the long sixteenth centum: and that involverl the ,ra„sfon,u„ion of a
Europe
‘a7rr,ders^^^ ‘"'’a
of production, that of fettdai
differen !
“0"omic Ancien Regime") into a cptalitatively
i c t social system (Wallerstein, 1980, pp. 7-8).
The signincance of this historical watershed, states Wallerstein,
,s matched only by “the
so-eallcd neolithic or agricultural revolution” (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 3)." As opposed to
the previottsly existing rsolated world-empires or world-economies which perchance did
trade with one another, Wallerstein postulated the development of a world economy
which originated in sixteenth eentury Europe and was linked initially with South
Amcrtca but later expanded to incorporate most areas of the world thus forming the
modern world-system. In this sense, a world-system
IS a soeial system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups
rules of legitimation, and coherenee. Its life is made up of the conflicting
forces which hold it together by tension, and tear it apart as each group
seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of
an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics
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Carlo Cipolla dates this agricultural revolution from the eighth millenium B.C.E. and
states that it, along with the eighteenth century Industrial Revolution, “created deep
breaches in the continuity of the historical process” ( 1962/1964, p. 29).
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change in some respects and remain slable in other, n„„ ,r
structures as be.ng at different times strong or weak in .tntemal logic of its functioning (Wallerstein. 1974. p
In addition, he adds, a world system has an ^extensive division of labor” winch ”is no,
merely functional-that
,s. occupational--but geographical. That is to say, the range of
economtc tasks ts no, evenly distnbuted throughout the world-system” (Wallerstein,
1974, p. 349), Moreover, ”,he Cass.cal lines of d.vis.on within social science are
meaningless,” he argues, when one studies a social system as opposed to a ‘liberal
conception of the state and its relat.on to func.onal and geographical sectors of the
social order.” As a consequence, world-systems theoty calls for a “unidisciplina^
approach” as opposed to a “multidisciplinaty approach”, thus muting the efforts of
anthropology, economics, pohtical science, socology, and history (Wallerstein. 1974, p.
11 ).
Historically, the modem world-system is the only such world-system and
incorporates a “set of relatively stable economic and political relationships that has
charactenzed a major portion of the globe since the sixteenth century” (Shannon, 1989,
pp. 20-21). This new type of social system which emerged is set apart from its
histoncal antecedents by the particular nature of its political economy which is “a
capitalist economy organized into an interstate system"’ (Shannon, 1989, p. 22). By this
understanding, it is the particular way in which exploitation occurs which distinguishes
the modem world-system from previous societal formations. Whereas accumulation of
surplus previously had been extracted by political coercion through taxes, tribute,
slavery, and other means usually by a hereditary aristocracy who controlled the state, by
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contras, accu^u.anon of surplus under capnaUsn,
,s undena.en by
.be pnva.e owners
of .he nreans ofproduCon. The role of
.he s.a.e under
.his new econonnc sys.enr
bdTes loV;t'rf
—
.ennsofe.eha„rar/p^rp:^^^
(^al^" -'^ntrises
This new sys.en, ,s a capi.abs. sys.enr because i. is based upon ‘‘(I) proH. maximizing
and .he search for eonrpe.ihve advantage through efficiency. (2) .he quest for conhnual
cap.tal accumulation, and (3) the exploi.afion of labor by .he owners of .he means of
production” (Shannon, 1989, p. 23). Its fundamental imperative, however,
-is capital
accumulation for the owners of the means of production” (Shannon, 1989, p. 28).
Moreover, as Hopkins explains, the most fundamental theoretical claim of world-
systems theory is as follows:
It IS the articulation of the^rrocmes of the world-scale division and
Integra
,on oHabor and Ihe processes of state-formation and deformation(the latter in the twin context of interstate relations and relations ofimp^enum) that constitute the system’s formation and provide an account
at the most general level, for the patterns and features of its development’(hence, of the patterns and features ofmodem social change). The
articulation of the two sets of processes necessarily results, in the theorym the network of relations among political formations (states, colonies
’
etc.) being patterned like the network of relations among production-
accumulation zones (core-periphery), and vice versa (Hopkins, 1982, p.12 ).
In addition to its capitalist economic organization, the other basic aspect of the
modem world-system is that it is comprised of competing sovereign nation-states, none
of which has been able to eliminate its counterparts. Indeed, writes Wallerstein:
It IS the peculiarity of the modem world-system that a world-economy
has survived for 500 years and yet has not come to be transformed into a
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79 (Wallers,ei„.
Precisely because of the multiplicity of states in the system. Wallerstetn argues, has
capttalism flourished. This large ••arena- allowed economic factors to operate beyond
.he control of any single political entity.
-This gives capitalists a freedom of maneuver
.ha, is stntcurally based. „ has made possible the constant economic expansion of the
world-system, albeit a very skewed distribution of its
348).
rewards” (Wallerstein, 1974, p.
Besides nation-states, other components of World-Systems theory include
economic zones, social classes, and status groups. Borrowing from Dependency theory,
World-Systems theorists utilize the terms core
, semi-periphery”, and “periphery” to
categorize the world social division of labor. These terms, states Hopkins, “designate
complementary portions of the world-economy and only denvatively pertain to its
political division” (Hopkins, 1982, p. 1 1). Core states are understood to be
economically and politically dominant states in the world-system which have access to
the most advanced technological processes and thus specialize in manufacturing the
most sophisticated goods. As well, core states’ military power is superior to the other
economic zones of the system. Although initially confined to Europe, the U.S. and
Japan are understood to have attained core status in the twentieth century.
At the other end of the world-systems spectrum are those states and colonies in
what IS referred to as the periphery. Relatively weak in terms of military power, states
in the periphery are technologically deficient and engage in more labor-intensive
production. Consisting ofmost states in South and Central America, Africa, and Asia,
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•‘production for export was concentrated on raw ntaterials an<l agricultural
connnod.ties” in these states for“n,ost of the ntoden, era” (Shannon, 1989, p, 25 ).
Existing as a mid-point between core and periphery states, and winch also act to
ntediate hetween these two extremes, are what are known as semi-peripheral states.
Exhibiting a mixture of more-or-less technological sophistication in production
mechanisms relative to their core/periphery counterparts, the organization-both
political and military-of these semi-peripheral states (e.g. Brazil and Argentina) grants
hem a degree of autonomy envied by states in the pertphery, though their subordinate
status in the world-system maintains their dependent status on the core stales.
With regard to social classes, world-systems theorists follow Marx’s
classification of differentiating social groupings according to their relationship to the
means of production. In contrast to world-empires which preexisted the modem world-
system where the basic distinction was between those who controlled the slate
machincor and those who did not, under the modem capitalist world-system, the basic
distinction “is between those who own the means of production and those who arc
denied ownership” (Shannon, 1989, p. 27).
A final social cleavage which world-systems theorists recognize is that of status-
groupings “whose solidarity derives from cultural identification” based on factors such
as “religion, language, race, or ethnicity” which, in the modem era, have “become
organized into nations or peoples governed by a single state.” The significance of these
groupings for world-systems theory is that these identifications have often “prevented
global class solidarity of both the capitalist class and the proletariat” (Shannon, 1989,
pp. 27-8).
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While world-sysle^s theory constitutes a relatively new perspect.ve by which to
analyze intentational relations, one of its ntost pronnsing studtes (Boswell & Chase-
Dunn. 2000) relates direetly-if only as postulating an altetnat.ve conception of
democracy from that being promoted by the NED-,o the
,bests of the present
dissertation. In theonzing the prospects for wha, they call
-global democracy,” these
theorists analyze antisystemic social and labor movements from 1 848 to the present
whtch have overcome the worst fonrrs of dominat.on including slavery and colon.alism,
and they postulate ”a spiral ofeconomic expansion and social progress by which the
modem world-system has expanded and intensif.ed to become the global pohtical
economy of today” (Boswell & Chase-Dunn, 2000, pp. xi-xii).
Rejecting teleological claims which postulate the inevitability of progress,
Boswell and Chase-Dunn utilize structuralist and materialist theories in light of the
impact of cultural factors and individual decisionmaking to formulate a response to
what they see as “the current ideological hegemony of neoliberalism” (p. xii). With the
world economy as their level of analysis, they recognize certain systemic trends and
cycles which have molded the world-system over the long-tenn. As well, they
acknowledge “the impermeability of the global capitalist system,” asserting that the
various attempts ofcommunist or socialist states to break out of the system were “never
feastble m practice” (pp. 3-4). Nonetheless, they argue that the parameters of the world-
system are not impervious to social action from below as witnessed by the change in
mies governing global capitalist relations over the past 500 years including the
abolishment of slavery, the liberation of colonies, and the winning ofdemocracy in
various areas of the world. However, they warn, individual action at the state level is
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not sufficient to generate permanent change in the world-system; on the contrary, they
write,
“institutions and relations at the global level must be chainged in order to foster
equality and end exploitation in every state” (p. 5)
Boswell's and Chase-Dunn's conception of global democracy has a dual
characteristic in that it advocates for “democratic institutions governing the ever more
integrated world economy” while, at the local level, they call for “economic
management and social administration as well as politics and the state open to
democratic participation.” In this regard, they assert, “[d]emocracy includes civil and
individual human rights, without which democratic institutions are meaningless.”
Moreover, they argue, “nghts in the economy, and links between the economy and the
polity, are also fundamental to any conception ofdemocracy that can actually produce
social justice and equality” (pp. 5-6). Consequently, they reject the simple notion which
equates the mere presence of popular elections with democracy. Without economic
democracy, they argue, what results are “highly unequal, class-divided societies”
governed by “an elected polyarchy.” This is the form of democracy, they assert, which
currently exists in the United States and is promulgated world-wide by the U.S.
[National] Endowment for Democracy as the political basis for the neoliberal
globalization project” (p. 6).
Rejecting the necessity for state ownership of the means of production to
achieve their goals of meeting basic social needs, sustainable development, social
justice, and peace, they nonetheless believe that the actions of workers worldwide can,
through the twin processes of market competition and class conflict, contest the
standards and rules of the current capitalist world order. The accumulation of capital
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aiongs.de its cycles of expansion and s.agnai.on
-‘produces a spiraling growth nr
production forces that, however unevenly, always offers periods w.th the possibihty of
.nrproving people's lives- (p. ,0). Adnntting that an alternative response to cap.tal.st
globalization could well be led by forces of national chauvinism which “can easily
devolve into racism and xenophobta,” they argue that ,t is for this reason that the
-contemporary transnat.onal dnve toward heightened explo.tation can only be checked
by - what they refer to as “transnational pohlics ” In particular, they argue:
Global labor standards, environmental regulations, and women’s rights
form a smgle starting point. Through institutions of global democncvor and allied movements can direct market competition away fromcheaper wages and toward increasing human productivity. In world
The present study with its focus on the NED and the export of a U.S. brand of
democracy abroad m an attempt to secure U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War world
and into the 21» century, draws selectively from each of these globalist theoretical
paradigms. Historical materialism provides an understanding of the animating aspects
of both societal and material development and the underlying dialectical tensions in the
historical epoch of capitalism. In addition, Gramsci’s further elaboration of historical
matenahsm as presented in Chapter 1 provides insight into the necessity for a would-be
ruling class to provide leadership without simply relying on the use offeree so as to
engender a socio-political moral ethic to win legitimacy for its programs and rule, thus
exerting sufficient hegemony necessary for its reproduction and continuity. And while
Dependency theory’s distinctions between core and periphery are useful in categorizing
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asym,nelries of power and wcalll, imcrnal.onally,
,,s undorslanding ofcxploi,a(ion as
occurring between states fails to aeconnt for the new processes associated with
globalization winch are beginning to bring pockets of wealth to these traditionally
neglected areas in the Third World winie exaccrbat.ng disparities of wealth within core
soeicttes themselves, albeit the major economic divide still rests between the so-called
ilcvciopcd and developing nations.'’" On the other hand, the broad international
systemic context presented by World Systems theory, positing a trtdy global systen,
currently capitalist in orientation, provides the fundamental framework for analyzing the
evolution and integration of the world capitalist economy and the interdependencies of
social classes, states, status groups, their effect upon struggles both within and between
States, the effect the overall system has recursively on these struggles, while
highlighting the antisystemic movements which act to alter current constraints of the
global capitalist system. Because the capitalist mode of production is dominant
throughout the system, the level of analysis it posits for international relations theory
rests at the level of the global economy. However, this writer agrees with Halliday
(1999) that World Systems theory’s implicit assumption that all antisystemic
movements opposed to capitalism are “necessarily part of a broader emancipatory
process conveys too much of a unity on them “and commonality of direction” (pp.
68
To this starting point list should be added the fight against racism as well
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Dependency theory has historically catalogued how much of the asymmetries
resulting from the internationalization of capitalism has played out and been understood
by many, especially by those theorists from the world’s periphery whose countries have
suffered the most from core domination of developing economies.
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306-7). Moreover, as Halliday points out, many of the soci-,Im„ ,y me ial movements since the mid-
1960s were “anything but emancipatory” including:
RjaThf^r,'irrad^^^
Indeed, Halliday’s central critic.sm of World Systems theory is its assertion that
the whole world is inextricably cap.taltst in onentation. The theoty pos.ts, for example,
that the Soviet Union and its Hasten, European satellites were part of the capitalist
world system. If there has only been one system, then oppositional forces to
conimumsm “were part of the same world-wide movement as those opposed to
cap.taltst states”; however, if there were indeed two world systems during the existence
of the Soviet Union in conflict with one another, “then those opposed to the system on
one side were, by dint of this opposition, supportive of the system in the other.” In this
case, he writes:
The antisystemic’ movements within the established ‘antisystemic’ were
therefore ‘prosystemic’: this, indeed, was what the historical function of
the opposition movements in the East turned out to be. In a systemically
divided world, two negatives make a positive (Halliday, 1999, p. 307).
The state-capitalist nature of the Soviet Union has been argued by many including
Resnick and Wolff (Summer 1993), with the central aspect of this latter critique
pointing out that the social surplus failed to be appropriated and allocated by the direct
producers. On this basis, the accumulation of surplus by the state and its managers
often mimicked processes of accumulation in the developed capitalist states. And while
this wnter agrees with this analysis, it is nevertheless arguable that the Soviet Union and
those countries which followed its lead represented nascent, though ultimately
127
unsuccessful. a„en,p,s ,o ,uove beyond ,he cap.u,|,s, world syslcnr. thus providing
hisloncal experience fronr wluch ,o draw upon. With
.heir collapse, however, even ,he
remaining nominally communis, regimes have, more or less, opened up ,heir societies
.0 market-based eeonom.cs, operating under the principles of prof., maximization and
pnvately-appropriated extraction of surplus.
Wnting on the nature of revolutions-i.e. the ultimate antisystenric movement-
and their impact on the world system. Halliday proposes a seisn.ologic analogy wluch
underscores the systemic level of analyis for IR.
“[RJevolutions,” he states:
occur in particular places, as do volcanoes and earthquakes, but we canonly understand these specific explosions by looking a, broader contextsand structures within which the revolutions, their causes and their
contexts, are located. An earthquake or a volcano tells us to look at
underlying stmetures and faults in the earth’s surface as a whole, not just
at the site of the explosion itself ( 1 999, p. 3
1
Q).
^
And though not all antisystemic movements are revolutionary in nature, the key aspect
of Halliday’s analogy is that analyses which focus only on individual countries to
explain change or potential changes “will miss the ideological, or economic, or power
political context” in which such crises occur. Neither, he warns, can the international or
systemic level be the sole focus, for “this will not explain why states pursue the policies
they do, nor why such policies have the outcomes they have.” With a broader
internationalised perspective” that encompasses socioeconomic and ideological
structures, then not only will we be able to understand the particular forces that generate
revolutions, but, as well, and contrarily, such a wider perspective will also help to
explain “why, given the vast range of potential causes, domestic and international, there
is not more upheaval in societies than there is” (pp. 310-11). What is proposed by
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Hanida, wi„, his se,sn,„logic analogy ansing on. of his sUuly of
.voh.hons
.s no. ,he
displacement of the state, bu, rather ,ts redefinition: states are to be seen not as
undifferentiated legal-.errt.orial entities, nor as units that operate ,n an abstract
international system, bu. as the eoercive and admtnis.ra.ive en.it,es that polt.iea, and
social forces both challenge and appropriate” (p. 3 1
1 ). this respect, states are sites of
contention, and changes within them affect the constitut.on and stability of the
international system. And jus. as coercive and administrative practices of reward and
punishment occur within states as dominant classes seek to perpetuate the econonne and
social bases of their rule, so too at the level of the global capitalist system are there
constraints along with benefits and rewards in addition to punishments meted out in
order to maintain and extend the system.
In addition to his reconceptualization of the state, Halliday argues for linkage
between the socio-economic context and that of ideology or culture. Thus in examining
the socio-economic aspects of a regime, we should “also look at the ideology that
underpins it, and at the preconditions, internal and external, for that stability” (p. 314 ).
Yet, he notes, approaches which stress the importance of ideas and culture must be
distinguished from that which “bases its account of change on the role ofhuman will.”
The latter does not follow from the former, he argues. To the contrary, he writes:
Ideas, culture, and language may be part not of the domain of human
volition and of meaningful collective action, but rather of that which
contextualizes and constrains: individuals are bom into a world of
realities they cannot change, and these include the culture, religion,
language, the texture of social meaning that envelops them. These are
constraints as important as social and economic structure. When they
change, they can, equally, be part of that convulsion of the system that
takes individuals and social groups along with it (Halliday, 1999, p. 313).
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Lastly, in his reassessment ofintemattonal relations theory and approaches.
Hall,day argues for the incorporation of soc.al movements and classes. Social
movements, he wntes. challenge states both internally and externally, and the successful
ones that make revolutions “are fontted ,n an international context.” The hroadc,
transnational forces which actually make revolutions prompt Marxists to posi, “classes
as both internationally constituted and internationally aot.ve” while hkewise prompting
behaviourahsts to view such events as “affected by, and in turn affect, the conduct of
others, through demonstration effects and a range of transnational linkages.” Both
approaches, argues Halliday, pose a conception of IR “that displaces the primacy of
states and seeks to locate individual revolutions, or political processes in general, within
a broader context of transnational action" (1 999, p. 315). Revolutionary situations
always break down the barriers between states and societies. In this regard. Halliday
writes: “1789 challenged 1648, 1 848 challenged 1815. [and) the twentieth-century
revolutions repeatedly defied schemes for the maintenance of international order.” The
permanence of transnational infiuences engendered by revolutions persist for some time,
though “the stability of societies presupposes, inter alia, a favourable international
economic climate, and the reinforcement, by shared practice, of the political and social
practices of the country m question.” Here the factor of a dominant ideology must not
only be instilled within particular societies but as well “reinforced from outside by an
appearance of naturalness” (Halliday, 1 999, p. 3 1 6). Values and ideology thus refiect
the constitution of transnational social groups and classes who exhibit a convergence of
interest, shared values and ideology due to the simularity of conditions produced by
transnational forces. The same transnational forces constitute similarities in values and
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aleology for the donr.na.ed as well, including workers, peasants, and
.ntellecluals.
Halliday notes, however, that while social groups and classes nray be satd to have a
convergence of interests
-.n the sense that their secunty, prosperity and wealth ts to a
considerable extent dependent on international conditions.
.
.
[this] does not. however,
entail that classes have a transnational identity or consciousness” (1999, p. 317).
Pointing out that the possessing classes, the bourgeoisie, have been globalizing their
interests since the Second World War, he notes, to the contrary, that the dominated
classes—including both service and part-time workers which are a product of
transnational forces in the late twentieth century-have been less able to put forward
their interests internationally, “for the dominated,” he argues, “do not have the
investments, the material incentive, to articulate an international interest that the
dominant do.” In this respect, the “dominant have more resources-money, air tickets,
conference centres, [computers,] administrative support, time itself—than the
dominated. ’ In the ensuing conflict between transnational and national forces, Halliday
IS cautious to remind the reader that “[sjocial movements act in a context of states and,
in the longer run, serve to reinforce states, internally and externally” (1999, p. 318). But
in acknowledging the ground on which such movements are played out, he nonetheless
asserts that such changes which are produced in revolutionary periods cannot be
explained “by a logic of states, balances of power and idees regues’" nor by such logic
can their impact on the international system itself be explained. To the contrary, he
argues. Only a dual perspective, incorporating both state and society, can encompass
the international dimensions of revolutions” (Halliday, 1999, p. 319).
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The “inescapable comex,” in which societal conHicts are played om the
ntodem world_.nciud.ng revolu.ions, conHic.s between states, social classes and
deologies, is. he wtates. a combined and uneven process. Drawing on Tro.sky-s
formulation of the laws of uneven and co,nbined development (cf Trotsky, 1932;
1931/1969) which respectively pointed out how backward countries are compelled to
make leaps to catch up ideologically, technologically, etc. with their relatively
developed counterparts while simultaneously combinhig different stages of
development in this leap forward, Halliday notes that it is this broad contradictory
context which explains “how ideas, and forms of conflict, l.ke fom,s of technology or
economic activity, could be transposed to contexts very different from that in which
they onginated” (1999. p. 320). In concluding that “the combination would prevail over
the unevenness,” Halliday states that this Marxist approach to the laws which
ant.c.patcd a “world revolutionary cataclysm” (i.e. the combination) failed due to “the
fragmentary character of states, the spatial and political distributor of that unevenness”
( 1 999, pp. 320- 1 ). This unevenness is particularly exacerbated in the current period of
capitalist globalization, as evident with the ever-w.dening gaps between rich and poor
on a global scale. Globalization impacts on the level of states as well as the
socioeconomie and ideological levels. Writes Halliday:
States and eommunities exist in a world increasingly unified by
economic and social processes, by both transnational formation and by
the pressure on societies to conform with each other with an increasingly
unified, and unequal, world. Part of this transformation involves the
reproduction of separate political and economic forms, the ‘nation-
states’, but part involves the reproduetion within each society of the
tensions and conflicts characteristic of the modem world as a whole
(Halliday, 1999, p. 321).
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In recognising the accompanying giobalizaiion of social conll.Cs as a consogucncc of
the production of ,l,c global systen, itself, llalliday
,s <,uick to note that such contlicts
arc first located and fought out within particular states, although he re,narks this “does
not contradict the fact that it is a global phenomenon”; after all, he writes,
“na,ionalism...by definit.on the most self-regarding of ideologies, is universal-lUerally
no country can be without it”
,
1 999, p, 32
1
). Indeed, nationalist forces present one of
the most potent threats to the present global capitalist system that may eventually thwart
the present campaign by the U.S. to introtluee its brand ofdemocracy within the borders
of other countries.
While the strength of Marxian analyses “located politics and social behaviour
within a global context, that of,he spread of an uneven but increasingly globalised
capitalism,” llalliday nonetheless faults Marxism on two counts: I) “in the depreciation
of the endurance of states, and the ideologies associated with it”; and 2) “in ascribing
this globalisation a direction, a teleology, that would lead necessarily to its destruction
and supersession by another political and social formation” (1999, pp. 321-22)
1 he present analysis rejects any teleological understanding either of the
democracy-promotion activities of the U.S. or of the antisystcmic movements which
such interference in the affairs of other states engender. General tendencies and
exposition and analysis of the particular practices undertaken within their historical
context, however, do provide explanation and insight into the varying forces at work in
this regard. Moreover, one of the basic underlying assumptions of this study is that the
socioeconomic, political, and ideological contexts in which the NED has arisen and
continues to operate is as the creation and tool of a particular national social formation,
to
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V<z. the USA. In this respect, while certatn tendencies explored below point in the
direction of the supersession of these efforts away front national states and the possible
sohdtfication of a tntly transnattona, elite direettng such efforts, it is argued herein that
i.
-s .he particular circutnstances wh.ch the U.S. currently enjoys with its dotntnance in
the world system which necessitates no, only its involvement
,n democracy-promotion
activities to secure its hegemony but as well to set the agenda and dtreCon. ineluding
the ideological fonn democracy promotion takes in its implementation.
I. is with this exposttion and understanding of present tntemational relations that
we now look a, previous U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad by focusing on its
long involvement in the regions of Latin Amenea and the Caribbean, areas in which the
U.S. has most successfully tmplemented its hegemony under the banner of promoting
freedom and democracy.
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m. PAST US. ATTEMPTS TO EXPORT OEMOCUACV
,N EAT.X AMERICA
t.rfureTs“,rrr"“ " ^
member of our counto^’s most agile milimrJce-re'MarL'cr “7''' “ “in all commissioned ranks from sernnH lir. t >
^ Marine Corps. 1 served
•ha. penod I spent mos of b t ^ A''d during
Bus,ness, for Wall Street and forle b",7er^I„ sho77'“
'
capitalism (Butler, 1935-36, p. 8).
^™ ^ racketeer for
—Marine Corps Major General Smedley D. Butler Under fire 1
9
1 t
action and twenty times decorated Smedlev Butler i
^ ^ mounded in
the Ph,l,pp.„es. Honduras and Ch.^aTnd all
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
niericans to be twice
Throughout the Cold War, and indeed going back to the 1823 Monroe Doctnne,
U.S. foreign policy pronouncements have been presumptuous in claiming to speak for
all of the countnes which make up the Amencas, for this is in truth an aggressive
hegemonistic position which denies any particulanty or relative autonomy to the
multiplicity of countries which comprise South, Central and North Amenca.
Historically, however, U.S. domination of the Americas has oftentimes proved this
smgulanty of voice by the U.S. to be true in fact, at least as a matter of practice. And
though these countnes still remain largely under the influence of U.S. control, they
nonetheless have asserted their relative independence from U.S. dictates within the last
thirty years or so either by challenging U.S. leadership in the United Nations or by
cutting their own deals with the former Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and other countries.
Hence, it is more accurate and less presumptuous to replace the concept of “American,”
with that of “U.S.” foreign policy as I have done here. However, such a descriptive
change is unlikely to occur in practice, because one of the essential aspects of U.S.
foreign policy has always been its expansionist tendencies. And when a country has
expansionist tendencies, it requires a corresponding language to point toward the
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expans,on, s, goals sough, wh.le sin,ul,anoo„sly incorpo.ahng
.hose elcnen.s of .he new
.err,.ones and peoples whieh can be ass,n.ila.ed and vigorously coun.ering. suppressing
and wnhng on. of exis.enee
.hose aspeo.s wh.eh
.end
.o undcrnine
.he
.deologieal un,.y
needed .0 carry ou. such expansionis. goals ™ Such was
.he case wi.h
.he Monroe
Doenne wh.eh declared
.he Anrencas off-linri.s
.0 fur.her European colonixa.,on (cf
Perk.ns, 1941/1946). A. .he .urn of .he 20.h cen.ury, expansion, s. ienninology hecanre,
,n Pres,den. Woodrow Wilson’s words, a figh. “for democracy, for .he righ. of
.hose
who submi.
.0 a„.hori.y
.0 have a voice in .heir own Govemmen.s” (W.lson, Presulen,
W,lso. s War Message, in Baric, 1947, p. 457) which, following
.he elec.ion ofFDR
m 1 932, go. .ransla.ed again in.o
.he “Good Neighbor Policy” of nonin.erven.ion (cf
Roosevel., The Good Neighbor PoUcy, in Baric, 1947, pp. 551-2; see also Pike,
1995). One should no.e .ha. in .his in.erwar period of presumed U.S.
isola.ionism/nonin.ervenlionism, FDR did pledge .o be a “good neighbor” in his
.naugural address of 1933 and did commi. Ihe U.S. lo a policy of nonin.erven.ion a. .he
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A cogen. example of such expansion.sl language can be seen in PresidenlMcK.n ey s desonphon lo a group of Melhodisls ofhow he had agonized over IheAspos.lion of Ihe Philipp.nes claiming lo have prayed lo “Almighly God” every nigh.
And one nigh, lale il came lo me ihis way...lhal
.here was nolhing left for us lo do bul
o ake them all [ihe Philippine archipelago], and lo educale ihe Filipinos, and uplifl and
cv.hze and Chnsl.amze ihem, and by God’s grace do .he very besl we could by ihem
as our fellow-men for whom Chris, also died. And ihen I wen. lo bed, and wen. lo sleep
and slepl soundly...” (Christian Advocate, January 22, 1903, New York' quoled in
Bailey, 1040/1946, p. 520).
’ ^
The U.S. purchase of Louisiana in 1803, East Florida in 1819, the 1853 Gadsden
Purchase, and the 1 867 purchase of Alaska in addition to earlier and subsequent forcible
acquisitions or divisions of territory were all arrangements with either European state
powers or the government of Mexico, territories bought, sold, conquered, or divided
which save for the seldom honored Indian Treaties—never seriously consulted the
opinions of nor recognized as binding the rights of the indigenous tribal occupants of
these lands.
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Wilson was alluding to those citizens who followed the authority of those leaders the
U.S. recognized.
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December ,933
,n,er-American conference Montevideo. Uruguay. But. as ,bkc
notes: ••From the very beginn.ng, however, the new U.S. pres.dent denro.rstrated that
when ,t came to nonintervention he would pursue a Talleyrand-like course of
trickstensm; he would show that nonintervention was a policy meaning fundamentally
very much the same thing as intervention” (Pike, 1995, p. 173). Such was the case in
U.S. refused to recognize the nationalist government of Ramon Grau
San Martin and acquiesced when Fulgencio Bat.sta overthrew Grau in January of 1 934
and replaced him with Carlos Mendieta as President, whose government Washington
recognized within five days of the coup d'etat. Pike also notes that FDR's
noninterventron policy acted similarly to the previous U.S. interventionrs. policy in
other ways as well, as. for example, FDR's stationing of warships m Cuban waters as a
show of strength and U.S. resolve or the U.S.'s retention of military forces in
Guantanamo Bay. Cuba and in the Panama Canal Zone. Concludes Pike. •'Yankee
intervention had ended but it still persisted; and Latin Americans understood they might
very well derive advantages from two diametrically opposed policies if they played the.r
cards nght (Pike, 1995, pp. 1 73-4). Changed conditions after WWll, however, at the
onset of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, called for a poliey of •‘containment” of the
communist menace which in turn further necessitated a policy of global interventionism
to protect those countries fighting communism through the establishment of a U.S.-
dominated international governing body, otherwise known as the United Nations. And,
for a short while with regards to Latin America, U.S. President John F. Kennedy
proclaimed the “Alliance for Progress” which ostensibly sought to “assist
democratization in Latin America through socioeconomic aid and thus inhibit the spread
of communism” (Wiarda, 1990a, p. 104).
The theoretical bedrock of the Alliance for Progress was rooted in an amalgam
of perspectives which came to be known as modernization theory (see Chapter 2 above).
Associated with individual scholars such as Walt W. Rostow (The Stages ofEeonomic
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Gro»,„: A Non-C„„, Manifesto, 1 960). B. Hosoii.z (Soaolog.cal Aspects of
Econo,nic Gco.„.,
1 965), D. McCielluncI
,
The Achieving Society, 1901), o, al
niodemizaoon theory charactenzcd Weston, Europe and North An,erica-tho so-cal,cd
F.rst World”-as
-the centres of modernity, innovation, industrializahon. dynantic
entrepreneurship, achievement, rationahty, democracy and freedom.”” With
ntodenrization theory hlaming Latin American underdevelopment on powerful,
entrenched oligarchs,
“inherited, long-standing inertia, corruption, and careless
inattention to economic and social problems,” and a culture noted by “a pattern of
Hawed character traits, medieval cultural traditions, and defective instittttions.” Park
writes that the Alliance for Progress became widely upheld and accepted as policy
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Slater further elaborates on modernization theory as follows:
I^n contrast, the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin Amenca were definedby the preva cnee of traditional culture, undeveloped divisions of labourthe lack of utilization of their own resources, over-population, pre-
emocratic structures, and the predominance of rites, rituals and
primitwe customs. Above all, they were characterized in terms oUack—
lack of capital, technology, entrepreneurship, advanced social and
political institutions and modem values. In the early 1950s, a prominentUS academic argued that the United States had interests in the welfare of
foreign peoples that went beyond national security and commercial
prosperity; we want these people to have some participation in the good
material things of life which we enjoy in the United States. Viner (1952:
1 76) commented that ‘we want the common man and his wife and his
children to have not only Coca-Cola and chewing gum and ice cream,
not only modem plumbing, automobiles, refrigerators and electric
lighting, but also good health and good diet, good education’
... and ‘the
benefits and virtues
... of political democracy and social security’. The
West was constmeted as the model and prototype for the non-West the
future destination for traditional societies willing and able to make the
transition to modernity. As one political scientist prescicntly observed in
the 1970s, a little over a decade before the term ‘end of history’ became
so famous, — ‘the idealized vision of modernity has an American face’
...
‘ this ideal type is in effect the end of history, the temiinal station at
which the passengers to modernization can finally get out and stretch
their legs (Cruise O’Brien 1979: 53)’ (Slater, 1997, p. 642).
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because „s op.nn.s.ic ou.look
-captured ,he nrood of the
.i„,e and expressed ,he
.rad,„onal American sense of mission - The m.ssion, presumably, was ,o go nuo Larin
Amenca and roc, ou, these long-stand.ng problems.
-Fundamentally,- though. Path
notes,
-that m.ssion remained what it had been throughout the postwar period: defense
of the noncommunis. world- (Parh, 1995, pp. 217-20). Hence, U.S. intervention
,n the
Domtnican Repubhc tn 1965, called tn.o question modemiaa.ion theory and, as Park
notes, “together with mili.aor coups in Brazil in 1964 and Argentina in 1966 darkened
the assessments of the Alliance for Progress during the remainder of the decade and
infused them with a sense of disillusionment” (Park, 1995, p. 224). In an article in
Saturday Review in 1 970, Senator Edward M. Kennedy added, perhaps, the final stake
to the Alliance for Progress as he wrote that: “For the vast majority of Latin Americans
the alliance has fatled..
.
.” The Senator wen. on to characterize the failure as “a major
economic disappointment,” “a social failure,” and “a political failure” (Kennedy,
October 17, 1970,pp. 18-19). Park summarizes:
Its putative failure was less a result of Latin American events than of
momenlous cultural and political changes within the U.S., which sharply
curtailed the liberal agenda and also reduced the public’s already
notoriously short attention span for things Latin American. The
consensus that had upheld the Alliance for Progress early in the Kennedy
administration failed pnmarily because of those changes, but the decade
also witnessed a growing challenge to modernization theory by a new
paradigm, which brought into doubt the theoretical underpinnings of the
Kennedy program and undermined confidence in its ultimate success
(Park, 1995, p. 204).
This new paradigm was called Dependency Theory. Based on the writings of Andre
Gunder Frank {Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, 1969), Samir Amin
{Accumulation on a World Scale: A critique ofthe Theory of Underdevelopment, 1974),
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and E. Faletto {Dependency and Development in Latin
America, 1979), and, perhaps most especially, to Raul Prebisch {Change and
Development Latin America s Great Task: Report Submitted to the Inter-American
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De.e,on„.e,„
.97,), dependency theory saw deve.opnron, and underdevelop,nen.
as two aspects of ,he satne h.s.onca, process which gave nse ,o European co.onizahon
and led ,o an
.mernational d.v.sron oflabor, viz. the process of capitalist development.
As Dependency theory displaced Modernization theory, the policies promoted
by the Alliance for Progress were soon forgotten, and in the ,970s dunng the so-called
•‘decade of the generals” (which had actually begun with the CIA-backed Brazilian coup
cVem of 1964). bureaucrattc-authoritarian regtmes headed by milttary governments
ruled in most every Latin American country.
Thus whether it was the Monroe Doctrine, Wilson’s “fight for democracy”,
FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy, “containment”, or JFK’s Alliance for Progress, all of
these policies had a corresponding language which attempted to maintain U.S.
hegemony. And while the U.S. made inroads into Africa, Asia, the Middle East and
Western Europe after WWH, nowhere has its hegemonistic desires had a more
prolonged, enduring, and brutal history than with the countnes of Latin America.^^ And
nowhere other than m Latin America has the U.S. acted with so singular a public
purpose of acting under the guise of promoting “freedom and democracy.”
Following the independence movements of most South American countries in
the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the U.S. responded with the Monroe Doctrine
m 1823 which publicly declared Latin America off-limits to further European
colonization while implying that, in effect, as political scientist Michael Parent! notes,
the United States would be the sole political and colonizing power in the New
World, and that the western hemisphere was to be an American sphere of
influence.... A year after the Doctrine’s promulgation, [Secretary of State]
Adams informed South American liberator Simon Bolivar that the Doctrine
must not be interpreted as authorization for the weak to be insolent with the
Allen Haden, an observer of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America in the period of the
second world war commented that: “Latin America is in effect a laboratory in which
much of the application of foreign policy can get its first workout...” (Haden 1945 p
48).
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plague America with miseo^ m the name omerly
And. indeed, misery for Latin America came in ihe fonii of U.S. interventionism
.O maintain U.S. hegemony in the region which allowed easy access for U.S. investors
and extraction of the region’s vast quantities ofraw materials. Thus before the Open
Door Policy was proclaimed regarding China in 1899. the U.S. had intervened over 20
Itmes in Latin American countnes as far north as Mexico in 1 847 and as far south as
Chile in 1891.
One classic example of U.S. intervention in Latin Anienca is that of “the strange
career of William Walker” (Houston, in Walker. 1 860/1985. p. 1 ), the American
filibuster who, acting in a private capacity, in the seven year period from 1 853 till his
death by a Honduran firing squad m 1860, first proclaimed himself “President of Lower
California”, then proclaimed the Mexican department of Sonora “free” while
designating himself as “President of the Republic of Sonora” as well and, when those
ventures failed, attempted four times-killing 1 2,000 people in the process-to take
control of Nicaragua (even managing between 1 855 to 1 857 to have himself elected
Chief Executive of the Republic of Nicaragua) in an attempt to further U.S. boundaries
down through Central America.’" The rage of U.S. citizens to become “filibusters” or
“freebooters” following the successful filibustering action of Sam Houston in prying
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Greene writes:
Webster traces the noun filibuster to the Dutch vrijhuiter {vriz, free; buit,
booty) and gives this definition: “A freebooter or soldier-of-fortune who
aids a revolution in a foreign country in order to enrich himself; first
applied to buccaneers in the West Indies, who preyed on the Spanish
commerce to South America, and later to such adventurers as followed
Lopez to Cuba, and Walker to Nicaragua, in their expeditions of
conquest” (Greene, 1937, Introductory Note).
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CO
in
away Texas fron, Mexico
,836, and afier ,he U.S. sncceedod
.a.ing halfof Mex,
follow,
„g Che subsequent war w.Ch cha, coun,^ over Che annexation of Texas endnrg
.he , 848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,
-was acceptable to a large part of the thirty
rndhon Anrencans,” Houston argues, “as long as it could be so,nehow justified by our
n,ess,an,c duty to spread denrocracy.” And he confinues,
-[,]f „ow we address our
rhetonc to fighfing communism, then [i.e, ,n the ,9th century] we addressed it to
fighting ignorance, colonialism, the shameful inability of ‘effete and decadent’ races to
govern themselves properly-anything that stood ,n the way of Progress” (Houston, in
Walker, 1860/1985, p. I), So supportive of fihbuslenng was the American public in the
m,d-nineteenth century, that even the faded attempts by General Nareiso Lopez ,o
“hberale” Cuba and offer it ,o the Americans virtually assured him the status of a hero
when the Spanish executed him and his band on his third attempt in 1 85 1 . Indeed,
when Lopez’s second attempt in 1 850 failed to insptre the Cuban population to rise up
and welcome him and instead forced him to flee back to the U.S. where he was charged
with violating the Neutrality Law of 1 8 1 8. “public opinion was so sympathetic toward
the fihbuslers that three successive juries disagreed. Prosecutions in New York and
Ohto,” wntes Barley, “met with similar failures” to convict Lopez (Bailey, 1940/1946,
p. 308). As regards the widespread belief in the fundamental legitimacy of American
expansionism, Representative Anderson of Missouri spoke for many when he stated:
Let no technical impediment be thrown in the way of our
Americanizing Central America. Humanity, philanthropy, and
Christianity, demand that it shall be done at no distant day. Such is our
Manifes^t destiny; and why should we be afraid to proclaim it to the
world? Wave upon wave of immigration will roll in upon that country,
until, ere long, its internal wars, ignorance, superstition, and anarchy,
will be supplanted by peace, knowledge, Christianity, and our own
The term “Manifest Destiny” was invented by John L. O’Sullivan, leader of the
Young America movement in the 1 830s and 1 840s. O’Sullivan coined the term as
“warrant for the country’s westward expansion” (Wills, January 31,1 999, p. 1 5).
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Heaven-bom institutions” [Cong. Globe. 35 Cong 2 sess n 200January 10, 1859] (quoted in Batley, 1940/1946, pp. 294-5)
Pro-slavery rn.erests in the Southern U.S. states,
“satisfied of,heir nrabd.ty to carry
slaveor rnto Kansas [by the 1 850s], were then prepared to concentrate thetr labors on
Central Amenca...” (Walker, 1860/1985, pp. 364-65).“ The repeated attempts at
colonizing Nicaragua presented advantage for the U.S. government as well which could
deny any backing for Walker's adventures should they fail wh.le readily accepting any
newly “1,berated” state into the Union should the subject population prove to be
relatively pacified and passive to Yankee rule.^^
In his account of his 1854-57 war in Nicaragua, Walker several times makes it a
pornt to rndicate that the U.S. government failed to back him in his adventures and even
acted to thwart his activities; but that such pronouncements of U.S. disinterest in
expanding rnto Central America were not widely believed is indicated by Walker’s own
explanation below:
Often, It has been semi-officially announced that the United States
government was determined to force open the road across Nicaragua; but
as no justification for so violent an act on the part of the United State’shas been presented, it must be presumed that such declarations are
intended merely for popular effeet. In fact the American authorities, by
an arbitrary act offeree, interrupted the only effort which, since
December, 1856, has promised suceessfully to restore the passage across
Nicaragua to citizens of the United States (Walker, 1860/1985 pp 365-66). ’
The Demoerats, who were strong in the Southern states, put themselves on record in
their platform of 1 856 as approving Walker’s efforts ‘to regenerate’ Nicaragua The
Bntish not unnaturally felt that this prince of filibusters was but ‘the advance guard of
Manifest Destiny, and that he was engaged in a covert attempt to secure territory for
the United States m Central America, in violation of both the letter and the spirit of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty” (Bailey, 1940/1946, p. 294).
Whether [filibustering] was wrong or right was a question answerable only after the
filibuster had failed or succeeded. Successful, he was a hero; unsuccessful, he was an
outlaw contemned by all of his fellows” (Greene, 1937, p. 27).
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The American diplomatic historian, Dexter Perkins, liowcvcr, i
forthcoming about the U.S.
indicated below:
,
IS much more
govenimcnfs atliiiide towards Walker’s lilihuslering as
The filibustering expedition of William Walker, his seizure ofihcgoveimment of Nicaragua, the tolerance and Hnally the reeog, i ona corded him by President Pierce and his advisers' all seemtd mlw
at unscnipulousness and covetousness had more to do with Americanpolicy than anything else. There had been ihc Mexican War lesTlI ndecade before; there had been a bullying policy toward Mexico almost'
imDeccThler^T "i*^™
years of Whig rule (and Ihcse notpec able), and now there was the toleration of this rulhicss if
unotticial, impenahsm (Perkins, 1941/1946, p. 104).
The legacy of William Walker, writes Houston, is that he is remembered all over
Central America as the pattern and paradigm for American intentions.” Houston
continues:
here s not a schoolchild who doesn’t know his name and his story.
Parents for generations have been frightening children to sleep with his
name. He has become the core around which their national myths havebeen created (and all countries define themselves by their national
myths): the heroic and successful struggle of the people of Central
America against the arrogance and power of the North Americans—as
they see it—has sustained them through all the years of other American
interventions since Walker’s first and “unofficial” one. Whoever their
internal enemies are, they know for certain from which direction their
external enemy has traditionally come (Houston, in Walker 1860/1985
p. 9).
And though the U.S. government did not always openly back such private colonial
ventures in the 19th century, the opposition to direct U.S. intervention in the 20th
century has forced it to reexamine the path of private initiative and the security cloak of
plausible deniability it provides. But all of this rethinking on the part of U.S.
government policymakers had to wait, for in the nineteenth century the public clamor
and support for outright imperialism was then in its heyday.
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In .he aftemnath of the 1898 Spanish Amencan War, Teddy Roosevelt's "B,g
Sttck” policy led to multiple military interventions mostly in Central America and the
Canbbean in Cuba, Honduras, Dom.nican Repubhe, Nicaragua, Haiti, Mex.co and in
.he newly-created state of Panama^wh.eh gained tts independence from Colombia wtth
U.S. contnvance and gunboat diplomacy so that a canal could be built link.ng both
oceans and reducing the travel time for transoceanic shipping.’*
With the election to the presidency of Woodrow Wilson in 1912, U.S.
tntervention in Latin America continued, though it now occumed under the auspices of
protecting constitutional government in the hemisphere and “making the world safe for
democracy.” But lest anyone believe that support for democracy was the basis of U.S.
intervention in Latin America in the past, one need only be reminded of the words of the
much-decorated Major General Smedley Butler of the U.S. Marine Corps who had a
completely different perspective ofjust in fact whose interests he was protecting when
he recapitulated his past military exploits thusly:
I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in
14. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bankboys to collect revenue in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central
^encan republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is
ong. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown
rothers in 1909-12. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American
sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras “right” for American fruit
companies m 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went its
way unmolested.
During those years, I had, as the boys in the back room would say, a
swell racket. I was rewarded with honors, medals, promotion. Looking back on
it, I feel I might have given A1 Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to
operate his racket in three city districts. We Marines operated on three continents
(Butler, 1935-36, p. 8).
By the treaty of December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished sovereignty over Cuba and
ceded the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam to the U.S. The U.S. took possession of
Wake Island on January 17, 1899 while the Samoan Islands were divided up between
the U.S. and Germany later that same year. The Hawaiian Islands had just previously
been annexed by the U.S. on July 7, 1898 (Bailey, 1940/1946, pp. 466-530).
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As Parent, notes, “[sjome saw no contrad.ction between Wilson’s professions and
General Snredley’s statenrent-.nclud.ng Woodrow Wilson hinrself. In the.r v.ew,”
Parent! argues,
-.o bnng the energetic blessings of capitalism to Lat.n America was as
much a par, of the nat.on’s sacred m.ss.on as was dissem.nating Christianity and
constitutionalism” (Parenti, 1971, p. 18).
Twenty-s.x years of constant interventionism from 1914-34, which included,
amongst others, the 1 9-year occupation of Haiti, the 1 8-year occupation of the
Dominican Republic, multiple interventions in Panama including those of 1918 and
1 925, and the e.ght-year occupation of Nicaragua (this latter being the third such
military occupation into that country by the U.S.), were ended with the ascendancy to
the U.S. presidency by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933. FDR, however, only
replaced military diplomacy with dollar diplomacy as his “Good Neighbor” policy
towards Latin America continued to install, arm, and foot the bills for despots like
Somozo in Nicaragua and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. Yet it should be noted
that FDR’s Administration sought to rely more on liberal trade policies than the
constant use of force and intervention which had characterized previous U.S. policy on
the Latin American continent. The Caribbean also experienced U.S. interventionism as
WWII saw the U.S. Navy occupy Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, Bermuda, St. Lucia, and
the Bahamas. As well, in order—at least offrcially—to curb Nazi activities and German
influence in the region, the U.S. shortly before its entry into the war in December 1941,
had begun establishing military missions throughout Latin America to serve as “liaison
agencies between the military establishment of the United States and those of Latin
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Amencan countries, and mission personnel became advisers to the Latin American
military” (Meditz and Hanratty, 1989, p. 249). This U.S, military assistance program to
the region laid the basis for subsequent programs designed to ensure U.S. hegemony in
the region.
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This fifteen year period of relative non-rnterventionisni from 1933 to 1947 (i.e.
asrde from those necessitated by WWII) was transfonned once again, however, as
President Truman took over after FDR's death in 1945 and institutionalized what would
be the cornerstone of subsequent U.S. foreign policy for the ensuing 40 years. And
whether one refers to the Truman Doctrine which vowed U.S. aid “to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by anned minorities or by outside
pressures” (Truman, quoted in Ambrose, 1971/1979, p. 150) or National Security
Council Resolution Number 68 which delineated the view that the conflict with the
Soviet Union involved “the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of
civilization itself (NSC-68, 1950/1975, p. 51) or whether one merely uses the original
lerm of containment as formulated by George Kerman (cf Kennan, 1947, p, 575), all
of these policies pointed to basically the same goal: containing communism and rolling
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it back wherever possible. In short, the U.S. launched itself on a holy crusade against
Fejes points out the “control of communications, first point-to-point, and later the
mass media” was an important element in the establishment of U.S. power in Latin
America. [FJirst film, then newspapers and magazines, and lastly radio broadcasting
—
were integrated into the media structure of the United States. By 1945, United States
hegemony in hemispheric communications was complete” (Fejes, 1986, p. 4).
Kennan himself has maintained that he only called for ‘political’ containment of the
Soviet Union and not ‘military’ containment or, what is referred to as, rollback. Taking
blame for his policy recommendation’s misinterpretation, Kennan states; “I should
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C0.™,n,nisn, whether against Stalin and the Sov.e, Union and the threat posed to
Westen, Europe or aga.nst presutnahly Soviet allies ,n Lain, Anrencan or other parts of
.he glohe or even
, n,err,ally w.thin the U.S. itself aganrst those eharged w.th aiding and
abetting the “eonrmunist nrenaee” as eharged by the then junior senator from
Wisconsin. Joseph R. McCarthy In consequence, this unfortunate trajectory in many
ways not only forestalled much demoerat.e development, particularly in Latin An.erica,
but oftentimes worked diametrically against it.
In the case of Cuba, American diplomacy, rooted in anticommunism, contained
what William Appleman Wilhams referred to as “the fundamental elements of tragedy”
(Williams, 1959/1972. p. 2,. Specifically, he noted four tragic elements ofAmerican
diplomacy m Cuba which could be generalized to most of the United Slates’ subsequent
relations with the countries of Latin America in that they entailed-v/z. I) vastly
asymmetrical power between the U.S. and the governments it dealt with, 2) the failure
have explained that I didn’t suspect them [i.e. the Soviet Union] of any desire to launch
an attack on us. This was nght afier the war, and it was absurd to suppose that they weregoing to turn around and attack the United Stales. I didn’t think 1 needed to explain thatbut I obviously should have done it” (Kennan, April 1 8, 1 996).
As the U.S. State Department states regarding the 1954 Senate censure of Senator Joe
McCarthy:
The hunt for subversives started during the war itself, and was furthered
by congressional committees that often abused their powers of
investigation to harass people with whom they differed politically. Then
m February 1950, an undistinguished, first-term Republican senator from
Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, burst into national prominence when, in a
speech m Wheeling, West Virginia, he held up a piece of paper that he
claimed was a list of 205 known communists currently working in the
State Department. McCarthy never produced documentation for a single
one of his charges, but for the next four years he exploited an issue that
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or inability ,o use tha, power ,o create a realtty in these other c.tUttres whtch correlated
with professed Anteriean ideals ofdemocracy and freedom attd respect for self-
detemrination and the modentiza.ton of the economy. 3) the abandottment of those
reformist elements in other countries who did support the goals of Amertcan
democracy, and 4) a reactionary behaviour exhibited towards any refonn movetnent
which conststently played tnto the hands of the most extreme radicals tn other countries
(Williams, 1959/1972. pp. 3-4). Thus the underlying roots of this U.S. behavtor rooted
in anticommuntsm meant that any efforts for reform in these countnes were met wtlh a
virulent American response in that the U.S. countered most genutne efforts at refom, by
claiming it was “communistic” and then acted to oust the refonners. As such, tlie
onginal expansionist motivations of the U.S. were very much present, i.e. the drive to
extend U.S. power and hegemonic inriuence. However, during the Cold War, this drive
took on a different clothing, so to speak, which, on the one hand, did have some basis in
fact (in the sense that there were active, though very small, relative to the dominant
political parties operating in each country. Communist Parties operating in most Latin
Amencan countries as in the U.S. as well), but which, on the other hand, was only
another chapter to be added to the continuing saga of further expansion and extension of
U.S. domination. Taken individually, accounts of U.S. intervention sometimes fail to
reveal a coordinated and encompassing plan to suppress movements aimed at reform;
juxataposed together, however, U.S. efforts to establish and extend its hegemony
he realized had touched a nerve in the American public
<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/60.htm>.
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Illuminate an all-around general functional mission which
policy.
chciracterizcs U.S. foreign
As tn other regions of the world, so too ,n Latm America, the U.S. needed
panicular
.nstruments to aid ,n ,ts pohcy of continued henuspheric douuuance. One of
the most effecttve, at least
.nttially, of these iustrtunents was the Organization of
American States (O.A.S.) created in Bogota, Colombia in 1948 which was set up so as
to coordinate and develop unified pan-Amencan pohcies. Latin American nations had
already committed themselves a year earlier in 1947 to the Inter-Amenean Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (i.e. the Rio Treaty) which was a mutual defense pact committing
Its members to provide mutual assistance in the event of aggression; specifically, in the
post-WWII context of the Cold War, this meant communist aggression. The O.A.S.,
with its provisos which allowed for the U.S. to intervene in Latin American states to
protect the peace” sanctioned U.S. imperialist policies under an ostensibly Latin
American controlled organization thus allowing the U.S. to avoid the appearance of
taking unilateral measures or abandoning its Good Neighbor policy of nonintervention.
The Rio Treaty was followed by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which solidified Latin
Amencan secunty in U.S. hands. Subsequent U.S. meddling—like the 1954 overthrow
ofJaeobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala and the sending of U.S. and Latin American
troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965—were both given legal sanction by the
O.A.S. as its member states were cajoled into issuing a resolution which declared that
international communism constituted outside intervention in the hemisphere which
required strong countermeasures—specifically, in these cases, permission for the U.S. to
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.ntervene ,o protect Guatemala and the Domimcan Republic frotn fallmg under the
treacherous sway of communism.
But “communism,” in particular in the case of Guatemala in 1954, amounted
only to a land redistribution program instituted by the refom,
-minded Arbcmt in 1951
,
building on an earlier reform program initiated shortly after WWII “ Specifically,
uncultivated land from farms of over 300 hectares was distributed to peasants, with
compensation to those suffering expropriation to be calculated on the basis of their
land’s declared taxable value. And as was the case with most of the big fanns and
especially with the land owned by the U.S. corporation United Fruit Company-^which
owned the largest amount of cultivable land in Guatemala-the owners would receive
the least compensation percentage-wise since they had reported their land’s declared
taxable value at far lower rates than its real worth. Incensed, at what would be
considered in later years a mild reform program in the region. United Fruit reacted
. 1,
Arbenz government, commenting shortly before
the 1954 CIA-backed coup d’etat on U.S. Secretary of State Dulles’s anti-communist
resolution adopted at the 1954 Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela,
characterized U.S. policy as amounting to “cataloguing as ‘Communism’ every
manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress,
any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive or liberal reforms” such that;
any Latin American government that exerts itself to bring about a truly national
program which affects the interests of the powerful foreign companies, in whose hands
the wealth and the basic resources in large part repose in Latin America, will be pointed
out as Communist; it will be accused of being a threat to continental security and
making a breach in continental solidarity, and so will be threatened with foreign
intervention. Connell-Smith notes that even though Toriello was given an ovation for
standing up to what was widely interpreted as a pretext for U.S. intervention, only
Mexico and Argentina abstained on the U.S.-backed resolution—the rest of the Latin
American countries fearing a cut-off of U.S. economic aid (Connell-Smith 1966 pp
162-63).
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The resulting CIA-controlled invasion thus followed and within two weeks was able to
persuade the Guatemalan army (many ofwhom had close ties to the oligarchy) to
transfer power to Castillo Armas, the leader of the invasion force whom United Fruit
had personally selected.^ Neither the alleged communist Arbenz nor the small
Guatemalan communist party (which never numbered more than four thousand persons)
chose to light.*'' The subsequent terror of the new Armas regime, however, was. as
Kolko notes, “merciless”;
n
"" 7" 7 * "“^pended, a majority of voters disenfranchised, andat least thousand persons arrested and an unknown number killed. The new
regime abolished the post- 1945 reform legislation, and United Fruit had its huge
estates returned. As the pre-1944 order was fully restored and the government
As Schlesinger and Kinzer (1982) describe Arbenz: “He was a nationalist
hoping to transform an oligarchic society” (p. 49).
cc
1954 that a Presidential Commission issued a top secret report calling
on the CIA to be ‘an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary
organization more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless than that
employed by the enemy’” (Weiner, August 29, 1993, The New York Times).
In a secret document prepared by the CIA and Armas, communists were singled out
for either Executive action” (i.e. murder) or imprisonment or exile. Under the subject
heading “Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military
Operations of Calhgeris” (the code-name for the disposal operation). Category I listed
58 people for disposal while Category II listed 74 people for either imprisonment or
exile (Doyle and Kombluh, “CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954
Documents. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 4, Document 4).
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sank mlo corruption, Guatemala became the leading exantple of the kind of
hemisphere the United States sought to create (Kolko, 1988, p. 105).“
Aside from its opposition to land redistribution schemes, the U.S. also soiiglil to
maintain a tight control over labor movements in Latin America. Labor relations arc
important to any state, and especially in a capitalist economy where there is a stark
division between the classes, between those with capital who own and control the mean:
of production and those who must necessarily sell their labor-power to the business
owners in exchange for a wage in order to eat, pay rent, maintain and reproduce
themselves, etc. Thus the U.S. government monitors very closely labor relations and
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CIA historian Ni^sk Cullather in his 1994 in-house secret account of the 1954 coup inGuatemala wrote that the political repercussions from the coup saw “Guatemala’s
political center... vanished from politics into a terrorized silence. Political activity
simply became too dangerous as groups of the extreme right and left, both led by
mi itary ofricers, plotted against one another.” In the mid-1960s, the “United States
responded by sending military advisors and weapons, escalating a cycle of violence and
reprisals that by the end of the decade claimed the lives of a U.S. ambassador, two U.S.
rnihtary attaches, and as many as 1 0,000 peasants. In 1 974, the Army stole another
election, persuading another generation of young Guatemalans to seek change through
intrigues and violence. Increasingly, Indians and the Catholic Church—which had
formerly remained aloof from politics-sided with the left, isolating the Army on the far
right (Cullather, 1994, pp. 90-91)
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Labor-power, not labor, is, as Marx stated in Wage-labor and Capital, the worker’s
commodity which is sold to the capitalist in exchange for a wage in the form of money.
In exchange for a specified wage, the worker expends her/his labor under the direction
of the capitalist for a specified period of time, i.e. “so much money for so long a use of
labor-power.” As Marx writes; “Labor-power, then, is a commodity, no more, no less
so than is the sugar. The first is measured by the clock, the other by the scales.” Why
does the worker sell this commodity? Simply put, states Marx, “in order to live.”
Labor, or the actual exercise ofhuman productive powers to alter the use-value of
commodities and thus to add value to them, cannot be bought and sold in the same sense
that labor-power can be bought and sold. The worker sells the power to labor under the
direction of the capitalist or his agents in exchange for a wage, but she/he does not sell
her/his labor. Moreover, it is important to understand that the sell of labor-power to the
capitalist for a wage precedes production and the emergence of a value in the product,
and that this is the basic mechanism by which surplus value is appropriated in the
capitalist mode of production. If the capitalist fails to exact more productive value from
the worker in the process of production than he pays the worker in the form of a wage,
then the capitalist will reap no profits.
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seeks .0 innuence and onernimes control the labor relations other countries. As
Wiarda notes,
launch a Marxist-Leninist revolution or seize control of u
^ "'owment to
which would be detrimental to American foreign pohcy imerS"'T^^^ Tfpreventing such Communist takeovers ofunioLoven^emsXo ^t Tlarge part entrusted to the American labor movement (Wiarda7“^
This U.S. ant.-communist labor program was set up at the beginning of the Cold
War when Stalin’s armies were completing their takeovers of Eastern Europe and
western Europe was devastated from the war, its infrastructure in shambles. At the
time, large communist parties existed in France, Italy, Greece and other European
countries, and their unions were well organized. The U.S. feared that these parties
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would come to power ,f they did not circumvent this developnient " Hence, the U.S.
government enlisted the American labor movement, funded by “CIA money and
sometimes CIA personnel,” to bolster and provide financial and material support to non
Communist trade unions.** In large part, the move was successful, for the U.S.
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IS interesting to note in the initial organization of this anti-communist laborprogram m Europe the role played by ex-Nazis and other intelligence operatives Theperations set up m Italy, Greece, Germany, Britain, Turkey, Portugal, HollandBelgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, as well as in ostensibly neutral countries such asSweden and Austna were organized on the avowed basis of so-called "stay-behind
unils which were “to undertake resistance operations or sabotage against Soviet troops”he event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. In fact, the head of the German
unit was none other than General Reinhard Gehlen, Hitler’s chief intelligence officer on
viet and East European affairs. Gehlen, who directed the stay-behind units in Europe
Waffen SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny, a fierce Hitler loyalist. Together, they arranged forthe training and equipping of five-man cells known as “Werewolves.” These Werewolf
units “had access to buned depots of food, radio equipment, weapons, explosives, and
other liquidation devices.” And like the medieval lore for which they were named
these stay-behind units were to operate as normal citizens by day while “meting out
death and destruction to their enemies under the cover of darkness” (Lee Martin A
1997. The Beast Reawakens. New York, NY; Little Brown Publishers pp 24) These
operations were instructed to link up with the “Romanian Iron Guard, the Vanagis of
Latvia, the Croatian Ustase, the Organization of Ukranian Nationalists, Polish quislings,
and an army of Russian defectors led by General Andrei Vlasov...” (Lee, 1997 p 23)
Similar European-wide stay behind units were set up by the CIA after the war. With
names like “GLADIO,” “Column 88,” “Gray Wolves,” and the “Gehlen Operation” or
simply "the Org", these operations recruited heavily from former SS officers,
Mussolini’s secret police, and from other fascist organizations. In addition to their
extermination and destruction campaigns, their methods also included the making of
payments to unionists, identified by AFL operatives as “potential scabs,” the
organization of goon squads to attack strikers, and collaboration with the Sicilian mafia
(Gibson, Richard. 1992. “CIA Leaders and the NEA-AFT Merger Plans.” From
ACTIV-L listserv, the Activists Mailing List).
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Godson writes that in the immediate post-WWII period, the AFL “utilized a variety
of channels to provide moral, material, and organizational support to European trade
unionists who were resisting engulfment by and within Communist-dominated labor
organizations” (Godson, 1976, p. 104). To aid in this endeavor, the AFL, in 1944,
created two multi-million-dollar organizations, the Free Trade Union Fund (FTUF) and
the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) in order “to fight the Russians and rebuild
democratic trade unions” in Europe. As Scott notes;
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The FTUC became lire official foreign policy vehirlf'nfil.n c r ,
while war was slili raging and communisis were slill allies in w^r wl’ I
I e arNSuL'"'"' -^1!^nti-Nazi underground resistance, the dispensers of aid weredeliberately selective, funnelling assistance to anti-communist socialistsand making life difficult for those who were suspected of sympadti nfWith communism (Scott, 1978, p. 194).
^ ^ ^
In 1945, the International Federation of Trade Union*; tTFTTi\ , 1 • 1 u j 1
dominated by refonnist socialist leaders bete" wa ^^ed I'h Ire r r
communists, as participants in the WWII victory, “enjoye^eno™ prtti“g7a^rnany workers saw little reason to oppose the Communisis.” Fearful of Eufopean trade
ikewL“4^e hn'r
"’‘= ^FL reasoned that the rank and file wouldwise see little reason not to elect and appoint Communists to positions ofpowerd accept them as brothers” (Godson, 1976, p. 105). In a move lo divide the WFTU
Secretariats Trade
’
s (ITS), which were autonomous subsidiaries of the IFTU. In so doing theAFL refused to become associated with the WFTU, encouraged the developmenfofatdt-communist unions in Europe, and continued lo press the dangers of communis[infiltration and control of trade unions.
As one of the methods used lo provide moral and psychological support to European
ant
-communist labor groups, “the AFL issued a continuous stream of policy resolutions
nd statements stressing the tyrannical nature ofcommunism and the fate that befell
7 "’\Communists came to power” (Godson, 1976, p. 107). Also, in 1946
•
[he monthly publication of the International Free Trade Union Ne^^>s ’in nghsh, French, German, and Italian. In addition to featuring AFL resolutions and
policy statements. Godson notes, “the publication carried analyses and details of the
suppression of free trade unionism in Communist countries and in such noncommunist
dictatorships as Spam.” In addition to publications, the AFL also brought a number of
anti-communist European labor leaders to the United States in the late 1940s, whileAFL leaders “repeatedly visited most of the European countries and gave numerous
speeches (Godson, 1976, p. 109). Food packages were also shipped to non-communist
trade unions m Europe by the AFL. While in Germany, these packages amounted to an
essential program of material assistance, due to the devastation caused by war in France
“they were a further demonstration of the AFL’s support for the democratic elements,”
especially, notes Godson, for those anti-communist workers in the mining regions
“where Communist militants received assistance from the Communist party” (Godson,
1976, p. 1 10). Another AFL initiative was the organization of a series of Marshall Plan
trade union conferences which, states Godson, “were catalytic in the processes that
eventually split the WFTU.” One London conference, notes Godson, had important
symbolic effects, in that it “gave the stamp of trade union approval to the Marshall Plan,
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government bu.lt up “the Chris.ian-Dcmocratic trade unions in Italy and the Socialist
(but non-Communis.) unio.i movement in France to the point whore their strength was
equal to or exceeded Communist union strength” (Wiarda, I hhOb, p, 1 19).*'’ Along
with Marshall Plan aid, the economies of Western Europe recovered and remained
decidedly capitalist in structure and the non-communist trade unions “were able to serve
as a check on the Communist unions and to prevent the possibility of Marxist-Leninist
revolution in Western Europe.” Consequently, Wiarda concludes, “American foreign
policy goals were thus served” (Wiarda, 1990b, pp. 119-20).
It officially established a pennanent administrative organization to ensure organized
abor a role in the execution of the ERP [i.e. the European Recovery Plan, a.k.a. the
Marshall Plan], and it marked the first time that both the AFL and the CIO participatedm an international meeting of trade union organizations.” By the late 1940s, it shouldbe noted, “the CIO was m the process of expelling Communists from its ranks”
(Godson, 1976, pp. 1 12-14). Largely on this anti-communist basis were the two unions
to merge into the AFL-CIO m 1955 (cf Morris, 1967, pp. 57-8). With this merging of
the two largest union groupings in the United States, states Scott, dominant union
opinion regarding foreign policy “was that the United States must act decisively to
prevent the extension ofcommunism in the world, in order to protect the economic and
strategic military security of the country” (Scott, 1 978, pp. 1 97-8). Also, believing that
France was the key to the control of Western Europe in the immediate postwar period
(due to the prostration of Germany and the defeat of Italy), the AFL utilized funding
through the FTUC to weld together the anti-communists labor groups into the Force
Ouvriere (FO), as a counter to the communist-dominated Confederation Generate du
Travail (CGT). Not only was financial assistance provided to these French anti-
communist labor activists, but, as well, office equipment—including typewriters and
mimeograph machines—was provided to FO offices throughout France. Also, in a
campaign to “neutralize what it believed to be Communist terror and intimidation,” the
FTUC hired “strong-arm men” to work alongside dock workers, so that when a strike
was called, professional and occasional dockers” who refused to join the strike would
be protected”. “Thus,” states Godson, “the Communists would have to tangle with
men experienced in the techniques of violence” (Godson, 1976 p 121)
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For an insightful account and subsequent consequences of Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collaboration with the Sicilian
Mafia and Corsican gangsters to limit the political gains of the Italian and French
Communist parties after WWII, from recruiting thugs to battling union strikers to
breaking up leftist political rallies, see McCoy (especially Chapter 1), The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia (1972).
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Because ofthis success, (he CIA expanded their cITons to the I'hird World in the
late 1950s when nrany new nations emerged by throwing ofl thcir colonial oppressors,
and when prospects for additional Cuban revolut.ons threatened (he Western
Hem,sphere with the prospect of Marxist regimes in what was considered the U.S.’s
own ’’backyard.” Utilizing the AFL-CIO. a program called the Amer ican Ins.itute for
Free Labor Development (AIFLD) was estabhshed in 1961 inside the AFL-CIO union
structure with the purpose of supplanting communis, union strength in other countr.es
with generally nonpolitical nnions which would operate according to the American
model of collective bargaining.'” Passing init.ally as an educational institute with its
main office in Washington D.C., field offices were quickly set up in virtually every
capital city in Latin America. Not only did the funding come from the CIA, but “often
the pcrsonnel-the labor atlaches sent to the American embassies abroad to work on
creating anti-Communist labor movements—were still CIA” (Wiarda, 1990b, p. 120)
This close association between the AFL-CIO and the CIA prompted Victor
Reuther, then international affairs director of the United Auto Workers, to charge in
1966 that the AFL-CIO’s department on international affairs was involved with the
Central Intelligence Agency and that “the AFL-CIO and some of its affiliates ‘have
permitted themselves to be used by the Central Intelligence Agency as a cover for
clandestine operations abroad’” (Reuther, quoted in Morris, 1967, p. 7). The split in the
labor movement as represented by Victor Rcuther’s remarks were directed primarily at
then AFL-CIO President George Meany and his “global affairs operational man” Jay
Lovestone. By the end of 1966, the split over organized labor’s foreign policy practices
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded in 1886. The Congress of
Industrial Organization (CIO) dates from 1935. The AFL organized craft and trade
unions and ignored the conditions of unskilled and semi-skilled, i.e. ‘industrial’,
workers. After the CIO emerged as a national federation of industrial unions in the mid-
1930s, the AFL responded by working to enhance the economic status of both trade and
industrial workers. In 1955, the two labor federations merged into the AFL-CIO.
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turned into a rupture as Walter Reu.her, Vtctor’s brother and then pres,dent of the
UAW, ‘•announced his union would henceforth follow a course independent of AFL-
CIO polices.” This was followed a year later, in 1967, with Walter Reuther’s
resignation from the vice-presidency and the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO
(Morris, 1967, p. 9).
Organized as a training institute, the AIFLD operated to sever ties local unions
had with fraternal unions and international confederations. Indeed, dunng the 1960s the
AFL-CIO itself severed its ties with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) and the International Labor Organization (ILO). As Hirsch and
Fletcher document, the AIFLD, in conjunction with its regional offices of six
International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), “established a network of subagents in the ranks
and leadership of unions throughout the continent” [of South America].... “The
strategic value of this network,” they point out, was to operate “as a fifth column,
waiting with cobra fangs to strike out, to poison, and where possible, to destroy popular
attempts to terminate transnational corporate domination...” (Hirsch and Fletcher, 1977,
pp. 7-8). Also, because of the pro-capitalist ideology ofmany AIFLD union officials
which prevented them from being able to identify with the stark material and social
conditions which their counterparts in the Third World faced, many of their attempts to
supplant communist dominated unions there proved unsuccessful. Moreover, once it
was found out that CIA funding was behind the activities of certain unions in the Third
World, this was often the kiss of death to the local labor movement that accepted
AIFLD assistance,” and “the labor group that received it was discredited and often
destroyed as a result” (Wiarda, 1990b, pp. 120-1). Often, the AIFLD did help to
mobilize reactionary forces and did succeed in overthrowing left-wing governments in
many areas of the Third World. But more often, “the AFL-CIO all but ruined the local
labor movements, thereby stimulating more pro-Communist and anti-American
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senument, which was wha, the program was designed
,o prevent in the f.rst place”
(Wiarda, 1990b, p. 121).
As indicated by this anti-communist orientation of the AIFLD, one can
understand why the AFL-CIO. then and afterwards, for years, sided with the U.S.
government whenever it invaded another country, or engaged in subversive activities in
the Third World, or supported aid to the Somoza dictatorship or the dictatorship in El
Salvador, or backed repressive regimes in numerous other countries. It also becomes
apparent why the labor movement here in the U.S. has so little power and inftuence, for
they have indeed been compromised by both their ant,-commun,st activities abroad and
by the corresponding need not to appear too radical on the home front. And, as regards
the average union member’s knowledge of such clandestine activities, Hirsch and
Fletcher note: “The AFL-CIO process of penetration, with labour apparati in most parts
of the world, is highly fragile because it operates almost totally without the knowledge,
understanding, or consent of the members of the unions comprising the AFL-CIO”
(Hirsch and Fletcher, 1977, p. 12). In return for the AFL-CIO’s assistance in helping to
secure capitalism internationally, unions initially were able to organize many branches
of U.S. industry, although by the late 1960s and 1970s, as organized capital-i.e. the
major corporations acting through their political fronts (e.g. the Business Roundtable,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Business
Council, and hundreds of other industry and trade associations)—fought back with the
misnamed “Right-to-work” laws, union strength greatly deteriorated and union
membership greatly diminished. Consequently, this relationship between organized
labor and the capitalist state, i.e. the representatives of organized capital who dictate
U.S. governmental policies, began to split as many rank and file members began to
castigate their union officials as mere pawns of corporate America; indeed, the growing
recognition by workers of the real power of corporations behind governmental policies
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led lo an ousting of class collaborationist union leadership in the
-90s and their
replacement by more militant, anti-corporate activists.
The election of new leadership in the AFL-CIO in October 1995 led by John
Sweeney, Richard Trumka, and Linda Chavez-Thompson thus may presage a new
period of militancy in the ranks of organized labor in the U.S., though it ,s still too soon
to determine whether the new leadership will alter the AFL-CIO’s activities abroad.
One should note, however, a report that one of the first actions taken by the new
leadership was to reject the heretofore annual payment by the CIA to the AFL-CIO of
$9 million for such activities (stated in a speech by CPUSA Vice-Chair Jarvis Tyner at
the University of Massachusetts on October 30, 1 996). Nonetheless, as one of the four
core partners of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the NED’s major
grant recipient (averaging approximately $6 million dollars in grants annually from
1990 to 1999), the AFL-CIO is still compromised by the dependency developed from
such payments. Still, an indication of the lighthack against class collaborationist
policies in the 1 3 million member union was graphically illustrated just three months
before the union’s convention in August of 1995 when, for the first time in its history,
the sitting AFL-CIO president. Lane Kirkland (praised by the Wall Street Journal for
his “yeoman service against communism” in August of 1995), was driven from office.
It is also noteworthy that in April 1999, the NED presented “Democracy Service
Medals” to former AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland and to former Polish President
and Solidarity Union leader Lech Walesa “for their roles in the demise of communist
rule in Poland” {NED Annual Report 1999, 2000, p. 7).
Another recent indication of the renewed surge in labor organizing in the U.S. as
well as the response of corporate America to what they see as a dangerous new
militancy can be seen in the successful victory in August 1997 by the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters against the United Parcel Service. As The Boston Globe
described it; Atlanta-based United Parcel Service settled a contentious 1 5-day strike
161
by 1 85,000 Teamsters late Monday, ending a dispute that hampered thousands of
businesses and cost the company $650 million or more” (Diane Lewis. Wednesday
August 20. 1997. “UPS accord seen lifting Teamsters, other unions.” Ue Bo.,on
’
Globe, p. A I ). Since the successful strike, however. Teamster President Ron Carey was
expelled from the union by a three-judge federal panel which found Carey responsible
for a scheme to funnel $850,000 in union money to his union election campaign, even
though the government supeiwised the balloting and taxpayers paid $17 million for the
election. Some see this as a Republican and rightwing vendetta against the new
Teamster militancy, especially given the unequal focus on campaign irregularities of
James P. Hoffa, Jr., the loser in the 1996 Teamster election and subseqently the winner
in the 1 998 court-mandated election, who is seen by many as a trojan horse for business
unionism (Gaboury, October 25, 1997, People’s Weekly World).
The labor upsurge of the Teamsters, however, only encouraged delegates to the
21st Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO in September of 1997 to unanimously
remove the anti-communist clause in the AFL-CIO constitution which barred members
of the Communist Party from full participation in the AFL-CIO or its subordinate
bodies. Such action sends a bold message to corporate America that the gloves are
coming off in labor’s fight for the basic interests of all working people. This new
militancy represents a milestone development in the AFL-CIO’s effort to renew and
reenergize the U.S. labor movement, though it is still too soon to determine how long it
will endure.
It is impossible within the confines of this thesis to go over all the other
instruments and instances of U.S. intervention in Latin America.^' For example, we
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For a thoroughgoing account of U.S. covert activities in Latin America from WWII
to the early 1990s, including the extensive role played by Nelson and David Rockefeller
in using the Cold War as a cover to expand their vast financial and mineral-rich land
holdings in South and Central America, to the funding and usage of missionary societies
to educate tribal natives in the Amazon and elsewhere to obey national governments
162
would have to look at the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) at Fort Gulick in
Panama and the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) at Fort Benning in
Columbus, Georgia (provisions of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty forced the SOA’s
move to Georgia from Panama m 1984) which provide military and police training to
the countnes of Latin America and examine how this training (particularly its
countennsurgency and “interrogation” [i.e. torture] methods aimed at fighting the
“communist” menace) served to shore up many of the subsequent dictatorships which
arose in that region.'^' We would also need to look at several new forms of intervention
in Latin America including the use of the air-waves as seen by the propaganda tools of
Radio and TV Marti which are beamed into Cuba, this latter a violation of the
International Telecommunications Union mles and hence m violation of International
Law. In addition, we would need also examine recent U.S. intervention programs
operated under the auspices of “drug interdiction” in Bolivia, Brazil, Pern, Colombia,
etc. which often are disguised attempts to route out leftist insurgents in these countries.
(which claimed jurisdiction over tribal temtory) and to fear “communism,” and the
widespread use of terror, torture, and occasional genocide to promote U.S. economic
interests and development policies, see Colby and Dennett, Thy Will Be Done (1995)
Also, see Penny Lemoux, Cry ofthe People: The Strugglefor Human Rights in Latin
America {\9^2) fox an account of U.S. persecution and murder of missionaries in Latin
America who aligned themselves with the peasantry and workers. See also William
Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History, US Global Interventions Since World War 2
(1986) for a grim account of the role played by the CIA “in overthrowing governments,
perverting elections, assassinating leaders, suppressing revolutions, manipulating trade
unions and manufacturing ‘news’” in more than 50 countries since World War II.
Pnor to 1963, the Southern Command was known as the Caribbean Command. Note
also that the School of the Americans is often referred to by the term given it by anti-
SOA political activist and Catholic priest Father Roy Bourgeois as the “School of the
Assassins.” Designated originally since its opening in 1946 as the U.S. Army
Caribbean Training Center in Panama, its name was changed to the School of the
Americas in 1963 under JFK’s Alliance for Progress. On December 15, 2000, in an
attempt to distance itself from public criticism and repeated protests, its name was again
changed to the Defense Institute for Hemispheric Security Cooperation with command
shifting from the U.S. Army to the Department of Defense.
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As Stan Goff, a retired 20-year veteran of the U.S. military who trained Colombian
Special Forces m 1992 and who served in seven Lattn American countries, stated: •In
Colombia, it is well known that those who profit the most by the drag trade are
members of the armed forces, the police, government officials and the big businessmen
of the urban centers. But dnigs are only the pretense for intervention, Goff notes, for
the more signiHcant factor is the “billions of dollars in markets for U.S. products in
Colombia and Latin American nations” which will require ‘'the continued bleeding of
those nations' economies through external debts owed to Amencan-dominated financial
institutions.” Referring to a June 1999 OAS meeting where Clinton administration
representatives proposed an American-led multinational military force “‘to intervene in
threatened environments’” to “‘protect democracy’” in Latin America, Goff writes;
Colombia will be the foothold for this force, because it is under the most
immediate threat. The guerrillas are the foes of democracy, of course.
And the government of Colombia is the nominal democracy. They have
elections. Only a tiny fraction of the population has the means to recruit
and promote candidates, and terror is part of the political machinery. But
they have elections (Goff, July 29, 1999).
The most egregious and systematic human rights violations currently taking place in
this hemisphere, argues Goff, are hidden by what he calls “the democratic facade” by
which U.S. interventionary activity is justified. But many of these interventions—either
directly or by proxy or by other indirect means—are already familiar to most.
And, of course, there are the more notable examples of U.S. interventions such
as the 1973 overthrow of the democratically elected Marxist government of Salvador
Allende Gossens which came to power in Chile in 1970. While the case of Chile also
reveals the U.S. government’s past preference for dictators and repressive regimes in the
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An example of this can be witnessed by the guilty plea on January 27, 2000 by
Laurie Anne Hiett, the wife of Colonel James Hiett, the fonner head of U.S. anti-drug
operations in Bogota, to drug charges in a scheme to smuggle $700,000 worth of heroin
into the United States from her husband's post in Colombia (Hays, January 28, 2000).
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hemisphere (as exemphf.ed by ,he Pinochet regime wirich sncceedeci Allende and which
institutionalized widespread torture and government-sponsored murder)-a preference
which was paramount m the 1970s-the example of Chile also demonstrates that the
U.S. could never accept “the verdict of democratic politics in any nation where anti-
Yankee sentiment was overwhelming,” because, as Kolko notes, there is a “fear of
seeing not only its local investments lost but also encouraging anti-United States
economic legislation elsewhere in the hemisphere” (Kolko, 1988, p. 221). In this
regard, Kolko especially notes that m Chile, the coalition fighting against the U.S.
was ceritnst as well as leftist, revealing that the historically dominant
emispheric trend toward nationalist economic strategies certain to constrict, if
not exclude, U.S. investment was more vital and dangerous than ever. Indeed,
the very nature of this nationalist vision created a hemispheric consensus that
was politically still far more widespread and effective, and therefore threatening
tlian conventional Left ideologies. Had it survived, the Chilean example would
'
have posed an unprecedented, grave challenge to Yankee hegemony. Allende’s
failure to neutralize the military immediately was his decisive error, however,
and that, too, was a moral all those of similar persuasion were certain to
understand” (Kolko, 1988, pp. 221-2).
Other more recent examples of U.S. intervention to protect its hegemony in the
region include the Contra War against Nicaragua in the early ’80s as well as the
invasion of Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Haiti in 1994. Of particular interest
of late has been the indictment, extradiction, conviction, and imprisonment of
governmental leaders, including General Manuel Noriega of Panama and Chief Minister
Norman B. Saunders and Minister of Commerce and Development Stafford Missick of
the Turks and Caicos Islands, actions which violate the principle of sovereignty
embedded in the foundation of international law and the modem states system (Meditz
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and Hanrany, 1989, pp. 579-80).’^ These exan,ples of in.ervem.on only scratch the
surface of the constant, extensive, and oftentimes brutal policy of interference and
intervention by the U.S. in Latin America.
Wha, ,s suggested here is that this U.S. pohcy in Lat.n Amenca is not new and
is one which seeks continued hegemonic dominance over the regton. its resources, and
Its peoples, and acts as a testing ground for hegemonic schemes launched elsewhere in
the world. Furlhennore, this is a policy which at first asserted a U.S. right to be the sole
exploiter of the region, was followed by a period of private “filibustering” imperialism,
which then led to a period of blatant military interventions and outright imperialism,
and which since 1934 and especially since the onset of the Cold War in 1945 has
witnessed the U.S. attempt to mask its interventions tlirough hemispheric instruments
like the O.A.S., the AIFLD, and, presently, the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) while ultimately relying on the military structures in each country to secure
continued U.S. hegemony and Latin American subordination. And, finally, the U.S. has
consistently claimed it was intervening in Latin America to promote the cause of
“freedom and democracy.”
Currently serving a 40 year sentence in a U.S. federal prison, Noriega failed to
convince U.S. courts that the 1989 invasion ofPanama violated international treaties
and principles of customary international law. In United States ofAmerica v. Manuel
Antonio Noriega (U.S. District Court of Southern Florida, 1990, 746, Fed. Supp. 1506),
the Court ruled that Noriega, as an individual, lacked standing to challenge violations of
international law; only sovereigns could. And since the new Panamanian regime of
Guillermo Endara (installed and strongly backed by the U.S.) did not issue a protest on
Noriega s behalf, the Court refused to entertain the question of whether international
treaties had been violated by the U.S. military action in Panama (Slomanson, William
R. 1990/95. pp. 412-14).
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Since the 1980s, U.S. policy has sought to move away from support of
dictatorships in Latin America, especially following the revolution in Nicaragua in
1979. Such dictatorships were seen as easy targets for leftist revolutionary agitation.
The policy has thus been to support regimes which have democratic elections,
understood as elections between two or more market-oriented (i.e. capitalistic) parties
and to fund, not govemment-to-govemmei,t aid. but rather directly private initiatives in
Latin Amenca, as was originally proposed by David Rockefeller in 1963 (Colby and
Dennett, 1995, p. 665). But does this mean that the U.S. has lost some control over
these Latin American governments? Not necessarily, for while democratic politics
(albeit capitalist in form) are once again allowed to be practiced, the U.S. has sought to
retain ultimate control over these regimes through extensive ties with the region’s
militaries. Thus, the training and supplying of Latin American military personnel
through the U.S. Southern Command and the School of the Americas is still pursued in
order to develop close ties with the ultimate arbiters and guarantors of political power in
these countries.
And as recent events have attested to in Haiti, where the democratically elected,
eight-month-long, government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was charged with moving too
far to the left (French, 1991, p. A 10), he was removed hastily through a U.S.-backed
coup d’etat on September 30, 1991 (Norton, 1991, pp. 1, 8). And even though he was
the first freely elected president of Haiti in over 186 years and had won over 67% of the
vote, he apparently had pushed the parameters of what the U.S. considered acceptable
Both Saunders and Missick had been lured to Miami, Florida by U.S. DEA
agents when they were arrested in 1985.
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politics beyond reasonable give and take. His subsequent installation back into power
in October of, 994 (aPer Clinton replaced Bush as U.S. pres.dent) by U.S. nnli.ary
.ntervention (referred to as “Operation Uphold Democracy”) was implemented only
after Aristide agreed to a prominent U.S. role in Haiti and also after securing Aristide's
pronrise not to run for reelection in 1 995 (which he was kept to) (Fineman, May 1
,
1998, The Los Angeles Times).
Moreover, U.S. congressional action in the 1990s with both the Torricelli Law
(the Cuban Democracy Ac, of 1 992) and the Helms-Burton Ac, (the Cuban Liberty and
Solidarity Act of 1 996) has attempted not only to tighten the U.S. embargo on Cuba by
prohibiting foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba but also by
denying U.S. visas to executives of foreign companies that engage in trade or have
95
investments m Cuba. In addition, the Helms-Burton Act seeks to negate any popular
gains of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 by allowing U.S. citizens-including Cubans
who became U.S. citizens after the 1 959 revolution-to sue for property abandoned or
nationalized by the Cuban government and to sue foreigners who use property seized by
Castro s government from U.S. companies or citizens.
Given this prior and present history of U.S. intervention, current U.S. efforts to
promote democracy abroad become uncomfortably suspect. Still, questions must be
95
The Torricelli Law was denounced in the UN General Assembly on a vote of 59 to 3
with 71 abstentions in November of 1992.
The Helms-Burton Act was denounced by the Organization of American States
by a vote of 32 to 2 in June of 1996 and condemned by the European Commission. On
September 6, 1996, the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of
American States unanimously declared that the Act “is not in conformity with
international law.”
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posed as .0 whether this policy of supporting restrained dcntocracies wtll work to ensure
continued U.S. donttnanee of the region or wii, lead only to further disillusionntent and
hence to further challenges to U.S. hegemony as the more familiar cases of Guatemala.
Cuba, Chile and Nicaragua have demonstrated. Lessons from this U.S. history of
promotmg democracy in Latin America have no doubt tnfluenced present efforts by the
NED to promote democracy abroad in the post-Cold War world. We will now tun, to
an examination of the nature and form of this brand of U.S. democracy being exported
abroad along with an analysis of its grant-fund.ng activity from its ftrst decade and a
half of existence.
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IV. ORK.IN, S I RUCTIIRK, & CRAM I' UNI)IN(; PRAC TICKS OK HIK NKI)
Some people liiink lhal II,ere is o„ly one deniocracy and only one olinarcl.vIns ,s no( inie, and therefore one should not forget how many differences Uierearc hetween constitutions and how many different ways there ire of comhi '
n-oiiBh the enrrent effort hy the U.S. to promote deniocracy abroad was initiated
al the ledcral level in 1983 by National Scenrily Decision DociinienI 77, it took Public
I .aws 98- 1 64 and 98- 1 66 to I ) a„thori/,e “Project l7enioeraey,” a program which would
hind projects supporting democratic insliintions abroad through the United Stales
Information Agency (USIA), the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the U.S. State Department and 2) grant a two year authorization for the
National Hndowmcnl for Deniocracy (NKD) in November 1983 and appropriate 18
million dollars for the NED’s liscal year 1984 operations (GAO/NSIAD-84-I2I 1984
pp. 3-4). NSDD 77, signed on January 14, 1983, and entitled “Management of Public
06
I ursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the United
States Information Agency (USIA) was integrated into the Department of State on
October 1
,
1 999. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), now part of USIA and
winch includes the Voice of America (VOA) and surrogate broadcasting, has become a
separate federal entity. The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) has remained a separate agency, though the 1998 legislation stipulated that on
April 1
,
1 999, the USAID Administrator would report to and be under the direct
authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. As such, USAID, for
the first time, became an independent statutory agency within the Executive Branch of
the U. S. government as of April 1, 1999 (Foreign Affairs Reorganization Fact Sheet
December 30, 1 998).
It is important to note that the authorizing legislation did not officially “create”
the NED but, rather, merely recognized the existence of the Endowment as a private,
non-profit organization already incorporated in the District of Columbia and authorized
funding for Endowment activities.” As a General Accounting Office report notes:
The director of the Democracy Program told us that this significant
change in the character of the Endowment was made because the Board
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Diplomacy Relat.ve to Nat.onal Security,” created the International Poht.al Comnnttee
(IPC), one of four interagency standing committees reporting to the Speeud Planning
Group (SPG) of the National Security Council. The IPC was given the responsibility
for planning, coordinating and implementing international political activities m support
of U.S. policies and national security interests including providing “aid, training and
organizational support for foreign governments and private groups to encourage the
growth of democratic political institutions and practices.” Instructed to work with labor,
business, universities, philanthropy, political parties and the press, the IPC was given
the task to “build up the U.S. Government capability to promote democracy” and to
“initiate plans, programs and strategies designed to counter totalitarian ideologies and
aggressive political action moves undertaken by the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates'
(NSDD 77, 1 J84, pp. 131-2). As then-Secretary of State George P. Shultz testified
before Congress, the third goal of the U.S. foreign policy agenda was the U.S.
“commitment to expanding the forces of democracy and freedom.”*'^ Echoing President
Reagan s words spoken before the British Parliament in June 1982, Shultz pointed out
to Congress the perceived need “to move decisively to strengthen the infrastnicture of
democracy free press, free trade unions, free political parties—institutions,” the
Secretary stated, “which allow people to determine their own future” (Shultz, 1983, p.
2 ).
Supporting the institutions and proponents of democracy abroad, Shultz
proclaimed, was worthwhile because “only in democracies is there inherent respect for
members were not willing to accept a presidentially appointed board that
they found would be necessitated if Congress were to create the
Endowment (GAO/NSIAD-84- 121, 1984 n 10)
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’
’ t'- }
The first two goals were: 1 ) a commitment to “a more peaceful, secure world” so
that states may pursue “peaceful change and to realize their political and economic
aspirations, and 2) to restore order and stability to the international economic system”
by coordinating U.S. domestic and foreign economic policies in order to “achieve
sustainable, non-inflationary growth” (Shultz, 1983, p. 2).
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individual libcrt,es and ngh.s” ‘-frcedon, of express,on and real pariicipa.ion
,n
droosing leaders,” and “econonuc vitality” Moreover, Shultz cla.nted, dentoeracics
do not invade or subvert their neighbors” (Shultz, 1983, p. 8).
That the U.S. should engage in Ihe export ofdemoeracy abroad was necessary
or so ,t was clainrcd, due ,o both the distortion ofwhat U.S. dcuocracy stood for and
’
because “practical assistance” was required by those who would emulate it.’* Those
who called for merely keeping the “beacon” ofdemoeracy
“bright” at home by
“meeting the econo,uie, social and political needs” of the American people were less
than far-sighted, Shultz implied, for it was “na,ve to beheve,” he claimed, that
democracy’s mere “exislcnce somewhere in the world is sufficient incentive for ils
growth elsewhere” (Shultz, 1983, p. 9). Heralding past U.S. successes ,n “providing
asststance” to post-war Western Europe and Japan and noting how this assistance “in
some ,nstanccs...becamc a function of covert activity," Shultz staled that U.S. support
for democracy abroad “should be done openly.” Finally, Secretary Shultz claimed,
destab,l,zat,on was not the goal sought with Project Democracy—as the entire effort
was referred to for [cjhange must come from within, not be imposed from outside”
(Shultz, 1983, p. 10). The CIA, he testified, would not he a recipient of any funds from
the project and all funds were to be publically accounted for.
Building on previous and on-going programs—“with a proven track record”—
which sought to influence political developments abroad, such as the Asia Foundation
and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), Project Democracy
sought to channel funding into five key areas: “leadership training, strengthening the
institutions ofdemoeracy, education, conveying ideas and information, and developing
closer ties between American organizations and individuals and their foreign
98
Then-USIA director Charles Z. Wick testified that American ideals and values were
“under attack by a potent Soviet propaganda and disinfonnation campaign” (Wick
1983, p. 116).
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coun.en,a„s- (ShuU,
.983, , 4). Privileging „n.s beUvecn Wes.cn, En.ope an., ,„e
U.S., Shultz's statement reiterated the desire to strengthen the percep.ton "of shared
values and a common destiny” between the citizens of Europe and the U.S
,, for. he felt,
“our young people...are drawing further apart” (Shultz, 1983, p. 12).
Thus, as initially set out by Secretary Shultz, the promotion of democracy
abroad by the U.S. assumed that indigenous democratic forces were active in other
countries, that there was a shared understanding between these forces abroad and the
U.S. government as to what is meant by “democracy” and “democracy promotion” or
“democracy-building”, that the U.S.-acting through the instruments of Project
Democracy like the NED-wou.d only be providing assistance for these forces to act on
then own, that such assistance was not aimed a. destabilizing existing governments, that
the U.S. had successfully provided such assistance in the past as indicated by the stable
democracies of Western Europe and Japan, that this practice would be good for
establishing links with American organizations and individuals and their foreign
counterparts, that it would correct the supposedly distorted view ofwhat U.S.
democracy stood for, and would be a worthy goal in itself for democracies respect
individual nghts and freedoms and are nonaggressive, and would serve to strengthen
bonds of a common destiny between Western European and American youth.'*"
Caught m a quagmire in Central America in the early 1980s and still reeling
from the effects of the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions, the second OPEC oil shock
in addition to the Soviet move into Afghanistan, the growing strength of marxist
regimes in Africa, as well as the electoral wave which brought social democrats to
power in Europe at the beginning of the decade, most notably in France, Italy, Spain,
Portugal and Greece, and also confronted in the early ’80s by an anti-nuclear movement
99
Cohen states that democracy-building “refers generally to information and training
programs that support the growth of participatory government, publicly accountable
institutions, and the rule of law” (Cohen, 2000, p. 846).
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m Europe which, a, the tinre, produced ,hc larges, nrass demonstrations in history, the
Reagan administration realized that its massive anus build-up. by itself, was insufficient
.0 counter the revolutionary rumbhngs then emanating from many areas of the globe.
Reagan himself acknowledged thts when he stated in his 1982 London speech that “the
ulttmate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world will no, be bombs and
rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve...” (Reagan. 1982. p.
549). More importantly, as Wiarda notes, one prime motivation behind the Reagan
Administration’s enthusiasm for Project Democracy was that i, came to realize that
“Congress, the media, public opinion, church and labor groups, to say nothing of our
allies, are much more cooperative and supportive when the goals of our policy are
presented as ‘democracy’” (Wiarda, 1990a, p. 147). Indeed, one NED critic writes that
It was the exposure ofCIA criminal activities as revealed by the Church Senate
committee, the Pike House committee, and the President’s Rockefeller Commission in
the 1970s which prompted the shift of these interventionary activities “to a new
organization, with a nice sounding name-The National Endowment for Democracy.”
As Blum writes. The idea was that the NED would do somewhat overtly what the CIA
had been doing covertly for decades, and thus, hopefully, eliminate the stigma
associated with CIA covert activities” (Blum, 2000, p. 179). But, as Barbara Corny of
the libertarian CATO Institute remarks:
The debate over NED is not a debate about democracy; no one is
disputing that democracy and liberty are worthwhile goals. Rather, the
controversy surrounding NED questions the wisdom of giving a quasi-
private organization the fiat to pursue what is effectively an independent
foreign policy under the guise of “promoting democracy.”
Noting that NED proponents argue that a private structure is necessary “to overcome the
restraints that limit the activities of a government agency,” she likewise points out
the inherent contradiction of a publicly funded organization that is
charged with executing foreign policy (a power expressly given to the
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federal govemnient in Ihc Constitulion) yet exempt frotn nearly
-tllpolittcal and admin,strattve eontrols (Conry, November 8, I9')3)
Moreover, Conty adds, the Cold War argnment that was previonsly ttsed to jnstify the
NED. as a connter to Soviet ideology, is no longer relevant sinee the demise ofthe
Soviet Union. But on what basis ean the U.S. elaim a right to intervene in the domestie
affairs of other eonntries? And what form ofdemoeraey does the U.S. wish to promote
abroad and for what ends?
In an attempt to justify its intervention in other cotintries’ affairs, the U.S.
promotion ofdemoeraey abroad, so claims the NED's Statement of Prineipics and
Objectives, is rooted
m universally recognized principles of international law. The Universal
Deeharatton of 1 Inman Rights and other United Nations agreements (ineindingde Conventions ofthe International Labor Organization), as well as the HeIsLiFinal Aet, commit governments around the world to honoring the fundamentalhuman nghts that are guaranteed to citizens ofthe United States and other free
societies.
In what one scholar favorable to the NED notes as “a considerable leap of logic and
interpretation” (Wiarda, 1990, p. 150), the NED statement concludes that it is
therefore in keeping with established international law for the American people,
through an institution such as the National Endowment for Democracy, to help
others build democratic institutions and strengthen democratic processes that
will promote individual rights and freedoms (NED SPO, 1992, p. 1).
To the extent that such an interpretation of these conventions has any validity at all, one
still must acknowledge that any intervention in another state’s affairs also contradicts
internationally recognized principles of sovereignty; consequently, whatever
intervention does occur must be understood either as the prerogative ofthe dominant
power due to the absence of any reliable enforcement mechanism by international
bodies to check such interventionary activities, or to the tacit acceptance of a host
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country owing to their relative weakness v,s-ri-v,> the hegemon Also, while
intervemton in another state's affairs in any fonn is generally suspect, such a
transgression of state sovereignty becomes particularly egregious when it takes a
pohtical form which seeks to inntience domestic power relationships and national
political development. The NED's justification for intervent,on. therefore, is not likely
to win the admiration and respect of the governments it deals with.
In the U.S., however, in a climate where the foreign policy establishment has,
since late 1991, lost its main organizing principle of the previous 45 years, viz.
anticommunism, the NED’s raison d’etre was welcome news to a defense establishment
whose 300 billion dollar annual Cold War budgets are harder to defend in a post-Cold
War world. Such was the sentiment uttered by the Chairman of the Coalition for a
Democratic Majority, Ben Wattenberg, who argued that “embarking on a crusade for
democracy can help persuade the American people to keep defense budgets high ‘to
prevent Soviet imperial recidivism’” (Wattenberg, quoted in Maynes, 1990, p. 14).
Moreover, as political scientist Charles Maynes surmised: “Most Americans probably
would be willing to defy international law,” not only “to support the use of military
force to spread the cause of democracy if the cost were low” but, moreover, they
“probably will also accept covert efforts to promote democracy, that is to say, other
forms of interference, including violence, that are barred by international law.” Arguing
100
See, for example, the Helsinki Final Act, Sections I, II, III, IV, and, especially, VI:
Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs, in Henkin, et al., 1987/1993, pp. 262-264; UN
Charter, Art. I (2), Art. 2 (1-7), in Henkin, et al., 1987/1993, p. 2; and UN General
Assembly Definition of Aggression Resolution of 1974, in Henkin, et al., 1987/1993, p.
333.
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that most Americans “do not have the time or background to become tembly troubled
over long-temt costs,” Maynes concluded, therefore, that “[,]f the end ,s democracy,
ofncals can persuade them that the end justifies the means. The average American wtll
rely on his government to exercise good judgment in carrying out tins policy” (Maynes,
1990, p. 15). Still, there are limits to which the Amencan populace w.ll support such a
policy; thus Maynes warned that if the U.S. supports only “facade democracies” (e.g. all
the governments in Central America except Costa Rica before the 1990s), then
“significant groups within the United States will object vehemently” (Maynes, 1990, p.
16).
The question of “facade democracies” versus, say, “real democracies” raises the
question of the particular form U.S. exported democracy takes. Hence, we must turn to
Ihe National Endowment for Democracy Act itself, where the avowed six purposes of
the NED are stated as follows:
1 ) to encourage free and democratic institutions throughout the world
through private sector initiatives, including activities which promote the
individual rights and freedoms (including internationally recognized human
rights) which are essential to the functioning of democratic institutions;
2) to facilitate exchanges between United States private sector groups
(especially the two major American political parties, labor, and business) and
democratic groups abroad;
3) to promote United States nongovernmental participation (especially
through the two major American political parties, labor, business, and other
private sector groups) in democratic training programs and democratic
institution-building abroad;
4) to strengthen democratic electoral processes abroad through timely
measures in cooperation with indigenous democratic forces;
5) to support the participation of the two major American political
parties, labor, business, and other United States private sector groups in fostering
cooperation with those abroad dedicated to the cultural values, institutions, and
organizations of democratic pluralism; and
6) to encourage the establishment and growth of democratic
development in a manner consistent both with the broad concerns of United
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gmup?m requirements of the democratic
Endowment (National Endowment for DemocrTc^yTc^^
These NED purposes, in turn, are to be guided by the following seven principles
as ret.erated ,n the NED's 1992 Statement of Pnnc.ples and Objectives:
their ow'n’ deshn;™”""'' *o de.emtine
freerlo
"ght requires a system that guarantees
communications media, and the rule of law;
3) that a democratic system may take a variety of forms suited to localneeds and traditions, and therefore need not follow the U.S. or any otherparticular model; ^
4) that the existence ofautonomous economic, political social andcul.ura institutions is the foundation of the demoerati; process md he bestguarantor ofindividual rights and freedoms;
1 1
*at private institutions in free societies can contribute to thedevelopment ofdemocracy through assistance to counterparts abroad;
enco
assistance must be responsive to local needs and seek lo
SnVan" t-d f- and independent
7) that the partnership between those who enjoy the benefits ofdemocracy and those who aspire to a democratic future must be based uponmu ual respect, shared values, and a common commitment to work together to
extend the frontiers ofdemocracy for present and future generations (NED
statement of Principles and Objectives, 1992, pp. 3-4).
As these six purposes and seven principles indicate, the conception of
democracy proposed by the NED is, in many instances, vague and leaves room for
discretion as to what constitutes a democratic institution, group, electoral process,
101
etc. What is emphasized, however, are procedural rights of freedom of expression.
101
In response to an April 1993 National Security Council request for information on
democracy promotion activities of the U.S. government, the State Department provided
other agencies the following list of purposes or activities to serve as a guide for
identifying what constitutes “democracy promotion”;
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belief and associa.ion and ,he n.le of law while „,ak,ng „o mention of subs,an., ve rights
such as the ngh, to work, education, health care, soctal security, housing, etc.
Furthennore, private-sector polit.cal, social and cultural ins„,u„ons are privileged as the
best guarantors of individual rights and freedoms. so offering these procedural nghts
over substanhve nghts. the NED’s conception of democracy does no, stray far, if a. all,
from that which dominates within the U.S. internally.
The particular brand of democracy being exported is further revealed when
examining NED’s funding priorities, which emphasize three major functional areas:
pluralism; democratic governance; and education, culture and communications. The
goals of these programs include “the strengthening of civil society, democratic political
institutions, and democratic culture, respectively.” These three areas are deemed by the
NED as “essential to the achievement and maintenance of stable democratic orders”
(NED SD, 1992, p. 4). Two other areas involving research on democratic development
and regional and international cooperation receive more modest funding from the
Endowment. All NED programs, however, are devoted to encouraging democratic
political development without mentioning economic or social development (NED SPO,
1992, p. 4). And democratic political development is primarily oriented around
independent private-sector organizations—especially trade and business associations.
So again, we see that the emphasis is not on changing the economic underpinnings of
CIVIC education; civic organization; civic-military relations; conflict
prevention/resolution; ethnic, racial, and religious diversity programs;
human rights education and training; information exchange; legislative
traming/development; media training and development; political party
development; public administration development; rule of law; support
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undemocratic governments, but rather on effecting legal and pol.t.cal alterations. i.e.
1 07
superstructural changes.
Funding by the NED is primanly directed at fostering a cooperative and
bipartisan effort to promote democracy by enlisting the support of the Republican and
Democratic parties, the labor movement and organized business interests. Four core
institutes of the NED—the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).
associated with the U.S. Chamber ofCommerce; the American Center for International
Labor Solidarity (ACILS). an arm of the AFL-CIO; the Democratic Party's National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDIIA); and the Republican Party’s
International Republican Institute (IRI)-receive the majority ofNED grant monies.'"
And of the these four institutes, the AFL-CIO’s international mstitute. through 1 995.
received the overwhelming largess ofNED funds, receiving between 40-50% or nearly
half of all NED funds annually. However, since 1996. following the ouster of Lane
Kirkland the year before from the presidency of the AFL-CIO. labor’s share ofNED
grants has been nearly proportional to the NED’s other three core institutes. These core
institutes also receive funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development
for elections/election reformj and trade union development
(GAO/NSIAD-94-83, 1994, p. 10).
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In Marxist theory, the superstructure refers to social institutions (legal, political, and
cultural) that are erected upon the economic base
103
Pnor to 1997, the AFL-CIO’s Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) represented
organized labor’s NED core recipient. But as of 1997, the FTUI has been redesignated
as the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (‘the Solidarity Center’ for
short) representing the merger of the four international institutes of the AFL-CIO, i.e.
the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the Asian American Free
180
(USAID). The NED itself receives the bulk of its monies for grantmaking from annual
appropnations from
.he U.S. Infomration Agency (USIA),
.he U S. Agency for
In.en.a.,onal Developmen. (USAID), and the Dcpar.men. of S.a.e (DOS). Bu. w,,h
USIA's in,egra.ion in.o .he DOS as of Oc.ober 1999, funding decisions for ,he NED
w.ll hkely reside wi.h .he S.a.e Departmen.’s Undersecretary for Public Affairs and
Public Diplomacy. Also, the “Endowment collects U.S. Goveminent funds by filing
requests for direct funding and by presenting payment vouchers against letters of credit
when it disburses cash for program grants and administrative costs” (NED Annual
Report 1999, 2000, p. 81). Recipients ofNED funding must apply for grants on an
annual basis—which are doled out quarterly by the NED’s Board of Directors.
In its lirst few years in the 1980s, the NED allocated nearly half of its funding to
programs in Latin America. By the late 1980s, however, programs targetting first
Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union were in full swing. These areas—Central and
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and, by 1992, the former Soviet Union or the so-called
Newly Independent States (NIS)”—were declared by the Endowment to be “post-
breakthrough” countries. These were broken down further into two categories
including, firstly, “emerging democracies, i.e. countries that have achieved democratic
breakthroughs but not yet consolidated democratic institutions,” and, secondly,
“transitional countries where repressive political authority is collapsing and democratic
groups committed to peaceful transitions and the establishment of alternative structures
exist and need support” (NED SD, 1992, p. 8). NED sponsored programs in these
Labor Institute (AAFLI), the African American Labor Center (AALC), and the Free
Trade Union Institute (FTUI).
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countnes
.hus
-seek ,o defend recen, demoera.ic ga.ns. eonsolida.e ,he de,nocra„c
process, and avoid reversals.” As such, programs in ihese couniries focus on
-pariy-
bu.ldmg efforts, economic refom, initiatives, electoral monitoring and training. In,man
rights monitoring, and the establishn,ent of a free and independent press” (NED 1991
Annual Repori, 1992, p. 13). And while many of the programs in these regions are still
ongoing, the focus ofNED grantmaking in the 1990s shihed more towards East Asia
(particularly China), Afnca, and the Islamic countries of the Middle East. These latter
regions of the globe are termed
“pre-breakthrough” societies and these are further
subcategorized into “closed societies that repress all institutions independent of the
Slate, and authoritarian systems that tolerate the elements of civil society but where
democratic development can only be viewed as a long-term prospect” (NED SD, 1992,
p. 8). NED programs in these areas “are more likely to focus on facilitating the free
now of information, enhancing democratic civic consciousness, promoting human
rights, and creating political space in which democratic activists can operate” {NED
1991 Annual Report, 1992, p. 14). These latter pre-breakthrough societies continued to
receive increasing priority in the late ’90s and into the new century while post-
breakthrough regions’ funding has diminished from approximately 80% of all obligated
program funds in fiscal year 1991 to approximately 59% by 1999 (NED SD, 1992, p 8-
NED Annual Report 1999, 2000). This 80% in 1991 was further broken down into 49%
of funds devoted to “emerging democracies’’ and 31% to “transitional countries.” As
for the remaining 20% of obligated funds in 1991 geared toward pre-breakthrough
societies, 6% went toward closed societies” while 14% was earmarked for
“authoritarian systems” (NED 1991 Annual Report, 1992, p. 25).
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A more dynamic view orihe Ins.ory ofilre NED grant fnnd.ng can be gleaned
by examining the funding breakdown by regton for the years IWO to 1999. In Tabic I
below, we can see that Central and Eastern Europe funding toppetl the ItsI for the
decade w.th nearly $53 •/. million, followed by a slightly lesser a.nonnt of over $48 /.
million for Latin America and the Caribbean, nearly $46 nrillion for Asia, over $40
million for the Newly Independent States of the fonner Soviet Union, over $34 y,
mtihon for Africa, nearly $20 'A million for the Middle East and North Africa, with $1
1
% million designated as Multi-Regional funding. In addilion, since 1996, the
“Miscellaneous” funding category which funds had previously comingled under Ihe
“Mulli-Rcgionar heading became a separate category and has since received nearly $5
L. million for various non-rcgion-specific purposes. Likewise in Table 3, a breakdown
by year of funding for the NED's four core institutes (which are annually the largest
grant recipients) reveals that the AFL-CIO’s Amcriean Center for International Labor
Solidarity (ACILS) was by far the largest grant recipient garnering over $60 'A million,
followed in a distant second by the nearly $34 million for the Chamber ofCommerce’s
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), over $30 'A million for Ihe
Democratic Party’s National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDIIA), and
nearly $31 million for the Republican Party’s International Republican Institute (IRI).
The “post-breakthrough” societies of Central and Eastern Europe, the Newly
Independent States of the former Soviet Union, and the countries of Latin American and
Ihe Caribbean received 58% of all NED funding allocated to its six regions from 1990-
99, comparing similarly to the percentage of funding these regions received in the year
1 99 1 taken alone, although the amount of funding for the “pre-breakthrough” regions of
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Asia and Ihe Middle East/North Africa since 1991 nearly doubled and tripled for Ihese
.wo regions by 1999. Funding for Africa appears to have renrained stagnant during the
decade, though the constancy of funding for this region must take into account the
recategorization of the Middle East which now inconrorates as well the area of North
Africa as of 1998, which likewise reduces the scope of the Africa region category.
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.Table 1
ational Endowment for Democracy Grant Funding by Region, 1990-1999
(In U.S. Dollars)year AFRICA ASIA CENTRAI
&
EASTERN
EUROPE
LATIN
AM. &
THE
CARIBBEAN
middle
EAST&
NORTH
AFRICA
NIS
(FORMER
SOVIET
UNION)
MULTI-
REGIONAL
1. National Endowment for Democracy Grant Funding by Region
1990-1999
N(3TE Miscellaneous spending which had previously been comingled
under the “Multi-Regionai;’ heading was made into a separate categow in
with various non-region-specific grant funding as depicted in Table 2
Table 2
National Endowment for Democracy Miscellaneous Grant Funding, 1998-1999
(In U.S. Dollars)
rtAK MISCELLANEOUS
1996
1,060,025
1997
1,301,858
1998
1,483,994
1999
1,633,615
TOTAL $5,479,492 '
2: National Endowment for Democracy Miscellaneous Grant Funding,
1998-1999
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Natio
Table 3
nal Endowment for Democracy Grant Funding To Its Four Core
Institutes, 1990-1999 (In U.S. Dollars!YEAR
1 non
Center for
International Private
Enterprise
ACILS
American Center for
International Labor
Solidarity (formerly
the Free Trade Union
Institute FTUl)
IRI
International
Republican Institute
INDIIA
National Democratic
Institute for
International Affairs
1 yy\)
1 nn-i
1,996,159 7,117,411 2,645,022 2,106,843
1991 2,472,340 4,875,909 1,201,317 1,191,834
1992 3,034,427 5,766,102 1,673,000 2,172,723
1993 2,672,194 7,735,119 2,234,342 2,455,333
1994 3,323,315 9,095,722 2,941,675 3,305,418
1995 3,516,821 8,441,082 3,163,841 3,241,360
1996 3,577,463 4,320,721 3,826,277 4,095,361
1997 4,603,606 4,124,999 4,333,001 3,811,098
1998 4,104,988 3,885,790 3,989,645 3,888,815
1999 4,545,189 5,171,624 4,828,512 4,248,113
TOTAL
-i. XT
$33,846,502 $60,534,479 $30,836,632 $30,516,898
3: National Endowment for Democracy Grant Funding To Its Four
Core Institutes, 1990-1999
In 1990, the NED began to issue its own Journal ofDemocracy published
quarterly by the Johns Hopkins University Press which is said to have both a scholarly
orientation and be accessible to general readers interested in worldwide democratic
developments, in particular analyses of international democratic movements and the
cultural, political and social factors that affect the institutionalization of democracy.
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Some of the contributors to the journal include polit.cal scientists Samuel P.
Huntington, Philippe C. Schmitter. Arend Lijpharl. Enrique Baloyra, Guilleimo
O’Donnell, Seymour Martin Lipset, fontter State Department analyst and now RAND
Corporation analyst Francis Fukuyama, and 1 998 Nobel Prize winner and economist
Amartya Sen, in addition to “leading democratic activists” such as Chinese dissident
Fang Lizhi, Russian parliamentarian Oleg Rumyantsev, Kenyan human nghts lawyer
Gibson Kamau Kuria, playwright-cum-president of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel,
Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, and “His Holiness” the Dalai Lama. Sinee 1994.
the Journal ofDemocracy has come under a new arm of the NED called the
International Forum for Democratic Studies which bills itself as “a leading center for
analysis of the theory and practice of democratic development worldwide. It also serves
as a clearinghouse for information on the varied activities and experiences of groups and
institutions working to achieve and maintain democracy around the world.” Marc F.
Plattner and Larry Diamond not only direct the Forum but they also coedit Journal
ofDemocracy. Three additional programs have been initiated by the Fomm including a
Democracy Resource Center, a Research and Conferences Program, and a Visiting
Fellows Program that “enables distinguished scholars and democratic activists from
around the world to spend from three to ten months in residence at the Forum.” The
Democracy Resource Center itself has set up its own moderated listserv on the Internet
called DemocracyNews, which it claims “facilitates an exchange of news and
information among NED grantees and other democracy activists, scholars, and
practitioners” (“Forum: International Forum for Democratic Studies, National
Endowment for Democracy,” March, 1999). In addition, a number of anthologies of
articles from the Journal ofDemocracy have been published separately by the Johns
Hopkins University Press.
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Also, in 1996, an NED website was initiated on the World Wide Web
delineating many of the NED’s polictes and programs.'" A litghl.ght of the
-DemocracyNer website ts an online ‘•Democraey Projects Database” ofNED grants
front 1990 to the present, in addition to grants made by newly affiliated Canadian and
European democracy-promotion organizations including the Westminster Foundation
for Democracy (Great Britain), the International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development (Canada), the Foundation Jean Jatires (France), and the Alfred
Mozer Foundation (The Netherlands). However, there are several drawbacks to this
online grant database, including the fact that only grants for one region and for only one
grantee can be searched at any one time, thus preventing the online researcher from
perustng all grants for all regions by year, though in 1999 the NED began placing its
annual reports online. Links have been established as well to the NED’s four core
institutes who are also now online at the following web addresses or Uniform Resource
Locators (URLs): CIPE <http://www.cipe.org/>, ACILS (formerly the ETUI)
<http://www.ned.org/grantees/center.html> IRI <http://www.iri.org/>, and NDIIA
<http://www.ndi.org/>.
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URL for the NED website is as follows: <http://www.ned.org/>.
This researcher is thankful to NED librarian Allen Overland at the Democracy
Resource Center for overcoming this obstacle by sending me via the Internet the entire
grant file database for years 1990-97 and for Jane Riley Jacobsen at NED who sent me
hard copies of the NED’s grant database for years 1998-99. Thanks also are extended to
UMass OIT Data Analysis Services for their help in sorting the 1990-97 data,
particularly Scott Evans, Eva Goldwater and Trina Hosmer
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It should be noted that ACILS ’s (which before 1997 was known as the ETUI) web
page is supported solely on the NED server whereas each of the other core institutes
host their own fully developed web sites. The nonexistence of a separate web site for
ACILS has been noted by Scipes who writes that one ACILS critic pointed out that
there is also no notice ofACILS on the AEL-CIO’s own web site
<http://www.aflcio.org/> (Scipes, July 8, 1999). This omission raises the question of
the possibility of the AEL-CIO’s reluctance to admit its collusion with both corporate
and U.S. government agencies.
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In addition to these efforts, the NED in 1998 launched what it tenns
-The World
Movement for Democracy.” holding its ftrst meeting in February 1999 m New Delht,
India with 400 participants representing over 80 countries. Descnbed as “a dynannc
network of democrats, both individuals and organizations, who aspire to work m a
coordinated way to address proactively the toughest challenges to the advancement of
democracy and human rights in the world today,” the NED's 1999 Annual Report states
that this first assembly
established the World Movement as a unique global forum for mutual
support, exchange, and cooperation, and highlighted the potential for
usitig new information teehnologies, especially the Internet, to meet the
challenges posed by authontarian regimes and to support democratic
development (pp. 5, 9).
With plans for a follow-up conference in Sao Paulo, Brazil, from November 12-15,
2000, a Steenng Committee has been established to guide the World Movement’s
development, with the NED designated as the Movement’s current secretariat {NED
Annual Report 1999, 2000, p. 9). It is also noteworthy that the World Movement for
Democracy’s first assembly in New Delhi was funded by both private and public
resources including: The Starr Foundation, The Ford Foundation, CIVITAS, Freedom
House, Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd., the Holdeen India Fund, the Industrial
Development Bank of India, RPG Enterprises, Tata Steel, and the U.S. Department of
State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor {NED Annual Report 1999,
2000, p. 9).
To see how NED practice conforms (or not) to its own rhetoric, we need to
examine some of the programs NED funds more directly. Looking at NED’s 1991
Annual Report and its rather sketchy description of grant allocations, we can see that
there were 50 grant recipients for all of Africa in fiscal year 1991 (See Table 4). The
largest single grant recipient was a $330,000 grant to the Joint Center for Political and
Economic Studies to enable the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa
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(IDASA) ,0 support a reg.onal office in Na.ai Provmce. The second largest recipient
$230,000 grant to the Free Trade Union Institute (FTIU) to allow the African-
American Labor Center (AALC) to hold three leadership seminars in the U.S. for
African trade union leaders and to develop worker education course materials. In Asia,
30 grants were made with the largest, a $363,000 grant, going to the FTUI to allow the
Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) to support the strengthening of free trade
unton
.nstitutions in the Philippines. A lesser grant of $318,337 was also given to the
FTUI to enable the AAFLI to support trade unions in Taiwan, Pakistan, India, Malaysia,
Hong Kong, Nepal and several “sub-Asian regional union organizations.” In Central
and Eastern Europe, NED funded 51 grantees in 1991 with the four largest grants goint
to the FTUI to fund labor organizations in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland and to assist
in regional independent trade union development. As for the republics of the fomier
Soviet Union, 22 grants were made, with, by far, the largest grant of $1,000,000 going
to the FTUI to provide support for independent trade unions in the region. A much
lesser grant of $250,000 was given to the International Republican Institute (IRI) to
conduct conferences in Moscow on institution-building and political training. NED
programs for Latin America and the Caribbean had 56 recipients in fiscal year 1991, by
far the largest number of active programs of all the regions. Again, the FTUI received
the largest grant of $294,650 to enable the AIFLD to monitor human and trade union
nghts in Latin America. This was followed by a $2 1 5,000 grant to the Ethics and
Public Policy Center to sponsor a Libro Libre publication program ofbooks which
promote democracy. The last region to receive funding was the Middle East where just
1
1 grants were made in 1 99 1 with the largest grant for $272,955 given to the Center for
International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in order to publish a new Journal ofEconomic
Reform for the region.
By 1999, the number of grants for all regions except for the Latin
America/Caribbean region had increased, going from 50 to 76 in Africa, from 30 to 74
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m Asia, from 5 1 to 90 in Central and Eastern Europe, from 1 1 to 41 in the Middle
East/North Africa region, and from 22 to 93 in the Newly Independent States, with only
the Latin America/Caribbean region declining in the number of grants going down from
56 in 1991 to 52 m 1999. Two of the three largest grants for the Africa region in 1999
were given to ACILS, with $142,000 allocated so as to “increase participation of the
Union Nationale des Syndicats des Traveilleurs du Benin and the Centrale des Syndicats
Autonomes du Benin in the 1999 parliamentary electoral process” and $162,385
allocated to ACILS so that it could “work with the Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs
du Niger to reverse the current deterioration ofworker and trade union rights.” The
second largest grant for the Africa region in 1999 went to the NDI for a total of
$1 50,120 to “help prepare key political party figures for the competitive multiparty
elections m March 2000” in Zimbabwe (NED Annual Report 1999, 2000, pp. 12, 15,
1 8). In Asia m 1 999, four of the five largest grants went to ACILS with the largest, for
an amount of $551,232, going to “support the protection of workers’ rights and the
institutional development of trade unions in Thailand and Malaysia” while the second
largest grant for $489,716 went to the IRI for its work in China to “support further
progress and consolidation of electoral reform at the village level, and to conduct
programs on legislative reform at the national and provincial levels” (NED Annual
Report 1999, 2000, pp. 26, 29). The one grant that stands out in Central and Eastern
Europe in 1999, and by far the largest of all regional grants that year, was for $735,177
allocated to the IRI in order to “establish a regional field office in Bratislava, Slovakia,
from which IRI will organize and implement a variety of programs involving
participants from one or more of 12 countries” (NED Annual Report 1999, 2000, p.
grant for $284,284 allocated to the IRI so that they can “conduct an international
election observation mission during the October and November 1999 presidential
elections in Ukraine” tops the list of funding in the Newly Independent States (NED
Annual Report 1999, 2000, p. 48). Likewise, the IRI received the largest grant in the
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Latm America/Caribbean region for 1999 with an amount of $310,507 allocated so they
can “work with the Cuban Democratic Revolutionao' Directorate to promote a peaceful,
democratic transition in Cuba” (NED Annual Report 1999, 2000, p. 53). And, lastly,
ACILS received the biggest grant for the Middle Eastmorth Africa region in 1999 with
an allocation of $353,897 in order to “work with the Working Women’s League in
Lebanon and the International Institute for Peace and Democracy to build democratic
trade union institutions, empower working women, raise consciousness about child
labor and migrant labor issues, and develop intra-Arab union networks to promote
democracy thoughout the Middle East/Northem Africa region” (NED Annual Report
1999, 2000, p. 63).
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Table 4
National Endowment for Democracy Number of Grants By
-
Region And Year, 1990-1999
AFRICA ASIA CENTRAL
AND
EASTERN
EUROPE
LATIN
AMERICAN
AND THE
CARIBBEAN
MIDDLE
EAST &
NORTH
AFRICA
NIS
(FORMER
SOVIET
UNION)
multi-
regional
1990 21 23 94 71 0 23 6
1991 50 30 51 56 11 22 6
1992 58 43 54 63 7 43 10
1993 49 42 39 67 19 55 9
1994 63 49 53 65 34 61 8
1995 58 62 60 63 39 54 10
1996 58 58 53 50 48 67 3
1997 62 47 60 42 42 74 5
1998 74 58 70 50 41 84 11
1999 76 74 90 52 41 93 17
TOTAL 569 486 624 579 282 576 85
4: National Endowment lor Democracy Number of Grants
And Year, 1990-1999
By Region
NOTE: The number of grants in the newly autonomous “Miscellaneous” category are
depicted in Table 5 below:
Table 5
National Endowment for Democracy Miscellaneous Number of Grants 1998-1999
YEAR NUMBER OF
GRANTS
1997
^
9
1998
-
9
1999 11
TOTAL 29
5: National Endowment for Democracy Miscellaneous Grants, 1998-
1999
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That the NED annual reports are vague as to the specific breakdown of its
individual grants has been noticed also by the U.S. government’s General Accounting
Office which in 1991 investigated 36 NED projects-accounting for a total of 20
million dollars-^-and concluded that only one had been evaluated adequately. In
addition, there were several instances of petty graft including $10,000 spent on
unauthonzed office renovations, inappropriate loans made with NED funds, funds spent
on a rental car for an individual later arrested for dealing drugs and then further
unapproved expenditures to cover the cost of rental fees on the impounded vehicle.
More to the point, however, the GAO also found itself unable to get the General
Workers Union of Portugal to assist in accounting for how it spent its $2.6 million grant
It had received from the ETUI. And though the NED brushes off such problems by
claiming that it works with mostly small activist organizations working under trying
conditions. Nation columnist David Com states that given this atmosphere of lax
oversight, it is apparent that NED recipients are “clearly learning one vital lesson of
U.S.-style democracy: Taxpayer dollars.. .are funds just waiting to be burned” (Com,
1991, p. 548). In its March 1991 report, the GAO stated that since the
GAO’s last report in 1986, the Endowment has not significantly
improved its capability to evaluate and report on the effectiveness of its
total program. The Endowment has not given adequate attention to
systematically planning program objectives and assessing program
results. In addition, the Endowment has not developed an adequate
evaluation capability to independently evaluate and report on the
effectiveness of its total programs (GAO/NSIAD-91-162, 1991, p. 3).
And while instances of petty graft and vague financial reporting point to certain
administrative problems at NED which perhaps, if the political will exists, may easily
be addressed, other funding programs raise questions as to NED’s priorities in its efforts
to promote democracy and indicate the narrowness of its ideological orientation. For
example, in May 1989, the NED held its first “world conference of democratic activists”
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whose invitees were strictly disc,pies of free market capital,sn, including Hernando de
Soto, the free market Peruvian economist and author of The Other Path- the anti-Soviet
activist Vladimir Bukovsky; the Polish free-marke, advocate Leszek Kolakowski; and
the Mexican neoconservative Octavio Paz. Award winners at this event included the
“renowned” Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi, Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro and
Vaclav Havel, current president of the newly-renamed Czech Republic [which separated
from Slovakia in 1 993]. Offering the invocation for the 1991 Democracy Awards
ceremony at the convention was Tihet’s Dalai Lama. And to conclude the program.
Vice President Dan Quayle praised Havel and Chamorro as representing “demoeratic
statesmanship at its very finest” (Quayle, quoted in NED 1991 Annual Report, 1992, p.
9). Since 1989, the NED has hosted approximately 17 other conferences including one
in March, 1997 entitled “Consolidating Democracy in Taiwan” which promised to
examine “the Taiwanese political landscape in the wake of its historic March 1996
presidential elections to identify obstacles to the strengthening of Taiwan’s democracy,
and to explore the impact of international factors on Taiwan’s future prospects” (NED:
International Forum Conference Reports <http://www.ned.org/pubs/intercom.html>).
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Titles ofNED conferences include: The 1999 Elections and the Future of Nigeria
(October 1999), International Relations and Democracy (March 1999), Democratic
Consolidation in South Africa: Progress and Pitfalls (February 1998), India's
Democracy at Fifty (September, 1998), Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability:
How Democracies Can Fight Corruption and the Abuse of Power (June, 1997),
Democracy in South Asia (September, 1997), Five Years into the Transition: Where is
Russia Headed? (May, 1997); Consolidating Democracy in Taiwan (March, 1997);
Democracy in East Asia (December, 1996); Constructing Democracy and Markets: East
Asia & Latin America (July 1996); Stability and Reform in Egypt (May 1996); Mexico:
the Challenge of Political Opening (December 1995); Civil-Military Relations and the
Consolidation of Democracy (June 1995); Democracy’s Future (April 1995); Nigeria’s
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That the 1989 convention featured, as did tire others which followed, many of
the heroes of the conservative right is not suntrising. Still, other funding programs spell
out this orientation more clearly. A 1984 FTUl grant to Panamanian union activists was
used to promote the presidential candidacy of one Nicolas Barletta who the U.S.-backed
Panamanian military endorsed. Such support for particular candidates not only violates
NED principles but is against U.S. neutrality laws. Also in 1984, the FTUl gave secret
grants to two French groups opposed to French President Francois Mitterand. One grant
for $500,000 went to a rightwing activist group which proceeded to stage protests
against Mitterand. The other secret grant for $800,000 went to a CIA-connected trade
union called Force Ouvriere which acted to counter socialist and communist controlled
unions. In these latter two grants, not only did NED funding raise questions about
engaging in destabilization campaigns, especially against a democratic ally of the U.S.
but, moreover, the fact that these activities were funded secretly again violated both
1 08NED principles and U.S. law.
In another effort at destabilizing an elected government, the NED in 1990
allocated more than $615,095 to the Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces with
Political Crisis: Which Way Forward? (February 1995); The Prospects for Political
Change in China (December 1994); and The Unfinished Revolution (April 1991).
This March 23, 1996 presidential election represented Taiwan’s first election
since Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang party (KMT) fled mainland China in 1949,
after losing the civil war with the communists, and set up a dictatorial government on
the island of Formosa. Democratic opposition to the KMT-led government coalesced
around the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which was able to successfully push for
the lifting—for the first time since 1949—of Martial Law in 1987. The DPP’s success
in pushing for a political opening in Taiwan, however, was not rewarded in the 1996
elections, which was won by the ruling KMT party candidate, Lee Teng-hui.
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another $232,695 going to its newspaper in an attempt to defeat the Bulgarian Socialist
Party in the June 1990 elections. When even this financial aid failed to prevent a BSP
(which formerly had been the Bulgarian Communist Party) victory, the NED, Blum
writes:
stepped m with generous funding and advice to the specific opposition
groups which carried out a campaign of chaos lasting almost five
months: very militant and disruptive street demonstrations, paralyzing
labor strikes, sit-ins, hunger strikes, arson...parliament was surrounded,
the government was under seige.
. .until finally the president was forced
to resign, followed by some of his ministers; lastly, the prime minister
gave up his office (Blum, 2000, p. 157).
In the subsequent 1991 Bulgarian elections, NED-backed political allies prevailed, or as
Blum writes, what NED calls the ‘democratic forces’ won” (Blum, 2000, p. 157).
Still other NED practices not only suggest impropriety, if not illegality, but also
certain individuals and groups NED has working for it tarnishes its stated commitment
to democratic goals; moreover, what goals NED does have only further indicates that in
truth it merely pursues U.S. foreign policy aims—which have more to do with selfish
state interests, e.g. accumulation of wealth and expansion of power, than in promoting
democracy. For example, in one 1990 grant given to the University of South Carolina,
the university took a ten percent administrative charge for handling the funds and
passed the rest on into several vaguely described Chilean projects with money being
deposited directly into the personal account of the director of one of the Chilean projects
with no further documentation on how it was spent. As investigative reporter Holly
Sklar and political analyst Chip Berlet note, “the university was used essentially as a
108
See Chapter 3 above on the enlistment of the U.S. labor movement in America’s
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money laundry” (Sklar and Berlet, 1991-92, p. 13). Also in 1990, U was found out that
former pro-Nazi Arrow Cross official Laszlo Pasztor, a convicted Nazi collaborator,
was helping to channel NED funds to his friends in Hungary by translating and
evaluating grant requests from Hungarian and Czechoslovak groups to the National
Republican and National Democratic Institutions for International Affairs. Just two
years before, Pasztor had been forced to resign from President Bush’s 1988 presidential
campaign when it was found out that the campaign’s Coalition for Amencan
Nationalities, headed by Pasztor, had numerous ties to anti-Semitic and openly fascist
organizations (Berlet and Sklar, 1990, pp. 450-51). In September 1991, a scandal
erupted m the Philippines after the U.S. attempted to buy the support of Philippine
Senator Ernesto Herrera for the treaty to keep U.S. bases in the country. Herrera is also
the general secretary of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) which
received NED grants via the ETUI and the Asian-American Free Labor Institute
(AAFLI). After criticizing the treaty as being against Filipino workers’ interest,
Herrera reportedly switched his vote in favor of the losing treaty after AAFLI promised
$3.7 million in additional TUCP support” (Sklar and Berlet, 1991-92, p. 59). NED
funding activities, or rather the lack thereof in one noticeable 1991 case, came under fire
when Congressman William P. Gray III (D.-Pa.), the House Majority Whip at that time,
was able to temporarily strike NED funding in retaliation for the apparent unwillingness
ofNED to distribute $10 million in aid to political groups helping victims of apartheid
in South Africa. The money had been approved as part of a 1 990 supplemental
appropriations bill and yet 14 months later, the funding still had not occurred. But
fight against communism.
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hcforc Grsy could move to climiriiitc NPO’c toe 'n*e iminate ED s $26 million in funding for 1991, the House
quickly dropped NED funding from HR 2608 i n order to avoid a full debate (Biskupic
.991, pp. 1594-5,. NED funding was reintroduced and passed later in the year in the
’
1992 appropnations process, but the racist implications ofNED action, or rather
inaction, opened the NED up to further senitiny.
The degree to which the NED will go to subvert a country’s sovereignty can
perhaps best be gleaned from its funding of ant.-Sand.nista groups ,n Nicaragua. Prior
to 1986, for example, part of $3.5 million in NED grants to Nicaragua went to an
organization called PRODEMCA which funded the Sandinista opposition newspaper in
Prensa while simultaneously taking out advertisements supporting Reagan’s contra war.
To obviate criticism which resulted from this practice, funding for La Prensa was taken
up by the Washington-based Delphi International Group which later became a key NED
grant operator in Nicaragua. More blatant interference was witnessed in 1 989 when
NED pumped in nearly $9 million to help fund Nicaragua’s anti-Sandinista United
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) in the February 1990 elections. That the NED had gone
overboard is indicated by the fact that the Endowment never, prior to 1989, spent more
than $2.8 million for opposition movements in Chile, Poland, Panama and the
Philippines, and all but Panama had larger populations than Nicaragua’s 1 .6 million
voters (Overt Meddling, 1989, p. 408). And though by Nicaraguan law half the aid had
to go to Nicaragua’s Sandinista-dominated Supreme Electoral Council, the NED
partisan funding raised questions as to whether NED had violated its own principles and
charter as well as U.S. law by working to elect individual candidates, in the present case
UNO s presidential candidate Violeta Chamorro, and by paying the salaries of
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ectoral Council, however, did have to put its foot down when an NED-funded group
called the Center for Training and Electoral Promot.on (CAPEL) proposed to airdrop
nearly two million “civic education leaflets” at the final political rallies of both the
UNO and the Sandinista Frente on Febniary 18 and 21, 1990, respectively. The Council
also decided not to allow a CAPEL produced videotape to air on Nicaraguan television
(GAO/NSIAD 90-245, 1990, p. 22). As a report by the Institute for Media Analysis
(IMA), a New York-based nonprofit which monitored the 1990 Nicaraguan television
campaign, stated: ‘“The U.S. defines the Nic[araguan] electoral campaign in temis of a
battle between the [Sandinista] Frente and the UNO despite the fact that there are eight
other contenders. However, the money that the U.S. is giving to UNO will turn this
definition into a reality. It is totally distorting the electoral process and this is only the
beginning’” (IMA quoted in Branan, 1990, p. 14).
Why the Sandinistas allowed NED funding to begin with is a telling case of the
coordinated pressure tactics used by the U.S. to-in Ronald Reagan’s words-get the
Sandinistas “to cry uncle.” Economically strangled by U.S. control or dominate
influence over international markets and international lending agencies and under
pressure by Washington to make concessions to the opposition in order to end U.S.
backing for the counterrevolutionary guerrilla bands known as “the Contras”, the
Nicaraguan government figured it had little choice but to allow the funding. However,
in order to thwart the impact ofNED funding, the Sandinistas passed in 1989 a new
electoral law—mentioned above—which required that half of all funds donated to
political parties from non-Nicaraguan groups must be turned over to the government’s
electoral council as a tax to help pay administrative costs of the election (Nichols, 1990,
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PP. 266-67). With regard
.o the NED, abou, half of its $2.1 mill,on granted ,o the UNO
y Public Law lOI-l 19 went to the Electoral Council for taxes (GAO/NSlAD-90-245,
1 990, p. 1 8). The Nicaraguan law, however, did not envision nor could defend agamst
mtllions of other dollars in U.S. aid which also flowed to the Sandnnsta opponents
including $47.9 million authorized under U.S. Public Law 100-276 and $49.75 million
authonzed under U.S. Public Law 101-14 for the “Nicaraguan Resistance”
(GAO/NSIAD-90-245, 1990, p. 8).
As the victory of Violeta Chamorro in the 1990 elections proved, overt, perhaps
even more than covert, U.S. funding can have a powerful influence in manipulating the
internal politics of other countries. Indeed, current efforts to undermine the Cuban
government are running along full-speed ahead. With help from the anti-Cuba
Torricelli bill signed into law by President Bush on October 23, 1992 and the Helms-
Burton Act signed into law by President Clinton on March 12, 1996, external pressure
to tighten the then 34-year-old U.S. blockade of Cuba by attempting to cut off
international trade by penalizing companies doing business in Cuba on properties
owned by U.S. companies and citizens prior to the 1959 revolution, denying U.S. visas
to executives of companies doing business in Cuba, allowing lawsuits by U.S.
citizens—including Cubans who have since the revolution become U.S. citizens—for
reclamation of land nationalized by the Castro government, will be complementing
NED funded anti-Castro groups which in turn could produce what years of CIA covert
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activities have been unable to do, v,z. the overturning of the Cuban revolution.'” And
though on .lune 27, 2000 (following the Elian Gonzalez saga) the U.S. House of
Representatives voted to ease sanctions on delivering food and medicine to Cuba for the
first time in 40 years, it remains to be seen whether other aspects of the trade embargo
against Cuba will be relaxed or not by the new administration following the November
2000 elections.
One of the key NED grantees in the anti-Castro operation is known as the Cuban
American National Foundation (CANE) founded and originally chaired by a wealthy
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Formally known as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Torricelli bill (named
after Robert Torricelli (D.-NJ)) forbids overseas subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from
doing business with Cuba, threatens reprisals against any country trading with the
island, and prevents foreign ships that visit Cuban ports from docking in U.S. harbors.
The 1996 Helms-Burton Act (the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act) allows lawsuits in U.S. courts against foreigners who use property
seized by Castro’s government from U.S. companies or citizens, including people who
were Cuban citizens at the time of confiscation but whom are now U.S. citizens. The
Act also bans executives from companies investing in such properties from the U.S. by
denying them visas,
no
Elian Gonzalez was a six-year-old Cuban boy who was brought illegally to the U.S.
by his mother in November of 1999, the latter who drowned along with ten other Cuban
immigrants in the crossover to the Florida coast from Cuba. His Cuban father later won
a custody battle to repatriate his son to Cuba on July 6, 2000, albeit in defiance of
Miami-based anti-Castro activists who filed numerous lawsuits to prevent the boy’s
return.
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M,an,i businessman and virulen, anti-Castro activist Jorge Mas Canosa.
' '
' Mas and
CANF came under scrut.ny as Mas conttnued to receive large NED grants through 1 9d2
and, in turn, funded eantpa.gns of scores of candidates for federal oflice, mcluding that
of former chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who was also a founder of
NED and its first acting chairman, Representative Dante Fascell (D.-FI.) (Nichols, 1988,
pp. 389-90). Indeed, Representative Robert Torricelli, sponsor of the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992, received thousands of dollars in funding from CANF. And r
U.S. News & World Report correspondent Linda Robinson wrote: “It is less dear
whether their (CANF) goal is promoting democracy in Cuba or restoring 1950s style
rule by a wealthy elite. In fact. Mas was said to have already chosen positions for Ins
cohorts in Miami to serve under him as president in a post-Castro Cuba” (McAfee,
March 23, 1 994, Movimienlo Cuhano por k, Paz). These NED-funded activities in
Cuba intended to overturn the Castro government “leads to the probability,” stales
In 1997, the Center for Public Integrity identified CANF as not only ‘“the most
potent voice on U.S. policy toward Cuba’” but as well ‘“dollar for dollar, arguably the
most effective
.
’ The Center’s report notes that CANF funneled approximately $3.2
million into the U.S. political system from its founding in 1981 until 1997 As
Washington Post reporter Karen DeYoung writes, CANF “claims credit for the current
pillars of sanctions policy—Radio and TV Marti, a $28 million-a-year taxpayer-
financed system broadcasting into Cuba, along with the embargo-tightening Cuban
Democracy Act in 1992 and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act” (DeYoung Februarv 21
2000, p. A02).
^ ’
Mas Canosa died unexpectedly on November 23, 1997. As the front man for
U.S. policy towards Cuba for the previous decade and a half, his death has arguably
altered the previously beligerent manner in which U.S. policy towards Cuba is carried
out.
1 12
In 1987, Fascell was the recipient of the NED’s first Democracy Award which, since
1991, is a small-scale replica of the so-called “Goddess of Democracy” statue
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fonner CIA agent Ralph McGehee, “that [the] CIA uses [the] NED for cover and tha,
NED’S hundreds of so-called non-governmental organizations (NGOs)-many ofthem
human rights groups, are little more than fronts for the operations of the CIA.”
Furthermore, he argues: “Since NED sponsors human rights groups and other NGOs in
about 80 countries, this creates a massive worldwide mechanism for subversion”
(McGehee, September 6, 1 996).
Since 1990, and especially since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union in 1991, the
NED has funneled millions of dollars for political organizing and independent trade
union development into Russia primarily through its four core institutes. These efforts
have been supplemented by millions of dollars more from other U.S. foreign policy
agencies including the USIA, USAID, DOD, and the State Department. As the GAO
noted, the “democracy assistance program in Russia seeks to capitalize on the historic
opportunity to build democracy in place of a centralized Communist system”
(GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1 996, p. 2). For the years 1 990 till June of 1 999, NED funding
has exceeded $38 million for Russia and the former states ofthe Soviet Union.
Although the GAO reported that democracy related projects under their review were
constructed by students for use during the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing China
in May and June 1989.
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seen as “generally valuable” by Russian refomrers and others, they stated there were
m.xed results as far as the projects contributing to significant changes in Russia’s
pol.lical, legal, or soc.al system and concluded that “the most important factors
determining project impact were Russian economic and political conditions"
(GAO/NSIAD-96-40. 1996. p. 2). While citing a “new openness” of the newly
independent media as indicated by their “frequently aired views highly critical of the
Communist government,” the report also noted insufficient advertising revenues were
forcing many media organizations “into bankruptcy or joining larger affiliates, thereby
curtailing their independence and capacity to produce their own programs.” Also noted
was the pressure faced by many print and broadcast outlets “from local political
authonties or from organized crime, in large part due to their dire financial situations”
(GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996, p. 3).
Regarding the NED funded activities to promote free trade union development,
the GAO recognized the FTUI for providing “important equipment and training for the
first independent, non-Communist unions that arose in the late 1980s, that backed Boris
Yeltsin and other reformers, and that played a key role in the breakup of the Soviet
Union. However, the report notes, the “influence of the successors to the official
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“
It should be noted that in its 1996 report, the GAO chose not to include any projects
undertaken by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in its review on
U.S. democratic development assistance to Russia stating that “the primary focus of the
Center s projects was to promote privatization and promarket reforms, two areas outside
the scope of our review” (GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996, p. 10). Commenting on the
GAO’s omission of CIPE projects, NED President Carl Gershman argued that the GAO
“erroneously categorized CIPE’s efforts as business development” rather than, he
argued, as “strengthening the capacity of private groups to build a constituency for free
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Communist trade unions, the inexperience and isolation of democratic unions, the
apathy of Russian cit,^ens, and the weakness of the economy” continues to hamper the
new democratic untons (GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996, p. 5). As of late 1994, there were
between three to five million workers in the “independent” or “democratic” labor
movement (encompassing such unions as Sotsprof with 300,000 members; the
Confederation of Maritime Workers with 86,000 workers; and a regional affdiate of the
Independent Miners’ Union of Russia with about 95,000 members), while the
overwhelming majority of workers, more than 50 million, were still affiliated with the
Communist dominated unions. Leaders associated with the “independent” labor
organizations cited their biggest obstacle to establishing independent unions as laying in
the continued control of the social insurance fund by the official trade unions, through
which they could disperse benefits such as workers’ vacations and sick pay
(GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996, pp. 31-33). Citing the need to give workers a means of
participating m the new political and economic environment, NED program documents
and U.S. and Russian officials warned that “if workers are not given a voice during this
transitional period and believe that free markets and democracy only work to their
disadvantage, then they could pose a threat to social peace and political and economic
development” (GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996, p. 30).
With reference to political party development in Russia, the GAO noted that
U.S. funded activities “had not significantly strengthened reformist national political
parties, either organizationally or in terms of increased membership or perfomiance in
market democratic reforms through advocacy and educational programs”
(GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996, p. 63).
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cicclions.” Dcsp.lc Nltl) lumlmg of $956,000 the NDIIA aiul the IR|
1992 lo snpporl the anl.-Com,n„nisl Danocatic Rassia Movcmcnl,
lundtng lo conduct civic cdiicalion and grassroots organizing programs I
the national and local levels in addition lo over $2()0,000 to monitor the
elections and lo send Russian parly leaders to the U.S. for “training,” on
million spent by USAID on similar efforts during tins same neon, I
nd I between 1990
cnient as well as
public have not been receptive to their political message” (GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996, p.
parties and movements.” Russian political reform activists lamented that viable
refonmst political parties “may only emerge after more than a decade” and that “they
will only win elections when the Russian people arc receptive to a refonnist, democratic
political message.” As for now, the report notes that reformist parties are bogged down
by “the unpopularity of their free market message” and the “historical negative view of
‘party’ (a harsh memory from the days of Communist party control)” (GAO/NSlAD-96-
40, 1996, pp. 40-41). Moreover, local elections held countrywide in 1994, notes the
GAO, raised concerns about future national elections, as these elections were marked
by many irregularities and low voter participation” (GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996, p. 27).
37). Since the 1 993 elections, the situation for reformist parlies has “only marginally
improved," such by the December 1 995 parliamentary elections, “the two large pro-
reform election blocs of 1 993, Yabloko and Russia’s Choice, had split into 1 1 different
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Civ.c educalion programs funded by the NDIIA and the IRI were cited as a way
to better promote democracy ,n Russia. In part.cular, polit.cal party pan.cipants ‘'spoke
favorably of U.S. support for sending Russians to the United States for training.” Such
efforts. ,t was stated, may convince Russians to support the reformist parties’ message.
Because of a lack of success with political party development, USAID has been
encouraging the NDIIA and the IRI “to place less emphasis on their party training
programs and more on their work with civic organizations" (GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1 996,
p. 43).
Given the foregoing NED funding activities, it is fair to say that U.S. democracy
promotion is tainted and contradicted when advanced through secrecy, money
laundenng, vote buying, kickbacks, paid junkets to the U.S. for “training”, and blatant
acts which violate national sovereignty. That the U.S. has been successful in achieving
Its aims m several areas of the world is undeniable—the election of Violeta Chamorro
being a classic case in point. But short-term gains can have long-term negative
consequences as witnessed by CIA coup d’etats and other covert activities in Iran,
Guatemala, Nicaragua and elsewhere before and during the Cold War which continue to
lend fuel to fire virulent anti-American sentiment in these countries. It is true that the
presumably overt nature of much NED funding may help to dispell some of this
resentment, but NED proponents should not be surprised if the new beneficiaries of this
made-in-America brand of democracy begin to reject this export seeing it as just another
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attempt ,o mask U.S. des.res for world hegemonic dominance.' " And such a rejec.on
is most likely to occur when the supposedly liberalory institutions of this capitalist,
market-based brand of democracy fail to deliver material goods adequate to the
promises given. For. indeed, are not compliant and/or submissive publics for the better
part satiated, while those whose needs have long gone unmet stirred to revolt?
Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to pursue this course of “promoting democracy”
abroad in the Clinton administration. In fact, before he was sworn into office, the then
president-elect Clinton was quoted in 77,e New York Times as stating that he wanted a
Secretary of State who possesses “a commitment to global growth and economic
regeneration here and the fuffilling of our responsibility as the world’s sole superpower
to try to promote democracy and freedom...” (Clinton, quoted in Friedman, 1992, p.
In the midst ofthe 1999 US/NATO war on Yugoslavia, instigated on the pretext of
“preventing a humanitarian catastrophe,” with the stated intent to bring democracy to
that country or, at the very least, to its Kosovo-Metohija region, and following the
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese People 's Daily, in an article
entitled, “On New Development ofUS Hegemonism,” stated, as regards the US armed
intervention in Yugoslavia:
It is an important measure taken by the United States to step up
implementation of its global strategy of seeking hegemony at the turn of
the century, and a major indication of the new development ofUS
hegemonism....
Flaunting the banners of “freedom”, “democracy” and “human
rights”, the United States wantonly interferes in the internal affairs of the
developing countries. The United States has tabled, year after year,
motions concerning other nations’ human rights at the UN human rights
meetings, attempting to act as the “human right judge” and conduct
“trials” of developing countries (“On New Development.
.
.”, People ’s
Daily Online, May 27, 1999).
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A 1 9). For the most part, Clinton, in his two terms ,n office, has not had to confront
.he multiphcity of antt-U.S. rebellions and revolut.ons around the world winch marked
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Janu'Ill^o'lW '"'Tb"'" Secretary of State onary 20, 1993, and his successor, Madeleine Albright, the first female Secretary ofSlate, who was sworn in on January 23, 1997, Clinton may be said to have gottenThe^
13 1W3T "i"' ° 1 remarks on January, 99 , Secretary-designate Christopher stated: ^
Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down but must be
built from the bottom up. Our policy should encourage patient, sustained
efforts to help others build the institutions that make democracy possible:
political parties, free media, laws that protect property and individual
rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions, and voluntary associations
that stand between the individual and the state. American private and
CIVIC groups are particularly well suited to help. In this regard, we
will move swiftly to establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced
Americans m contact with foreign grassroots democratic leaders, and to
strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy.
We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide timely
and effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free
markets....
These three pillars for our foreign policy—economic growth,
military strength, and support for democracy—are mutually re-enforcing.
A vibrant economy will strengthen America’s hand abroad, while
permitting us to maintain a strong military without sacrificing domestic
needs. And by helping others to forge democracy out of the ruins of
dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create
new markets for US trade and investment (Christopher January 13
1993).
And as Secretary-designate Albright stated in her prepared confirmation remarks before
the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 8, 1997:
Mr. Chairman, we have reached a point more than halfway between the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the start of a new century. Our
nation is respected and at peace. Our alliances are vigorous. Our
economy is strong. And from the distant comers of Asia, to the emerging
democracies of Central Europe and Africa, to the community of
democracies that exists within our own hemisphere—and to the one
impemianent exception to that community, Castro’s Cuba—American
most U.S. administrations throughout the years of the Cold War. Cettatnly the demise
of the Soviet Union has eontributed to the lessening of international tensions. But one
could argue that U.S. interventtonary behavior Itke those carried out by the NED may
likewise be impacting on the present absence of major international connicts. NED
advocate Cohen argues the case that “[t]o the extent that U.S. foreign policy and
diplomacy fosters the spread of democracy, the world will become more hospitable to
freedom.” Moreover, long-term support for democracy promotion, he predicts, will
yield “a less contentious community of nations, regional stability, freer soeieties with
few refugees, and freer economies that spread prosperity to their citizens while opening
markets to all” (Cohen, 2000, p. 846). That this view is shared by the present
administration can be witnessed by the adoration of Secretary of State Albright who, on
May 16, 2000, praised the NED stating that it “is one ofmy favorite institutions.” The
NED, she remarked:
has pioneered the use of our own civil society to work with supporters of
democracy from other countries and cultures. It’s had extraordinary
success in helping democracy-builders learn from each other by sharing
experiences across national lines. And by so doing has helped to give
global impetus to the movement to democracy (Albright, May 16, 2000).
Secretary Albright’s claims of success may be more than just cheerleading as the U.S.
has perhaps found an answer to what years of Cold War arms and advisors often failed
institutions and ideals are a model for those who have, or who aspire to,
freedom.
All this is no accident, and its continuation is by no means
inevitable. Democratic progress must be sustained as it was built—by
American leadership....
And we will continue to promote and advocate democracy
because we know that democracy is a parent to peace, and that the
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to achieve, namely, pae.flca.ion of hostile foretgn popula.tons. And though the NED's
acttons constitute only a small part of overall U.S. government acttvity abroad and
much less of the overall activity associated wtth globalization and the tying together of
the world’s various regions into a single global market, the NED ts nonetheless actively
coopting political elements in the developing nattons which, to the consternation of both
anti-U.S. and/or anti-capitalist activists, otherwise might be susceptible to following
indigenous oppositional rule."^
Whether this commitment to promoting democracy abroad continues with the
new U.S. administration elected in November 2000 remains to be seen, though at
present, the bipartisan consensus supporting the NED appears to remain constant, thus
solidifying this component of U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future. As NED
President, Carl Gershman, stated m 1999; “Today, the Cold War is almost a distant
memory, and democracy-promotion has become an established field of international
activity, and a pillar of American foreign policy” (NED Annual Report, 2000, p. 4).
Shared assumptions about the nature of the liberal capitalist state and its foundation in
the presumed virtues of civil society will assure that the U.S. is committed to this
foreign policy path whether the party in power is Republican or Democratic and with
the active support of both the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce. The successful
export of a political philosophy, however, especially one closely intertwined with an
American constitution remains the most revolutionary and inspiring
source of change in the world (Albright, January 8, 1997).
NED’S annual budget of approximately $32 million “is 0.2 percent of America’s $16
billion foreign operations budget and just 0.01 percent of its $300 billion defense
budget” (Cohen, 2000, p. 848).
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ccono.nic progra.n, rcc,„ircs ,hc ah.l.iy i„nucncc, c„o,cli„a,c, and son,e,,n,cs
.lircc,
cc<,n„mic
.locisions, policies, and Ircnds in counirics largctcd To,- de.nocracy p, on,
In .1,0 nox. and f.nal chap.c, U.S. Iransna.ional ccono.nic cx.csion and leadership will
bo analyzed as lo Ihe l.kelihood Ihal Iho world capi.alisi syslen, nnder Ihe lu.elage oflhc
t'.S. hogonron n,ig|„ acl lo med.alo and racil.lale Iransilions ,o Iho U.S.
.nodol of
.lomocracy or genoralc snllicicnl resenlmenl and aniipalhy lo Ihis U.S.-lod export so as
lo negate its goals.
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V. CAPITALISM, HEGEMONY, AND DEMOCRACY
Dunng the last years, the power of money has presented a new maskover ,ts cnmtnal faee. Above borders, no matter race or 00^7 the Powerof ntoney humiliates d'gn, ties, insults honesties and assassinates hopesRe-named as Neol.berahsm”, the historic crime in the coneentration ofpnvi^ges, wealth and impunities, democratizes misery and hopelessness.
( ubcomandante Insurgente Marcos, January 30 1996 Za
Jornada, “The EZLN calls for an intercontinental ami-1,b^ralism
gathenng. Mexico; Chiapas Mountains.)
Can the U.S. successfully export its own brand of democracy abroad? Can this
“revolution” towards democratic capitalist structures be effected in a passive manner or
will It create the type of convulsions historically awakened by external intervention of
one state into the affairs of another? Indeed, does not this U.S. brand of democracy
contain contradictions of political obligation which could forestall such transitions?
Intended to foster U.S. hegemony and, hence, the functioning of the world capitalist
system under its leadership, will not such transitions to liberal democracy in fact impede
or obstruct the necessity to accumulate capital as national resentment against the U.S.
hegemon and its foreign export grows? And, in this event, which interests will likely
dominate? In this concluding chapter, I examine certain aspects of global capitalist
development since WWII and the affect this development is having on the relations
between the so-called “developing nations” vis-a-vis the so-called “developed nations.”
As well, the accelerated globalization of the world market in the 1990s demands a look
at the established international economic bodies including the newly formed World
Trade Organization (WTO). Utilizing a Marxian class analysis, I then construct a basic
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theoretical model of capitalist production as It operates within the current global market
and attempt to analyze the concomitant effect on the U.S. export of democracy in
general. In this regard, an assessment is made of the degree to which the U.S. attempt
to promote democracy abroad falls within the prescription for hegemonic rule as
outlined by Gramsci (in the sense of domination combined with political leadership).
Indeed, the possibility anses of a division between the interests of international capital
from that of U.S. national interests proper and, hence, the necessity by internationally
organized capital to create its own instmments for the implementation of its policies,
e.g. the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), and/or expand existing
instruments, e.g. the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; otherwise known as the World Bank), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN)."^ As such, can this
From 1995 to December, 1998, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), a Paris-based invitation-only secretariat that includes 29
member countnes, including all of the world’s wealthiest nations, had been negotiating
a pact “aimed at setting investment ground mles in the world’s richest nations, to
remove limits on foreign ownership of certain industries, and allow the free movement
of capital across international borders” {Multilateral Agreement on Investment..., March
5, 1998, pp. 1-2). According to the testimony of Lori Wallach, director of Public’
Citizen s Global Trade Watch, the U.S.-based public interest watchdog group, the goal
of the MAI “is to expand the same extreme mulinational corporate agenda of
undermining countries sovereignty and disempowering even legitimate government
action which is found in the GATT-WTO” {Multilateral Agreement on Investment
.
..,
March 5, 1998, p. 58). Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch Backgrounder notes that
the proposed MAI would “legally limit how and when nations, states or communities
can set investment policy,” “would require ‘national treatment’ for all member countries
meaning foreign investors must be treated equal to domestic investors in all instances,”
would ban ‘performance requirements,’ such as employment, reinvestment or other
conditions used to regulate multinationals investing in some communities,” and it
would grant legal standing to investors and corporations so that they can directly sue
governments in international tribunals for failure to deliver all of the MAI’s benefits.”
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U.S. policy be pursued successfully solely within the framework of a nahonal state
acting as the hegemonic leader or w, 11 a supranat.onal or urtemational framework need
be constructed and/or expanded in order to legitimate and enforce the capitalistic
democratic values being exported? In short, is the western liberal (i.e. capitalist)
democratic state under U.S. hegemony the best form for the realization of continued
capitalist accumulation or does this form of state and hegemonic relat.onships produce
its own irreconcilable contradictions which undermine this very hegemony?
n short, the proposed MAI “would accelerate economic globalization while at the same
'r,,?,
of democracies to control investment policy.” I,patly hinder the ability ofgovernments to combat the worst consequences ofeconomic globalization: increased disparity of wealth and income, growth of national
n global monopolies and loss of democratic control of a wide range of policies from
iiL"® I A “''"“7“'’ ‘“b” rights to welfare policy” (“The ManningMultilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) Now Being Negotiated at the OECD”)
“
*
^ 7^,
Congressional committee hearing underscored the opposition’s arguments'
one of the cntical concerns about the MAI” is the “infringement on national
sovereignty {Multilateral Agreement on Investment..., Mdxch 5, \99% p 2 ) In an
f
atement released on December 3, 1998, the OECD stated: “Negotiations on
the MAI are no longer taking place” {Official OECD Statement, December 3, 1998).
However, as De Brie points out, learning from the temporary failure of MAI, “big
business and technocrats are trying to force through a decision before the end of 1999”
either through the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) or the Millennium Round
of the World Trade Organisation scheduled to take place in Seattle in December 1999
“that will remove the final obstacles to the free play of ‘market forces’ and require
countries to submit to the unfettered expansion of the multinationals.” So far, however,
neither of these meetings was able to revive the MAI. However, the TEP, with its lobby
of big businesses on both sides of the Atlantic known as the Transatlantic Business
Dialogue (TABD), continues to seek to dissolve the European Union in a free trade area
with the United States. As regards the WTO meeting in Seattle, De Brie writes: “The
idea is to convert the meeting of the ministerial conference of the 131 WTO member
countries in Seattle in December 1999 into an enormous globalisation fair, where the
removal of the final obstacles to capital’s freedom of action would be negotiated pell-
mell (De Brie, May 1999). But with the enormous protests galvanized by this 1999
Seattle meeting, the WTO has temporarily been stalemated in attempting to move
forward in this regard.
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A Short History of the Post-WWII LIEO
Arthur Jensen (played by aetor Ned Beatty), CEO ofCCA (a fictional
corporatton)
,n the 1976 film “Network” to TV network anchonttan
Fi™eh) aterBealf'' T'‘ '’5' actor Peternc ft e went on air criticizing a proposed buyout of CCA bvdie Western World Funding Company, a eontomt.on baukroftld by Arab
You have meddled with the primal forces of nature MrBeale, and I won t have it! Is that clear?!
You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoplesThere are no nations. There are no peoples. There are no Russians
There are no Arabs. There are no Third Worlds. There is no West
'
There is only one holistic system of systems, one vast and immense
interwoven, interacting, multivariate, multinational dominion of
ol ars—petro-dollars, electro-dollars, multi-dollars, reichmarks, rheims
rubles, pounds, and shekels. It is the international system of currency
’
Which determines the totality of life on this planet. That is the natural
order of things today. That is the atomic and subatomic and galactic
stnicture of things today! And you have meddled with the primal forces
of nature! And you will atone!
Am I getting through to you Mr. Beale?
You get on your little 21
-inch screen and howl about America
and democracy. There is no America. There is no democracy. There is
only IBM and ITT and AT&T and Dupont, Dow, Union Carbide, and
Exxon. Those are the nations of the world today.
What do you think the Russians talk about in their councils of
state? Karl Marx? They get out their linear programming charts,
statistical decision theories, minimax solutions, and compute the
price/cost probabilities of their transactions and investments just like we
do. We no longer live in a world of nations and ideologies Mr. Beale.
The world is a college of corporations inexorably determined by
the immutable bylaws of business. The world is a business Mr. Beale. It
has been since man crawled out of the slime. And our children will live,
Mr. Beale, to see that perfect world in which there is no war or famine,
oppression, or brutality—one vast and ecumenical holding company for
whom all men will work to serve a common company for whom all men
will work to serve a common profit in which all men will hold a share of
stock, all necessities provided, all anxieties tranquilized, all boredom
amused. And I have chosen you Mr. Beale to preach this evangel.
Howard Beale: Why me?
Arthur Jensen: Because you’re on television dummy. Sixty million
people watch you every night of the week, Monday through Friday.
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Howar^Be^ I have seen the face of God!
AilhjirJen^ You just might be right Mr. Beale.
“The corporate cosmology of Arthur Jensen.”
Following World War II, a Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO) was
established under U.S. tutelage at the historic Bretton Woods Conference in New
Hampshire. Building on the Articles of Agreement of the 1944 Bretton Woods
conference, the LIEO which was constructed included several institutional instruments
to help facilitate the expansion and security of market forces. The conferees to the 1944
conference wishing to avoid the ubiquitous imposition of trade barriers and the
widespread practice of competitive devaluation, which in the late 1920s and 1930s
exacerbated the Great Depression, thus knew that to alleviate the fear and distrust of
governments a means would have to be devised to determine the fair value of each
country s currency relative to others (i.e. the necessity for convertible currencies) so that
trade could proceed in an orderly and uninterrupted fashion."^ With specialized
agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; a.k.a. the World Bank), and the International
Trade Organization (ITO), the Bretton Woods agreements laid the basis for a postwar
economic structure which was to rest on three political conditions: “the concentration
of power in a small number of states, the existence of a cluster of important interests
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Driscoll notes that during the 1930s: “The relation between money and the value of
goods became confused, as did the relation between the value of one national currency
and another. Under these conditions the world economy languished. Between 1929 and
1 932 prices of goods fell by 48 percent worldwide, and the value of international trade
fell by 63 percent” (Driscoll, July 1997, p. 3).
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shared by (hose states, and the presence of a dominant power [the U.S.] w.lling and able
.0 assume a leadership role” (Spero, 1981. p. 23). A system of ftxed exchange rates was
adopted whtch forced all participatory countnes to balance their finances while keeping
their exchange rates within narrow set limits with their currencies earmarked to the U.S.
dollar so that they could be sold or redeemed in the different exchange markets around
the world. U.S. dominance in the post-WWIl international economy kept the parity
of the dollar’s value relatively high vis-a-vis most other of the world’s currencies, hence
Its agreed upon status at Bretton Woods as the standard bearer was psychologically
reinforced by its seeming invulnerability up to the 1970s. And because the U.S. dollar
acted as the standard by which all other currencies’ exchange rates were set while
retaining a relatively high panty in relation to most other currencies, the U.S. was able
to act relatively unhindered as the capitalist world’s banker as the dollar became the
currency of preference for international transactions and investment.
An agreement on a new international trade order proved more elusive than on a
monetary order, however. Whereas the U.S. had dominated decision making at Bretton
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From 1945 to 1971, the U.S. dollar was said to be “as good as gold,” for countries
were indeed allowed to trade in their U.S. dollars for gold. Exchanged at the rate ofone
ounce of gold for every $35, the U.S. government backed up this arrangement,
exchanging gold for dollars at the above rate on demand. Moreover, as Kegley and
Wittkopf note. Dollars earned interest, which gold did not; they did not entail storage
and insurance costs; and they were needed to buy imports for survival and postwar
reconstruction” (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1981/1989, pp. 187-9). However, in 1971, the
gold standard was abandoned, as countries, resentful over U.S. policies in Vietnam and
fearing American instability due to chronic deficits in the U.S. balance ofpayments
(necessary to keep the war going), increasingly demanded gold instead of dollars. The
resulting depletion of U.S. gold reserves forced the transition to a free floating currency
market not based on gold convertibility. Since then, each countries’ money has been
worth whatever it can fetch on the world’s markets.
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Woods. U was unable to dictate the stn.cture of trade rules fonnalized the Havana
Charter. Immediately from the start, exentptions from generalized rtdes by member
countries participating in the trade negotiations weakened the dominant role of the U.S
and made the ITO a watered down institution. And though the U.S. did not fonnally
abandon the ITO until 1950 (by not submitting the Havana Charter to Congress where it
raced certain defeat), an interim treaty drawn up by the U.S. in 1947 (which came into
force ,n 1948) known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-whieh
was to serve until the Havana Charter was ratified_by default became “the expression
of the international consensus on trade” (Spero. 1981. p. 78).
While acknowledging as "useful and necessaiy” the contention that the
configuration of state power in the world political economy is the most basic factor
required for the existence of an international economic regime—the so-called
hegemonic stability thesis” (Kindlebcrgcr, 1973; Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1980 &
1 984), Ruggie argues that the existence of a LlEO “has more to do with the
international projection of a particular configuration of domestic state-society relations
than it does with the projection simply of state power” for, in a liberal order pride of
place is given to market rationality, and “political authority is designed to give
maximum scope to market forces rather than constrain them.”'^^ Hence, Ruggie notes:
An (sic) LIEO will exist, then, when this form of state-society relations enjoys a
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The two central propositions of the hegemonic stability thesis as outlined by
Keohane are; 1) that order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant
power. Since regimes constitute elements of an international order, this implies that the
formation of international regimes nonnally depends on hegemony. The other major
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hegemonic status among the major economic powers” (Ruggie, 1984, p. 35). Once the
major economic powers achieve this congruence in the balance of their state-society
relations, the collective purposes of these regimes must still be operationalized and
justified as policies. And this, Ruggie argues, “largely depends upon the prevailing
bodies of economic theory and ideology to which the regime-making states hold.”
When the gold standard prevailed prior to WWI, for example, state abstinence was
advocated and understood within the framework of classical economics and justified by
the Imssez-faire ideology. The interwar period saw no reigning theory or ideology
states Ruggie. In the post-WWII period, however,
among the capitalist countries social democratic doctrines and methods
have coexisted with more traditional economic forms, but there has been
a substantial area of theoretical and ideological overlap in the Keynesian
middle (Ruggie, 1984, p. 36).
The neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis, he argues, provided “the means both to
legitimate the prevailing social objectives of the major economic powers as well as to
tenet of the theory of hegemonic stability is that the maintenance of order requires
continued hegemony” (Keohane, 1984, p. 31).
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opera, ionalize Ihosc objccves imo specinc policies ,ha, ,he economic regimes were
programmed to coordinate” (Ruggie, 1984, p. 37).'^'
Though U.S. prcdo„„nancc in the post-war penod cotdd guarantee the
establish,,,ent of a LIEO, a n,uc„ n,ore eotnpheated task was ,„ secure ,egi,in,acy for
the system in order to make it work. This was to be aehieved, first, through the
principle o[co„pan„lve a,Ivan,age which was to renect the fonnal equality of those
states party to the agreentents. This “mutual-gain” approach, as Bhagwati (1984) refers
to ,t. stipulated that “any two nations will benefit ifcach specializes in those goods that
It can produce relatively cheaply and exchange for goods that it can produce only at a
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avnihhl
^ of capitalism to lead to an excess supply of commodities relative toa lable consumer demand (and this situation’s resulting consequences of drivingown prices and prollts, leading to capital flight, closure of industries, etc.) indicated toBoventments in the 1930s the political inadvisability of waiting for “self-regulating’
marke s to correct their imbalances, amidst massive unemployment, demands forpro cettng national trade and, hence, the proliferation of world tariff barriers, and other
distortions, fhe British economist John Maynard Keynes proposed addressing the
counterpart to the problem of overproduction, viz. inadequate demand, through
governmental interventionist policies designed to spur consumer purchasing power
I h's was done in the U.S., for example, through FDR’s New Deal programs such as theWorks Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, and the Civil Works Administration, etc.
(Leuchtenburg, 1963). As Greidcr notes;
Keynes argued that markets cannot extricate themselves from pemianent
stagnation, high unemployment and underutilized capacity without the
artificial demand stimulus of government spending. The new spending
creates market demand for goods and labor; governments promote rising
wages and schemes that redistribute incomes downward to those who
will spend the money (Greider, 1997, p. 51).
The consensus around the success of the Keynesian solution to the capitalist crisis of
ovcrsupply lasted well into the decade of the 1970s until free market purists gained a
political upperhand and began demanding the shrinkage of government while heralding
the benefits of unregulated markets.
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higher cost” (Kegley and Wiukopr, 1981 / 1985
.
p. 172 ). Special,za, ion was thus to
ensure effective low-cost production while the bcnehis of unfettered hade were to
aceme to all participating nat.ons, more so than would otherwise be possible in a system
of protective trade bamers. And. secondly, the principle of non-.liscnnn,u„ion was
incorporated in the designat.on of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status which meant that
each member country had to treat all of its fellow GATT
.nembers equally, extending
favorable trade conditions it had made to one country to all fellow cotintries, as well as
prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports (although these restrictions were deemed
to be suitable measures for safeguarding balance of payments) (Ruggie, 1984, p. 37).'“
In addition, this high level of mutual economic interaction among states involved in
what were deemed to be relatively symmetrical relationships on an even playing field
was to lead to an interdependence between states thus legitimating the system.
In practice, however, the principle of mutual-gain gave way to self-gain as
competition rather than cooperation became the norm.'^^ Concomitantly, nations
As of 1998, the U.S. Treasury Department notes that the term “Most Favored-Nation(MFN)” has been changed to “Normal Trade Relations (NTR)” status. The name was
changed, the department states, “because the term Most Favored-Nation status was
deceiving since most nations have this trade status except for a handful of rogue nations
that have been refused this normal trade relationship.” Like MFN, “[ujnder NTR both
parties agree not to extend to any third party nation any trade preferences that are more
favorable than those available under the agreement concluded between them unless they
simultaneously make the same provisions available to each other” (International Trade
Data System [ITDS], June 4, 1999).
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Using World Bank figures, Madeley ( 1 992) writes that trade barriers used by
industrialized countries to keep out Third World goods “cost poor countries anything
between $50 billion and $100 billion a year” (p. 56). Industrialized countries either use
a tariff, which is basically a tax levied on a product at the port of entry into a country
which has the effect of increasing the cost of the product and hence reduces its sale or,
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repeatedly interfered with free trade praetices, continuously trying to get an edge in
market shares and exchange rates while playing favorites in deciding who was to he
granted MFN status. Indeed, as per section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1951 (P.L. 82-50). President Truman suspended MFN status to the Soviet Union and all
countries of the then Sino-Soviet bloc.'“ The presumed equality of states was thus hit
with the reality of their inequality as states with greater resource reserves and productive
capacities, as well as with more advanced technologies and a skilled work force, could
use this leverage to ensure unequal trade patterns. This had the political consequence of
perpetually subordinating those nations less well-endowed. Interdependence thus gave
way to dependence. Indeed, as Danaher argues: “The unwritten goal of the World
Bank and the IMF—one that has been enforced with a vengeance—has been to integrate
countries into the capitalist world economy.” Rhetoric about development and the
alleviation of poverty, asserts Danaher, merely cover the fact that the central function of
most expecially since the 1980s, protectionist measures of industrialized countries have
included the usage of non-tariff barriers such as the quota, which restricts the quantity
of a particular product which is allowed to be imported into the market of a country. By
1990, states Madeley, “nearly a quarter of protectionist measures were in the form of
non-tariff measures” (Madeley, 1992, p. 132). Though “the MFN clause might be more
accurately called the ‘equal treatment’ clause,” “[wjhatever its name, the clause has
frequently been ignored by Western countries in their dealings with developing
countries” (Madeley, 1992, p. 132).
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Title IV, of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, sets out the conditions and procedure for
restoring MFN status to any of the “nonmarket economy” (NME) countries. The two
key conditions of Title IV are: “(1) conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement containing
a reciprocal grant of the MFN status and additional provisions required by law, and
approved by the enactment of a joint resolution; and (2) compliance with the freedom-
of-emigration requirements (‘Jackson-Vanik amendment’). These requirements can be
fulfilled either by a Presidential determination that the country in question places no
obstacles to free emigration of its citizens, or, under specified conditions, by a
presidential waiver of full compliance” (Pregelj, June 10, 1998).
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these n,ul.ilatcral Icncimg agencies (i.e. Ihe World Bank and II,e IMF] is lo draw weaker
states more tightly imo a world economy dominated by large, transnational
coTiorations”
-[Tlhe Bretton Woods inst.tniions,” he adds, ‘•cnrorec economic polices
written in Washington, where both the Bank and the Fund are based. For many in the
Third World, this harkens back lo colonial times” (Danaher, 1994, p. 2).
And since post-war decolonialization saw the rise of independent states mostly
in the southern hemisphere (hence the terminology:
“the South"), the objective
condition of these emergent countries’ economies vis-a-v,s the capital intensive and
technologically advanced “North” led to the formation of political alliances in the South
and the creation, first, of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1955 at Bangdung,
Indonesia where 29 Asian and African nations met to devise plans to combat
neocolonialism which grew into an institutionalized organization by 1961.'“ Choosing,
or rather destring, to remain outside of the superpower confrontation of ihe Cold War,
Ihe nonaligned countries attempted to maintain bilateral and cooperalive relations with
both the Western capitalist and Eastern communist blocs, cslablishing mixed economics
which incorporated frequent state interventions while not totally nationalizing all
capital.
The disenchantment of developing nations was again vocalized at the .June 15,
1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva,
where a joint declaration by 75 (two other countries later joined in the declaration to
make it known as the “G-77” declaration) developing countries called for “a new
Currently, the Non-Aligned Movement consists of 1 12 mostly developing nations.
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mtemafonal division oflabour oriented towards the accelerated mdustnal.zation of
developing countries.
. .supplemented and strengthened by constructive mtemational
action” ^Joint Declaration ofthe Serenty-Seven Developing Countries Made at the
Conclusion ofthe United Nations Conference on Trade in Development, June 15, 1964,
Geneva, Switzerland). While UNCTAD became a fon,m for the expression of the
South’s woes and subsequent demands, the G-77 countries established a permanent
organization to push for multilateral cooperation within the UN framework to alter the
marginalization of the world’s developing nations.
The 1960s and early 1970s witnessed attempts by these developing countries to
“extend the international normative consensus in favor of independence to international
support for development” with official development assistance targets, preferential trade
arrangements, etc. m order to “close the gap” (Ruggie, 1984, p. 33). The key issues in
this North-South conflict (or “dialogue” as Ruggie et al. refer to it; cf Jones, 1983) have
subsequently revolved around the economic and political claims of the world’s “have-
nots” versus those of the world’s “haves,” with political independence and sovereignty
as well as economic assistance and development monies constituting the primary thrust
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of these negotiations.
It was the triumph of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in the 1970s, however, which suggested to the developing countries of the
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Currently, there are 132 member countries of the G-77
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“[T]he North-South system is one of disparity and inequality,” writes Spero. “In
1977, the developed market economies had an average gross national product of $7,317
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resources unilaterally from
South “that other commociilics couUI be cartelized to extract
the North" (Bhagwati, 1984. p. 23) With the eredtbility ofconttnodity power
strengthcnetl by OPEC's lead, the Sottth sought not only to expand cartelization to other
commodities but, moreover, to overturn the LIEO established at Bretton Woods
ittsisling that “the entire range of international economic issues-lrade, money, aid,
energy, raw materials, ete.-be negotiated together.” What was called for was nothing
less than a New International Economic Order (NIEO) which was “proclaimed at the
1 973 Algiers Non-Aligned Conference and embraced at the UN General Assembly’s
1 974 Sixth Special Session” (Bhagwati, 1984, p. 25). At this stage, developing
countries pursued a strategy of “Global Negotiat.ons” seeking resource transfers to the
South arguing that such transfers would stimulate Southern growth which, in turn,
wouhl leatl to increased demand for Northern exports, thus “pulling the North out of
recession without rekindling inllalion” (Rtiggic, 1984, p. 34). Before the South’s
newfound commodity weapons could be deployed, however, world oil prices stabilized
and the cartelization of oil proved unable to be successfully duplicated with other
commodities. As Northern vulnerability declined, demands by the South for Global
Negotiations went unheeded. Bhagwati contends that the lack of Northern response was
per capita whereas the underdeveloped countries had an average gross national product
of $573 per capita” (Spero, 1981, p. 14).
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“The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed at a
conference held in Baghdad on September 10-14, 1960. There were five original
members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Between 1960 and 1975,
the organization expanded to 13 members with the addition of Qatar, Indonesia, Libya,
United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon. Currently, OPEC
consists of 1 1 member nations (Ecuador dropped out in December 1992 and Gabon
withdrew effective January 1995)” (“OPEC FACT SHEET,” January 1998).
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.Iso due to a weakened maeroeconom.c situation in the advanced cap.talist countries
which hampered “tlre.r pohtical and financial capability to respond construet.veiy,
especially in regard to redisiributton measures such as foreign aid fiows” (Bhagwati,
1984, p. 26). And though a temporary resurgence in demands for Global Negotiations
followed the 80 percent rise in oil prices stemming from the 1979 revolution tn Iran, a
circumvention ofOPEC by the North by obtaining other sources of oil and by increased
production by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait followed by a subsequent reduction in oil prices
diffused the crisis thus stalling the Global Negotiations further. While energy
conservation played a role in easing the vulnerability of the North, Bhagwati noted that
“ultimately the world recession, following on the tight-money policies of the Federal
Reserve combined with the expansionary budget deficits and the resulting phenomenal
rise in US interest rates, delivered Ihe coup de grace” (Bhagwati, 1984, p. 27). Thus
with Southern inability to demonstrate any comparable commodity power to get the
attention of the North as oil had, and with the North feeling less vulnerable and, hence,
less willing to listen to Southern demands for resource transfers, once the cartelization
ofOPEC was rendered harmless (for the time being, at least), interest in Global
Negotiations waned as the South found itself without any bargaining power. Thus, the
lack of slate power on the part of Ihe South led to the stalled Global Negotiations, for in
trying to establish a “regime” under the rubric of the NIEO to counter the LIEO of
Bretton Woods, the South s relative power vis-a-vis the North was greatly inferior.
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Krasner defines regimes “as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area
of international relations” (Krasner, 1982, p. 186; see also Krasner, 1983). Ruggie
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The d,suni,y of ,he South also hindered ,ts abilt.y to establ.sh a counter-reginte
to Bretton Woods. Specifically, this related to the newly industrialized countries
(NlCs)-what are often referred to as the senn-penphery countries-sueh as Brazil,
Taiwan, and Singapore who, once entering the world's financial markets, were no
longer interested in solutions like “generalized debt relief to North-South disparity
issues (Bhagwati, 1984, p. 7). Thus with developmental gradations in its ranks, the
South was unable to agree on the collective purpose their NIEO regime was to pursue.
While the South was vulnerable due to its lack of congruence in the balance of
Its state-society relations, such was not the case with the emerging international society
of the North, whose collective purposes—though altered over time-had nonetheless
held the major capitalist oriented nations together for over 50 years at this writing.'^"
And though Ruggie concludes that “[t]he North-South dialogue has had little to do with
transforming international economic regimes,” he counters that, nevertheless, the
dialogue “has not been entirely irrelevant to this process” as indicated in tliree areas
defines international economic regimes” as “governing arrangements constructed by
states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of their behavior in such
issue areas as trade and monetary relations” (Ruggie, 1984, p. 34).
“A society of states (or international society) exists,” states Bull, “when a group of
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull
1977, p. 13).
Though the Bretton Woods monetary and financial system collapsed in 1971,
management of the LIEO remained in the hands of the U.S. which continued to sustain
the free market principles of the Bretton Woods system. Nations could no longer
exchange dollars for gold and fixed exchange rates were replaced by free-floating
currency values determined by market forces, thus introducing uncertainty and
unpredictability into international monetary relations while alerting other countries to
230
which these negcahons have in,paced: firs., in pn„,„g
,saes „„ .he
international agenda; second, in creating a nonnative in,pact as “the ritual of
nego.iat.ons provides a useful ins,n,men. in the global legitin,a„on struggle because i.
is earned on in universal.st.e tenns and in the language of con,n,on interests”; and th.rd,
the Nor.h-Sou.1, d.alogue has impacted the institut.onal level by embedd.ng
development policy constituencies ,n the bureaucracies of all the industrial,zed
countries, “in large measure,” he adm.ts, “because of the need lo prepare for and
respond to the never-ending rounds of the dialogue” (Ruggie, 1984, pp. 40-41).
Without a formal mechanism governing in.emahonal economic relations
following the collapse of Ihe Bret.on Woods system in 1971. the idea of regional trading
bloeks emerged in the late 1970s and ’80s building on the success of the European
Economic Community (EEC) wh.ch began in the early 1950s. The European
Community (EC) itself is a byproduct of the Cold War, as a working relationship
between pos.-WWII France and Gemtany was seen as necessao- to anchor the non-
communist countries of Europe into a unified and workable system (Fontaine, 1997;
PO'ce in Duff, e. al., 1994, p. 10). This integration was endorsed and overseen by the
United States which, as Pryce notes, “began by strongly encouraging the formation of
the EC, and shielded it in its early years from British hostility...” (Pryce in Duff, et al.,
1994, pp. 8-9). The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the first joint
the fact of U.S. inability to solely manage the existing LlEO (Kegley & Wittkopf
1981/1989, p. 194).
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treaty which paved the way to further cooperation This was followed with the
Treaty ofRome on March 25, 1957 establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC) which abolished customs duties on trade between signatory states as well as
quantitative limits on trade. “Between 1958 and 1970, the abolition of customs duties
had spectacular effects: trade within the community increased sixfold while EEC trade
with the rest of the world went up by a factor of three. Average gross national product
m the EEC over the same period went up by 70%” (Fontaine, 1997). With its initial
success, the EC began to enlarge, beginning in the 1970s, and in 1979 the first direct
elections to the European Parliament in Strasbourg were held, though the non-elected
European Council still controls most of the important decisions.''^ By the mid-1980s
The initial signatories to the ECSC included France, Gennany Italy the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
“In creating the EC its original six members set out on a more ambitious course
the essential aim of which was described in the 1950 Schuman [i.e. French Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman] Plan as a federation” (Pryce in Duff, et al., 1994, p. 10).
Denmark, Ireland, and the UK became EC members on January 1, 1973 Greece
Spain, and Portugal were admitted in the 1 980s. Sweden, Finland, and Austria were’
admitted on January 1, 1995, bringing current EC membership to a total of 15 countries,
The European Parliament (EP) grew out of the representative assembly
established with the ECSC, though prior to 1979, Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) were selected by their respective national parliaments (Laffon in Cafruny &
Rosenthal, 1993, p. 45; Fontaine, 1997). The European Council, on the other hand, has
been meeting since 1974. Here, “Heads of State or Government meet at least twice a
year in the form of the European Council or ‘European Summit’. Its membership also
includes the President of the Commission, fhe President of the European Parliament is
invited to make a presentation at the opening session” (“The Council of the European
Union,” 1997).
The Council of the European Union “is usually known as the Council of
Ministers, and has no equivalent anywhere in the world. Here, the Member States
legislate for the Union, set its political objectives, coordinate their national policies and
resolve differences between themselves and with other institutions. ... Each meeting of
the Council brings together Member States’ representatives, usually ministers, who are
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EC countries were ready to abolish many additional obstacles to free trade wilhin its
member states’ borders and thus signed on Febniary 17, 1986 the Single European Act
(SEA) which set January 1, 1993 as the date
-by which a full internal market was to be
established” (Fontaine. 1997). As Cafruny and Rosenthal note, the SEA “was
ultimately passed because it corresponded to the perceived national interests of Europe’s
most powerful nations. Governments recognized that international capital mobility had
rendered ‘Keynesianism in one country’ obsolete; they saw the SEA as an extension of
new domestic strategies of economic and financial liberalization” (Cafruny &
Rosenthal, 1993, p. 4). The SEA was followed by the more decisive political as well as
economic union resulting from the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on February 7, 1992
which came into force on November 1, 1993 and created “a vast internal market of over
340 million people providing free movement within it, with only limited exceptions, for
goods, capital and services and the citizens of the member states” (Pryce in Duff, et al.,
1994, pp.6-7). Although an initial Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in June of
1992 was overcome a year later with a majority “yes” vote in a second referendum in
May of 1993, the fact that only Denmark and France (amongst EC members) held
public referendums on the treaty, with the Danish referendum requiring to be mn twice
while the French majority was less than three percent of the vote (51.05% to 48.95%),
indicates a possible division of interests between European financial and political elites
responsible to their national parliaments and public opinions. Nowadays, there are
regular meetings of more than 25 different types of Council meeting: General Affairs
(Foreign Affairs ministers). Economy and Finance, and Agriculture meet monthly,
others such as Transport, Environment and Industry meet two to four times a year”
(“The Council of the European Union,” 1997).
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and the populations of these countries (Duff in Duff, et ah, 1994, pp. 54 -65 )
Nonetheless, Maastncht ushered in the transfomiation of the European Conuuru.ity into
.he European Union (E.U.) and, in the process, transferred
‘‘a great deal of power front
states to EC institutions” (Cafruny & Rosenthal, 1993, p. 4). Perhaps the most
tmportant consequence of the Maastricht Treaty, however, is the decision to enact an
economic and monetary union (EMU) buttressed by the establishment of a single
European currency-the Euro-which came into existence on January 1, 1999. While
the introduction of the single currency is, for Fontaine, the “final, logical stage in the
completion of the internal market” (Fontaine, 1997), Cafruny and Rosenthal note that
“monetary union would certainly represent an unprecedented and fundamental assault
on the nation-state.” Pointing out that the power to issue currency is “a fundamental
aspect of national sovereignty and the most important means by which governments
regulate national economies,” they denote the decision to adopt “one currency and one
central bank by the year 2000” as clearly constituting “the major achievement of
Maastricht” (Cafruny & Rosenthal, 1993, p. 6)."' Maastricht was followed on January
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treaty was passed by the national parliaments of the remaining EC states.
One should note that the adoption of a single currency for the countries of Europe
has its counterpart in the calls for the “dollarization” (i.e. adopting the U.S. dollar as
legal tender in place of the national currency) of several economies in Latin America.
In fact, in February of 1999, Argentine President Carlos Menem called for the
abandonment of the Argentine peso and the adoption of the U.S. dollar as the country’s
official medium of exchange. And though one analyst states that this indicates how far
nationalism has receded in Argentina compared to only ten years prior, he adds that, in
actuality, Menem’s proposal is not as radical as it sounds because, he states, “Argentina
is effectively dollarized anyway, since 50 percent of the deposits in the country’s
financial system are already in dollars or dollar-denominated instruments” (Falcoff,
April 1999). Opposition to dollarization, however, was witnessed in Ecuador in January
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1994 with the establishment of the European Economic Area (EEA) joining together
m one single market the 15 members of the E.U. with five members of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA): Austria. F.nland, Nonvay, Sweden, and Iceland.
The EEA, at that time, became “the world’s largest free trade
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zone, comprising 372
2000 when mass protestsagainstfe™!^
followed by a coup d’etat by several of the countries’ top generals—after Mahnadannounced ptos for dolarization of the Ecuadorian economy-forcing Matad toresign his office and replacing him with his vice president as the country’s new leaderEconomist Ross Mcleod, who is pushing a similar plan for Indonesia sTvs
movement towards dollarizat.on ”is a legacy of the" teady sberornrarc."
.hathave beset the world over the last two decades.” States Mcleod:
In these crises, countnes experienced sudden capital outflow driven by a
widespread expectation that their currencies were likely to be markedly
devalued. A sinking implication of this is that if countries did not have
their own currencies, they could never be subjected to destabilizing
swings m capital flows resulting from exchange rate speculation It
follows that vulnerability to occasional, but severe, financial crises could
be mitigated if countries were to abolish their own currencies (Mcleod
January 28, 2000, V. 26, No. 3, CNN.com Asia Now)
EFTA was established on November 20, 1959, as Ministers from Austria, DenmarkNorway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (seven West
European countries that were not members of the European Economic Community)
approved m Stockholm the text of a Convention establishing the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), which entered into force on May 3, 1960. As an alternative
method toward European integration, EFTA’s goal “was: (a) to remove import duties,
quotas and other obstacles to trade in Western Europe and (b) to uphold liberal, non-
discriminatory practices in world trade.”
“The membership of the EFTA has undergone significant changes since the
inception of the organization. Iceland became a member in 1970; Finland, which had
been an associate member from 1961, became a full member in 1986; and Liechtenstein
became a full member in 1991. Of the original members, six have left to join the
European Union (EU): the United Kingdom and Denmark in 1972; Portugal in 1986;
and Austria, Finland, and Sweden, on January 1, 1995. Norway, however, decided
against membership in the EU in a referendum in November 1 994, after completing
negotiations for accession to the EU along with the other three EFTA countries. The
present members ofEFTA are: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland”
(European Free Trade Association, April 10, 1997).
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million people,” thus making the E.U. “one of the three most important players on the
world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan” (Pryce m Duff, et al, 1994, p. 7).
The
.a,es. addition to these docuntents constituting the unification of Europe is the
signing on October 2, ,997 of the Treaty of Anrsterdan, wh.ch more fully expands on
social and political consolidation of the Union while revising aspects of the Maastricht
Treaty; in effect. ,t represents the new treaty on European Union.'“ The Amsterdam
treaty ts .mended to consolidate
-the three great ‘pillars’ wh.ch have been the
foundation for the Union’s work since the Maastricht Treaty of I November 1993: the
European Communities (first p.llar); the common foreign and secunty policy (second
pillar); and cooperation in the fields ofjustice and home affairs (third pillar)” (“The four
major objectives.
. July 31. 1 997). European plans for the
.mmediate future center
around the “Agenda 2000” political agreement reached by EU leaders on March 26,
1999 at the end of a special European Council held in Berlin. The agreement opens the
way for the enlargement of the European Union to a first wave of countries from Central
and Eastern Europe beginning in 2002, including the first six applicants-Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania and Slovakia have also applied for membership (“Presidency Conclusions,”
March 24-5, 1999; “Agenda 2000...,” March 26, 1999).
Only Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein (the latter which joined EFTA in 1991)
remain as the sole EFTA members in the EEA
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One notable aspect of the new treaty is that identity checks along internal borders
will be abolished within five years of the signing of the treaty, except at the borders of
Ireland and the United Kingdom.
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One further group,ng to emerge ou, of the econom.e tunuoil of the 1970s to
attempt to diree. and control the intemat.ona, capitalist economy hy coordinating state
economtc policies was the so-called Group of Seven (G7) launched in 1975 and
consishng of the seven major industnalized democrac.es „he United States, the United
Kingdom. France. Germany. Japan. Italy and Canada). Since the mid-1990s. Russia has
become a jun.or partner in this groupmg. hence the nomenclature change to G8 or
Group of Eight; though, because of Russia’s precanous economtc cond.t.on. some st.ll
refer to the grouping as the G7/G8. Increasingly, the EU. as a separate compos, te entity,
.s also being included in G8 discussions and summ.t meetings. It is the annual summit
meetings which form the basis of this organization, which is “relatively informal and
relal.vely unencumbered by bureaucracy.” The G8 also has a secondary stracture of
regular policy coordination meetings between these states’ fore.gn and finance ministers
and a third structure of regular meetings of lower-level officials which, in the mind of
one analyst, “has achieved respectable results on many economic, political and other
global issues” (Hajnal, June 1 1, 1998).
The New World Order of Global Capitalism
Entenng the decade of the 1990s, and especially following the collapse of the
Soviet Union and its eastern European allies, with the return of capitalist market
economies to the countries in these regions, the North-South terminology has in large
part been supplanted in the literature by more common references to the dichotomy
between developed market economies and developing countries. With the loss of the
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Soviet Union, many of their fonner client states in the so-called Third World were set
adnft and left to negotiate their own deals with the U.S., Japan, or the European Union.
And particularly, these countries quickly learned that in this New World Order
proclaimed by President Bush m 1990, state-to-state economic relationships often give
way either to state-to-corporation deals or, as is the preference with the transnational
corporations, private corporation-to-corporation arrangements and agreements, which
further threatens and undermines many of these developing nations’ ability to
democratically and, hence, publicly control their own development, much less enact
conscious long-term public development plans and projects. In this regard, though it
might be objected that nationalism and the states system is outdated and that many
developing countnes exhibit little democracy in practice, it is nonetheless clear that the
developed market economies, particularly the U.S., are exceptions to this general pattern
of the depreciation of state control. Thus, contrary to the Francis Fukuyama’s 1989
declaration of “the end of history” and the ultimate victory of liberal democracy as the
most effective and just organization ofhuman society (Fukuyama, Summer 1989,
December 1991, & 1992), what many developing countries now feared was “the history
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of the end” of their sovereign integrity.
Philosopher Jacques Derrida, in his Specters ofMarx (1993/1994), states that “the
eschatological themes of the ‘end of history,’ of the ‘end of Marxism,’ of the ‘end of
philosophy,’ of the ‘ends of man,’ of the ‘last man’ and so forth were, in the ’50s, that
is, forty years ago, our daily bread. . .. Thus,” he notes, “for us, I venture to say, the
media parade of current discourse on the end of history and the last man looks most
often like a tiresome anachronism” (Derrida, 1993/1994, pp. 14-15). Referring to
Fukuyama’s thesis that “‘liberal democracy remains the only coherent political
aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe’” as an “anhistoric
(sic) telos of history,” Derrida adds that not only is Fukuyama’s model of a liberal state
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As regards oil resources necessary to fuel this New World Order constituted
around the Amencan hegemon, the U.S. achteved w,th its victoty in the 1991 GulfWar
(however temporary or long-lasting) a decisive advantage ,n forcing the Persian Gulf
antes tnto greater dependence upon its military and security capabihties thus ensuring a
continuous flow of relatively cheap oil to developed market economies for the near-term
future. Acting on the precarious situation of Iraq—just two years out of the
economically and socially devastating Iran-Iraq War which left Iraq over $100 billion in
debt and wtth at least 150.000-200,000 casualties, the U.S, successfully goaded Iraq's
“that of Hegel, the Hegel of the struggle for recognition” but, moreover, “it is that of aHegel who pnvileges the ‘Chnstian vision’” (Derrida, 1993/1994, pp. 57-60).
Expanding upon Fukuyama’s admission that some countries might not be able to
achieve the ideal of liberal democracy, Derrida argues that this failure to measure up
dirTfn
primitive forms of government, theocracy, and military
c atorship but as well charactenzes “a priori and by definition, all democracies
including the oldest and most stable of so-called Western democracies. At stake here ”he wntes, ‘‘is the very concept of democracy as concept of a promise that can only arisem such a diastema (failure, madequation, disjunction, disadjustment, being ‘out of
joint’). That IS why we always propose,” he adds, “to speak of a democracy to
eome
. .
. Comparing the democratic promise to the communist promise, Derrida states
that Its effectivity “will always keep within it, and it must do so, this absolutely
undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come of
an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated” (Derrida,
1993/1994, pp. 64-5). Noting that Fukuyama explicitly states his rejection of empirical
evidence which contradicts the ideal state of existence to which liberal democracy has
presumably brought in its wake, and quoting him to the effect that we can only judge
“the goodness or badness of any regime or social system” by certain “trans-historical
standards, Derrida states that, on the one hand, Fukuyama “accredits the logic of the
empirical event” whenever it is a question of certifying the defeat of “so-called Marxist
States and of everything that bars access to the Promised Land of economic and political
liberalisms, while on the other hand, “in the name of the trans-historic and natural
ideal,” he discredits the “so-called empirical evenf ’ in order, argues Derrida, “to avoid
chalking up to the account of this ideal and its concept precisely whatever contradicts
them in such a cruel fashion: m a word, all the evil, all that is not going well in the
capitalist States and m liberalism... (Demda, 1993/1994, pp. 67-9). This author is in
agreement with Derrida that Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ argument is ahistorical and a
mere apologia in line with U.S. post Cold War triumphalism.
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Saddam Hussein to invade oil-rich Kuwait in 1990 (Horwitz, December 1988, p. 75;
Ogden, April 1, 1991, p. 36; Agee, October, 1990; see also Baker, 1995, p. 274), thus
providing the pretext for the subsequent 1991 Gulf War which, though comprised of
international forces, was heavily dominated by U.S. personnel, including, and
especially, the top general staff which directed the two-month war. And though the
Gulf War did not secure the overthrow of Hussein’s government, it nonetheless did
strategically position U.S. forces around the key global oil reserves in the Middle East,
ensuring a long-term presence of the 5‘^ Fleet m the Persian Gulf-a virtual floating
base-which operates out of Bahrain, as well as securing agreements for a constant
presence of over 20,000 U.S. troops at bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, the
ability to pre-position stocks of armaments and material in the region, all ofwhich
decidedly has shifted control over the Middle Eastern oil reserves in favor of the U.S.'^^
And, indeed, the continued existence of unfriendly governments (i.e. vis-d-vis the U.S.
and its allies) in Iraq and Iran serves to both perpetuate and legitimate a U.S. military
presence in the region, at least amongst U.S. allies. This U.S. presence is supplemented
by a regime of United Nations sanctions (Goshko, May 21, 1996, pp. A1 & A14;
Hoagland, January 15, 1998, p. A14) which dictate whether and how much oil Iraq can
produce and sell on international markets, in addition to allowing for numerous other
violations of Iraqi state sovereignty, including controls over production and storage of
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In companson with Middle Eastern OPEC countries, U.S. oil reserves of 22.4 billion
barrels do not come close to Kuwait’s reserves of 96.5 billion barrels, Iraq’s 112 billion
barrels, Saudi Arabia’s more than 259 billion barrels, and Iran’s 88 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves (Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Briefs;
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html>.
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military stocks, circumvention of Iraqi air space, other trade sanct.ons, etc. The
subsequent Pax Americana (anchored by the U.S. client states of Israel, the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Turkey, and Egypt), however, ,s not a secure one,
for the pohtical reality of U.S. dominance in the region has and will likely continue to
threaten to undermine the very regimes the U.S. depends upon to operate in this region
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of the world. Indeed, U.S. ability to secure its presence in the Persian Gulf region is
a consequence of the other major event of the early 1990s: the collapse of the Soviet
Union and its eastern European allies.
The United States’s biggest nemesis throughout the Cold War, the Soviet
Union—beset with internal feuding spurred on by the electoral victory claimed by Eons
Yeltsin to the Presidency of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in June of
1990 by the Russian parliament, followed in 1991 by Yeltsin’s popular election as
President of the Russian republic, compounded with the resignation of Mikhail
Gorbachev as head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in December
1991 collapsed and was replaced by the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) on
. 140
Chnstmas Day 1991. Gorbachev himself had supported the drive towards
pnvatization of the Soviet economy when he initially backed the 500-day plan to move
the Soviet Union from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy within a year
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states include; Bahrain, Kuwait, the
Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
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A symbolic prelude to this collapse was the destruction, beginning in November
1989, of the wall which had divided East and West Berlin since 1961 in anticipation of
the economic, monetary, and social union between East and West Germany, which was
enacted in 1990.
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and a half, as drafted by the economists Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky. As
former Washington Post correspondent David Remnick stated in his book Lenin ’s
Tomb, Shatalin and Yavlsinsky had done nothing less during the summer of 1990 than
plotted, in civil tones and bureaucratic language, the dismantling of the System.”
Upon returning to Moscow from his summer holiday on the Black Sea, Gorbachev “told
the legislature he was inclined’ to support the plan.” As Remnick writes: “That was
all the hard-liners had to hear. The fight for their political life, a war that would rage for
the next eleven months, had begun” (Remnick, 1993, p. 359). And because Gorbachev
was forced to scrap the 500-day plan, this sent signals to other free marketeers that
reform could not come from within the system (Zaks, 1997). Consequently, internal
pro-capitalist forces and free market advocates then lent all of their available resources
to back Boris Yeltsin to accomplish the job. As one analyst concluded at the time:
“Whereas Gorbachev seemed unable to part with the dream of a Soviet empire, Yeltsin
built both his economic and political programs on the assumption of full sovereignty for
all republics” (Shlapentokh, 1993, p. 165). External efforts also contributed to the
downfall of the Soviet Union as both overt and covert assistance came in the form of
funds—over $40 million between 1984 and 1990—from the National Endowment for
Democracy. Indeed, describing the U.S. intelligence community’s role as constituting a
“full court press”, one writer notes that the U.S. cooperated with at least 50 other
organizations, including British, German, French, and Israeli intelligence agencies to
take advantage of the internal turmoil in the Soviet Union estimating that alone the
“CIA was probably spending $160 million per year on intervention operations in the
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SociaHs, Bloc” Noting ,ha, .his U.S.-led
.n.ewenhon ”was probably one of .he
larges, coordinated cover, operations ever set in motion ” Gervasi concludes that:
An “anti-communist putsch” or “rmm” ,c^ IS not a “democratic revolution ”
Ta^d mb * il both ways- If
democrattc revolut.on” but a victoty in a new kind of warfare Thedebate about the “collapse ofcommunism” needs to be seen for what it
_
the propaganda which accompanies this new kind ofwarfare—a kindwarfare which, given its (at least) short-term success, is bound to beeproduced and exported around the world (Gervasi, Winter, 1991-92 p
With the shift in political power to the developed market economies (particularly
the U.S.) and the path now open to virtually unrestrained global exploitation and
marketing ofcommodities and services, international economic integration became the
order of the day.'^^ In this respect, the U.S. moved in quickly, first, setting up a
regional trade pact encompassing Canada, Mexico, and itself-otherwise known as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993-which became effective on
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The term full-court press,” as described by Scheer, “is a basketball expression thatdescribes an attempt to wrest the ball away from one’s opponent in his own territory”Scheer, 1982, p. 8). It was first used within the anti-Soviet context in a United Pr7ss
Administration official as
^
ahng that Reagan had approved an eight-page national security document that
undertakes a campaign aimed at internal reform in the Soviet Union and shrinkage of
the Soviet empire.’ He affinned that it conid be called ‘a full-court press’ against the
Soviet Union (Story by UPI White House correspondent Helen Thomas May 21
1982, quoted in Scheer, 1982, p. 7)
’ »
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International economic integration has been defined by economists specializing in
international trade as denoting “‘a state of affairs or a process which involves the
amalgamation of separate economies into larger free trading regions’.” El-Agraa
comments that less specialized economists “have for quite a while been using the term
to mean simply increasing economic interdependence between nations” (El-Aeraa
1997, p.l).
^ ’
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Janua^
,
, .994, The bas.c provisions ofNAFTA
.nCuded an agree.en, ,0 eliminate
.anffs on a„ products by 2009. Tanffs on certain goods were dropped inr.ed.aieiy,
while others are schedule to be phased out within 15 years.
Secondly, in that same year ofl993, President Clinton called for a summit on
Blake Island in Seattle, Washington of the Asia Pacif.c Econom.c Cooperation
community (APEC) to establish the framework for a free trade area spanning 1 8 Pacific
R.m countnes, including the existing then six member Associat.on of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN), as well as China. APEC’s combined 1994 GNP ofmore than 13
trillion dollars represented “about half the world’s total annual output” and “about 46
percent of the world’s total trade in merchandise” (“Overview of APEC,” May 12,
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1997). ,n November of 1994, the APEC leaders, meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, issued
a call “to usher in an era of free trade and investment in the region by not later than the
year 2020” (APEC Finance Ministers’ Meeting, April 24, 1995, p. 368). In Osaka,
Japan on November 19, 1995, APEC ministers adopted an Action Agenda dealing with
trade and investment liberalization and facilitation along with furthering economic and
technical cooperation. This was followed the next year by the Manila Action Plan for
APEC (MAPA) adopted on November 25, 1996 which called for progress reports on
opening member economies to trade and investment and noted the establishment of
several joint activities including the APEC Educational Network (EduNet), the Asia-
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ASEAN is currently comprised of ten nations: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Founded in
1967 to buttress U.S. efforts in the Vietnam War, ASEAN later expanded to include
Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in
1999 (El-Agraa, 1997, pp. 27-9; Chalermpalanupap, June 1, 1999).
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Pacific Energy Research Center (APERC), the APEC Labor Market Infomration
Network (LMI), and the Trade and Investment Data Database. The firs, annua, review
of member coun.nes' progress towards market liberalization took place tn 1997 a. the
APEC Ministenal Meeting in Vancouver. Canada. Also at the 1997 meeting, Peru,
Russia, and Vietnam were admitted as new members to APEC, following which a 10-
year moratorium on new membership was announced (APEC News Announcements.
January 8, ,998). And, a. the November 18, ,998 meeting m Kuala Lumpur, Ma.ay.a,
the APEC leaders me, amidst a staggering financial crisis which threatened to
undermine the political foundations ofmany Asian countries, as indeed it had already
done in Indonesia with the removal from office of President Suharto on May 21. 1998
who had ruled that archipelago nation of 17.000 islands since his overthrow of President
Sukarno in a 1965 co„p d’etat, killing hundreds of thousands in the process. Despite
the impending financial cataclysm gripping Asia, the APEC leaders renewed their
commttment to pursue “a cooperative growth strategy” with the “goals of achieving free
and open trade and investment within APEC” (“APEC Economic Leaders Declaration.”
November 18,1 998). And at the 7“' APEC economic leaders’ meeting in Auckland,
New Zealand, which met from September 12-13, 1999, “economic reform” (i.e.
privatization) and “liberalization” were the primary items being discussed even though
many of the region’s countries were still recovering from the financial crisis the year
before. Moreover, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to “promoting open.
transparent and well-governed markets (particularly domestic financial markets) and to
achieving the goals of free and open trade and investment in APEC by 2010/2020, as
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Ihey had agreed at the 2nd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Bogor, Indonesia”
(“APEC 1999 Summit - Aiikland, New Zealand,” 2000).
Third, the eighth round of GATT negotiations, launched al Punta del Este.
Uruguay in September 1986 (and which had dragged on for over seven years by 1993)
quickly accelerated its proposals for a permanent regulation of trade by estabhshing on
December 15, 1993 an institutionalized World Trade Organization (WTO), centered in
Geneva, which would from now on regulate the developing globalized economy.
Signed by 123 countries which at the time accounted for 90% ofworld trade, the
Uruguay Round ofGATT mandates “a more than one-third across-the-board reduction
m tanffs” as well as the elimination or reduction ofmany non-tariff barriers to free
trade, including “quotas, discretionary licensing, import bans, or voluntary export
restraints.” Even in the highly contested area of agricultural trade, new market access
provisions require countries “to provide a minimum level of import access opportunities
for certain products, usually sel at 3% of domestic consumption” (Fact Sheet; Uruguay
Round, July 1995, p. 20). The 550 page Final Act of the WTO was signed on April 15,
1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco, and was approved by the U.S. Congress in December
1994, and officially came into force on January 1, 1995. Encompassing the most
detailed body of rules ever conslructed to govern international trade relations, the WTO
IS also unique in that it establishes a semi-judicial structure referred to as the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) which has binding authority to settle trade disputes among
states as well as adjudicate over rights and obligations arising out of the WTO
agreements and its dispute settlement process. Some analysts see this as the beginning
of the end of the hallowed principle of state sovereignty in international relations (Jones,
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"*.i™ o,U,S. ,..
atives and progressives in the U.S. up in arms as indicated by condemnations
from
.ndependen, sociaHs. Rep, Bemie Sanders (,-VT) (of. ••Len-Ri,h, Coalidon...',
,o
consen,a,ive eo^nren.a.or and Pres.denda, aspirant Pa.nck Buchanan (Buchanan,
‘The
Rise of Sovereignty Fears”; Raunr.Janua^
, 9
,
. 996), Speaking before Congress on
May 14, 1996, Representative Cliff Steams (R-FL) stated:
enH
' 'hen. and still maintain, that our sovereignty is
equa^r^trYars"^^^ ^'7'^ -- not
To™' d
77“"^"^ •>’« worirs^oratanredTuT’
orwar -looking environmental, health, and safety laws In nth jwe have the most to lose. Entry into the WTOm7 o'her words,
J i. as a means toward the dlise”luTIoX'"; r^'a^LTof our standards and laws, and as a means toward tL subverZn n?l
H4904k‘’''“"°'''
Steams, May 14, 1996, p.
“To be sure,” argues one pro-WTO analyst, “WTO members have an obligation under
m,erna,io„al law to comply with the WTO mies, but the WTO itself has no means to
force countries to honor those obligations” (Schott, September, 1996, p. 4). Like its
non-institutionalized predecessor-GATT (which remained in force until the end of
1995 and whose agreements have all become inconaorated into the WTO), which
operated on the principle of comparative advantage and Most Favored Nation status—
the only remedy for noncompliance and unequal treatment is retaliation (once
authorization is permitted by the WTO) by the injured state. Thus, again, the more
powerful states, particularly the U.S. and the European Union (E.U.), will continue to
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maintain their asymmetrical domination
weaker states.
144
over the world’s markets and, hence. over
Fourih, at the Summit of the Americas in December
,994 in Miami. Flonda.
altended by 34 heads of state from the western hemisphere, with only Cuba no,
represented, President Clinton laid the framework for the Free Trade Area of the
Amencas (FTAA) which would establ.sh a free trade area encompass,
ng the entire
western hem.sphere. except for Cuba, from Canada to Chtle by the year 2005 (Fact
Sheet: Summit of the Americas. May
.995, pp. 3,-2). With 850 million people or Ur.
of the world’s population, the FTAA would renresent a “h,. •a p buying power of $ 1 3 trillion in
goods and services” (Pomeroy, fanuaty 28, 1995, p. V), The min.sters of the 34 states
of the proposed FTAA met in Denver, Colorado on June 30, 1995; a second time on
March 18-21, .996 in Cartagena, Colombia and vowed to strengthen their commitment
.0 conclude the pact by 2005 by establishing working groups to facihtate the economic
integration of the hemisphere (‘Toin, Declaration.” March 21, ,996); a third time on
May 16, 1997 a, Belo Horizonte. Brazil where a Working Group on Dispute Settlement
was established; a fourth time on March 19, 1998 in San Jose, Costa Rica where they
made fmal preparations for the Second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago. Chile
on April 18-19, 1998 by approving the San Jose Declaration; and a fifth time on
November 4, 1999 in Toronto, Canada where the ministers reaffirmed their commitment
he E.U IS a customs union whereas NAFTA and the FTAA are free trade areasCustoms unions have common external trade barriers whereas free trade areas do no.Member nations of free trade areas do “remove all trade impediments amongst
themselves but retain their freedom with regard to the determination of their
policies vis-a-vis the outside world” (El-Agraa, 1997, p. 1).
own
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.0 l,bera,.3a,io„ and vowed ,o “strongly support the widen,ng and deepen,ng process of
econonrrc integratron in our Hemisphere, including sub-regronally, brlaterally and
.hrough the adoption of unilateral liberaltzation measures in some ofoureeononnes”
(“FTAA Declaration of Ministers Fifth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Toronto, Canada,”
Novemberd, 1999). At a preparatory meeting for the Second Summit of the
Americas, Sven Sandstrdm, Managing Director of the World Bank, acknowledged that
“at least one-fourth of the total population in the Region-^r somewhere on the order of
11 0 mill,on people-continue to live in poverty” while “another quarter live just above
the poverty line” and, yet, he stated:
Throughout the Regton, there has been tremendous economicprogress through the hberahzation of trade, the privatization of state-owned enterpnses, the freeing of markets, and the reform and redirectionof state acttvttres. Accompanying this process of fundamental economic
reform has been an equally historic process of democratization and anopentng up of pohttcal systems to enhanced popular participation, newfoms of representatron, and the flounshing of grassroots organizattons
and civil society (Sandstrdm, October 1, 1997).
With one-half the population of the region just above or below the poverty line, even the
most uncritical proponents of the FTAA should question what type ofdemocracy is
bang estabhshed and to what extent is it accompanied by popular participation.
Moreover, as foreign debt of a combined group of 23 Latin American and Caribbean
countries reached $644 billion in 1997—a growth of50% between 1991 and 1997—it
The San Jose Declaration, which served as the basis for the beginning of the
hernisphenc trade negotiations by heads of state and government at the Second Summit
of the Amencas m Santiago, Chile on April, 18-19, 1998, represents “the largest
regional integration effort ever undertaken involving both developed and developing
countries in a common objective to realize free trade and investment in goods and
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becomes increasingly questionable whether free trade liberalization is the panacea or
problem ,o removing
.he region’s deb, obligations (’’Poor Countries Deb, R.ses.
January 27, 1998, p. B5).
An effort similar ,o the free trade pact for ,he Americas has been devised with
regard ,o the countries of Africa. After five years in the maktng. the Afncan Growth
and Opportuntty Act, sardonically nicknamed the “NAFTA for Africa” bill, was finally
passed by the U.S. Senate with a vote of 77-19 and signed into law by President Clinton
on May 1 8
,
2000. I, was the firs, major trade legislation approved by the U.S. Senate
since the 1994 legislation which led to the creation of the World Trade Organization.
Seeking to establish a new trade and investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa, the Ac,
would provide sub-Saharan African coun,ries-as well as Caribbean nations-with
increased foreign aid and U.S. trade concessions, while helping to establish a free-trade
area amongst countries in the region.'^'’ Though Africa possesses a population of over
700 million people in over 43 countries, one South African business paper states:
‘Even by the standards of developing countries, Africa is a backwater, accounting for
just 1 1 .3% of developing country exports and 8.6% of developing country GDP,
according to the IMF World Economic Outlook ofMay 1997” (“The Last African
Frontier,” August 30, 1998). Despite the fact that sub-Saharan Africa has vast deposits
of gold and diamonds which it exports along with “large quantities of copper, bauxite.
services, on a basis of strengthened trading rules and disciplines” (cf FTAA web site
<http://www.alca-ftaa.org/EnglishVersion/view e htm>)
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Associated Press writer Sonya Ross notes: “The inclusion of Canbbean nations
helps level the trade playing field that tilted in Mexico’s favor after the North American
Free Trade Agreement went into effect” (Ross, May 1 8, 2000).
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iron ore, uran.unr, phospha.e rock and nranganese; snraUer
,nanu..es of asbestos,
betylbunr, cad™iu.n, cbronrde, coba„, gen^aniunr,
,ead. li.b.unr, nickel, pla.inunr,
.amame, ,i„. tungsten, ntckel. vanadittnt, [and] ztnc,” prices in world markets for
Afncan products •.ave been faibng sbarpl, since
,950. with on,, an exceptional blip
for oil and most minerals in the early 1 970s” (Brown & Tiffen, 1 992, pp, 3
. 66).
Negative economic performance ts both cause of and caused by detrimental political
perfonnance. but while certain Afncan governments are partially responsible for this
cunent state of economic and poittical deCtne, Brown and Tiffen argue that “Africa-s
pohtica, disaster has to be understood in context.” Specifically, they note that analysts
must understand the follow,
„g three elements in order to understand Afncan economic
and poittical stagnation: I ) “the bnttalisation to which Afnca has been subjected from
outside since the beginning of the age of colonialism”; 2) “the artificial nature of the
state structure which colonialism firs, imposed on Africa and then bequeathed to its ne«
rulers
; and 3) “exploration of Africa first by colonists and later by the large
transnational conrorations has been accompanied by corruption,” by rewarding local
allies and suborning or eliminating those who get in the way (Brown & Tiffen, 1992, p.
7). Opposed by South African President Nelson Mandela, the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU). the AFL-CIO. and others, the African Growth and
Opportunity Act nonetheless had its corporate supporters in the likes of Chevron,
Texaco, Mobtl, Caterptllar, as well as the administration of President Bill Clinton,
amongst others. Africa’s underdevelopment may explain in part why consolidating a
free trade regime for the continent had not been at the top of U.S. government priorities
and took five years to pass, but the logic of capitalism for a constantly expandtng
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market for its products necess.tates, as Mat. and Engels long ago argued, that this
system “must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere”
(Marx & Engels, 1848/1948/1998, p. 12)."'^
Further, though by no means last, the World Bank has begun implementing a
fundamental transformation in its operational procedures designed to sh.ft funding away
from national governments to direct project assistance. Posturing itself as “a lender of
last resort,” the World Bank, since its inaugural meeting in 1946 following the Bretton
Woods Conference, has lent money to countries to improve their creditworthiness on
international capital markets.'^* Once a countiys economy was stabilized, it was
expected to “graduate" and stop borrowing from the World Bank. But the key aspect of
this lending is that money was lent to the national government of the borrower country.
which also received significant conditionalities over how such money could be spent.
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Walter Rodney, in his book How Europe Underdeveloped AFRICA (1982^
regards to Africa’s development situation:
,
states in
The question as to who, and what, is responsible for African
underdevelopment can be answered at two levels. First, the answer is
that the operation of the imperialist system bears major responsibility for
African economic retardation by draining African wealth and by making
It impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent.
Second, one has to deal with those who manipulate the system and those
who are either agents or unwitting accomplices of the said system. The
capitalists of Western Europe were the ones who actively extended their
exploitation from inside Europe to cover the whole of Africa.
In recent times, they were joined, and to some extent replaced, by
capitalists from the United States; and for many years now even the
workers of those metropolitan countries have benefited from the
exploitation and underdevelopment of Africa (Rodney, 1982, p. 27).
In its new Strategic Compact plan, the World Bank now states that its “basic
mission” is one of “reducing poverty” (Strategic Compact, 1997).
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Nevertheless, its new operational plan imphettly. though not directly, calls for the
bypassing of national governments. Designated as the Strategic Compact, this new plan
developed in 1997 by World Bank President James D. Wolfeiisohii and approved hy the
Executive Board of the Bank in March of that year, calls for “refocusing the
development agenda” to conform to “the rapidly changing global economy-where
pnvale capital flows are five times greater than official assistance.”'® In particular, the
“Strategic Compact” calls for “decentralizing activities to the field in order to better
customize country assistance strategies, design more appropnate conditionality, and
build local ownership ofdevelopment programs” (Strategic Compact, 1997). As well,
the World Bank heralds its strong cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) who “are involved in half the Bank-assisted projects approved in fiscal 1997”
and calls for “strengthening operations and dialogue with NGOs” (Strategic Compact,
1 997). In effect, this new World Bank plan constitutes another attack on developing
nations’ sovereignty, many ofwhom are too powerless to resist the obvious
149
By tradition, the President of the World Bank is a U.S. national whereas the
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a European (Driscoll
July 1997, p. 5).
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undent..,,n, of ,„e bas.c pnnciple of sovereignty by wb.ch tbe tntentationa, systen, bas
operated, at least ,n principle, since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.'’"
Another key institutional structure upon which tins globahzed New World Order
is betng bu.lt is an enlarged and nrore activist and interventionary Intenrat.onal
Monetary Fund (IMF,. As an additional byproduct of the .944 Bretton Woods
Agreenrents, the IMF was established
-largely in reaction to w,despread inconvert.b.lity
and related exchange problents” which prec.p.tated the worldw.de depression of the
1930s (Driscoll, July 1997, p. I). Beginning operations in 1946 w.th an initial
mentbership of 39 countries, the IMF today has 1 8 1 member countnes which, according
to one IMF proponent,
have voluntarhy joined because they see the advantage of consulting
w.th one another
.n this forum to ma.ntain a stable system of buying andseIhng ,he.r eutnencies so that payments in foreign money can take placeween countnes smoothly and without delay (Dnscoll, July 1997, m. |& 3).
150
Devtbleroft'' o S“egal-based Council for the
so L 7hTt bvl
S^'^nce Research states that many African economies have beenhard h. y the .mperat.ves of economic liberalization that some of them are likelv to
staZlg atS 'hJI
T
'"IT"
” With Africa's debt nowtanding $235 billion (which even the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey
urged the multilateral finance institutions to cancel) and promised foreign aid to those
ZemTe a?d°
World Bank liberalization measures nonexistent,Mbemb d s: The entanglement of Africa is likely to lead to the fragmentation of
p bhc authority and the emergence of pnvate indirect government. Then, the bottomhne IS that many African countnes would revert to the post-Atlantic slave trade era
where trade by barter would replace monetised (sic) economy” (Mbembe, quoted in
Njoku, January 27, 1998).
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The formerly centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union have, since 1991, become IMF members.
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IMF numbers are assigned annua,
-quota subset, p.ions- (rev.ewed every five years)
which ac. as „enrbership fees, „ is front „us poo, of nroney ,ba, ,he ,MF ,e„ds ,o
the IMF ,end,ng poo, had grown to more than $200 bihion by
, 997. Tbe amount
member countnes may bomow from the ,MF in penodie afiocations known as SDRs
(specia, drawing rights) is proportions, to the amount they contr.bute. As we„,
members’ vot.ng power is d.rectiy ,inked to their annua, financia, contributions, giving
the biggest contributors the strongest voice in determining ,MF poiicies. Thus, for
exampie, the U.S., with the world’s iargest economy,
-contributes most to the ,MF.
providing about ,8 percent of tota, quotas (around $38 bihion),” gamering it
-about
265,000 votes, or about , 8 percent of the tota, ” On the other hand, the Marsha,,
,s,ands
has the smahest quota, totahng about $3.6 mihion, giving it 275 votes (Drisco,,. Ju,y
997, p. 4). And contrary to Dnscoh’s Ca.m that
-[(]ar from being dictated to by the
IMF, the membership itseif dictates to the IMF the poiicies it wi„ fo„ow,” it is c,ear
from the vote ahocation procedures that an asymmetry exists as to which IMF members
do the dictating and which are forced to comply with the “wi„ of the majority”
(Drisco,,. Ju,y ,997, p. 5). The recent IMF imposition ofstnet austenty measures (i.e.
deflating of economies in conjunction with demands for reduced spending on social
welfare measures) combined with directives to open up the economies (i.e. demands
that governments set, off pubhc enterprises and privitege production for export rather
than for domestic consumption) of South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and the
Philippines to foreign direct investment—measures emphasized by subsequent U.S.
coercion—spell out the hierarchical nature of the IMF. Moreover, even though
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convert, bil.,y rates have, since the early 1970s, been determined by the market
mechantsm, the IMF has increased its mon.toring of members' economies penetrating
beyond the exchange value” and examining “all aspects of the
cause the exchange value to be what it is ” States Driscoll:
member’s economy that
Ixcw nolLfe'^ or supervision, over members'exchange p hci^ s. Supervision is based on the conviction that strongand consistent domestic economic policies will lead to stable exchange
rates and a growing and prosperous world economy (Driscoll, July 1997
Concomitant to this surveillance role for the IMF, however, is also the power to be the
final word on the health and stability of a country’s economy and economic
performance, thus centralizing such tasks in an institution which cames out the will of
its most prosperous members, particularly the U.S.'” During the 1980s and 1990s. the
IMF has pumped billions of dollars into the international economy in the fomt of loans
prop up the existing LIEO and the international lenders who profit from it (Wessel
December 26. 1 997, p. A2). The IMF lent member countries $28 billion in the early 80s
to fend off threats of default on loans. And in 1995 alone, the IMF extended over $17.8
billion of credit to Mexico and more than $6.2 billion to Russia. The poor perfonnance
of the Russian economy required another $10 billion in IMF loans in 1996. This was
followed by an initial agreement in July 1998 for an additional $22.6 billion in IMF
loans which later fell through as, just four weeks later, on August 17, 1998, the Russian
government defaulted on billions of dollars of debt and effectively devalued the rouble
152
.
Running a distant second to the U.S. IMF quota of 18.25% are: Germany (5.67%),
Japan (5.67%), France (5.10%), and the United Kingdom (5.10%) (Driscoll July 1997
p. 4).
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from around six to the dollar to 25 in a matter of weeks while 90 percent of shares on
the Russian stock ntarke, were w.ped out. Intense anti-Amencantsm amongst Russian
citizenry dunng the 79-day US/NATO war on Yugoslavia between March and June,
1 999 threatened to end relations with the West, which perhaps explains why the IMF
came up wtth another $4.8 billion in loans in April of 1999. And in Asia, as these
economies came under severe hardship in meeting their debt payments in 1 997 and
1998, the IMF lent $21 billion to South Korea, $10 billion (with an add.tional $1 b.llion
in IMF loans approved in March of 1999) to Indonesia, $4 billion to Thailand, and
lesser amounts to other Asian countries (“IMF Bail Outs.. .,” Januaty 12,1998, pp. 3-5).
The number and size of these loans indicates that far from being just a supervisoty
“institution for coordinating efforts to achieve greater cooperation in the fonnulation of
economic policies” (Driscoll, July 1997, p. 9), the IMF-despite its disavowals-has
become tn fact the capitalist world’s central bank. And, as Wade notes in the wake of
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the IMF tended to agree with the U.S. that this
crisis had “home-grown” causes, the so-called “crony capitalism” of “particularly
cotTupt national banking systems that promoted the misallocation of resources away
from their most efficient uses.” Consequently, the IMF “made further capital opening
[i.e. liberalization] a condition of its huge bailout loans for Indonesia, South Korea, and
Thailand” (Wade, Winter 1998-99, p. 43).
Since 1962, the IMF has extended a line of credit to a number of governments
and banks throughout the world. This line of credit, known as the General
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) with a capitalization of about US $24 billion, has been
recently supplemented by the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) adopted by the IMF
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Execulive Board January 1997 with a capitalization ofUS $48 btllion (“IMF
Adopts...
“Januao- 27, 1997,p. 1 ). While the NAB does not replace the GAB, the
latter which remains as a lender pool, “the NAB will be the facility of first and principal
recourse in the event of a need to provide supplementary resources to the IMF” (“IMF
Adopts...,” January 27, 1997, pp. 1-2,. ,n effect, NAB is a response to the volatility in
the international system, requiring the IMF to obtain resources from wealthy countnes
‘‘.n the form of loans up to specified amounts when supplementary resources are needed
10 forestall or cope with an impairment of the mtemational monetary system or to deal
with an exceptional situation that poses a threat to the stability of that system” (“IMF
Adopts.
. January 27, 1 997, p. 4).
In the case of the 1997-98 Asian crisis, the IMF, states Wade, “had a near
monopoly on the rescue effort and has been steered, in turn, by the U.S. Treasury.”
IMF-directed policy changes enforced on loan-recipient countries are of two kinds: 1)
policies “to restrict domestic demand using higher interest rates, lower government
spending, and stiffer taxes, the objective being to stabilize the currency and make it
easier for countries to repay foreign debts,” and 2) policies designed “to undertake
liberalizing reforms in finance, corporate governance, and labor markets.” In the latter
case, adds Wade, “the IMF has pressed the governments involved to keep making it
easier for financial capital to move in and out of their countries (in other words, to
liberalize their capital account) ...” (Wade, Winter 1998-99, p. 44). Capital
liberalization is “at the top of the U.S. foreign economic-policy agenda,” remarks Wade,
because the U.S. “needs to tap the rest of the world’s savings, which is much easier to
do if world financial markets are highly integrated.” The U.S. pursues this policy.
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argues Wade,
.n order for i, ‘.[,]o maintain its high levels of consunrp.ion and
nves„; ihe al.errra.ive ofT.nanc.ng
.nves.nren.s v.a h.gher donreshc savings,- he
adds,
-would require a shan, cu, ,n consunrp.ion (io allow
.he extra savings), causing
massive recession” (Wade, Winter 1998-99, p. 45)
In summation, by the actions descnbed above, it is clear that the U.S. under
President Clinton, “is carrying out the most important and ambitious international
economic agenda of any President in nearly half a century.” As Under Secretary for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Joan E. Spero, stated in 1994: “The Cold War is
over, and with it has gone our traditional frame of reference for looking at our
international involvement. It is almost a cliche now to say that our future will be
described in economic tenns.” And yet, she cautions: “We may be the world’s only
political and militao’ supe^iower, but when it comes to economic and business matters,
we have a lot of competition” (Spero, March 7, 1994, pp. 123-5). While Spero may be
correct in both the ubiquity and/or intensity of world competition for control of markets.
It IS the unevenness of this competition which captivates the rest of the world, which
intensely focuses on the U.S.’s political and military superpower status.
Demonstrating its resolve in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. secured control
over Gulf oil resources for the foreseeable future with its victory over Iraq in 1991,
where it was the driving force of a UN-sanctioned coalition of states. Through political
Currently, the U.S. aggregate savings rate is the lowest among Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, with “gross domestic
savings equal to 15 per cent of GDP, equal with the UK at the bottom of the scale—and
Its household savings rate of I per cent of disposable income is the lowest of any major
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and economic leverage, i, has pacified and coopted Russ.a and most ofihe Soviet
Umon s fomier East European all.es. More recently, and perhaps most demonstratively
m exhibiting its resolve, given the lack ofUN
.ntemational sane,.on and violat.on of,he
sacred principle of state sovereignty, the U.S. has been the driving force behind the
ongotng d.sn.embem.en, of socialist Yugoslav,a-a role which became obvious with
the 79-day NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia (a military campaign which
did no, even attempt to obtain UN sanc.on beforehand and which violated defensive
provisions in the 1949 NATO treaty itself) ,n the spr.ug of 1999, effectively ending w,ith
the de-facto severing of the province of Kosovo-Metohija by June 10."'’ While these
military campaigns and the political and economic leverage over Russia and Eastern
Europe do indicate U.S. intentions to clearly assert its domination, one side of
Gramsci’s prescription for hegemonic rule, it is the need to shore up its political
leadership which will likely concern U.S. leaders more fully in this one-superpower era,
Indeed, one new indication of this U.S. concern for how its political leadership is
perceived—and which is likely a response to the less than enthusiastic support it
received during the US/NATO war on Yugoslavia—is witnessed in the recent
establishment by the Clinton administration in July, 1999 of a new International Public
Information group, whose purpose is to ‘“influence foreign audiences’ in support of
U.S. foreign policy and to counteract propaganda by enemies of the United States.”
industrial economy since the Second World War” (Wade & Veneroso,
September/October 1 998, pp. 1 7- 1 8).
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Yugoslavia was the only country in Eastern Europe which steadfastly held on to its
socialist economy, despite years of intimidation, economic sanctions, and political and
military intrigue from the U.S. and other U.S. allies.
260
ln.end.ng ,o coord,na.e a., overseas
.nfor.ra,io„ a.ong ,he vanous branches of.he U.S.
govenrnrem. the aim of the IPI grouping, according lo ,he IPI Core Group Charter,
,s
-.0 enhance U.S. secun.y, bolster Amenca's economic prosperity and to promote
democracy abroad’.- With a stated objective to
-synchron.ze the infonnat.ona,
objectives, themes and messages that will be projected overseas...to prevent and
nttligate crises and to innuenee foreign audiences ,n ways favorable to the achievement
ofU.S. foreign policy objectives',” Barber remarks that numerous clauses in the IPI
Charter "have an Orwellian ring that gives the impression of a vast, coordinated
propaganda operat.on” (Barber, July 28, 1 999). While it is too soon to fully assess
what success the U.S. will achieve in this endeavor,
,t is nonetheless evident that its
goal is to project U.S. international leadership and, with it, the leadership of the
capitalist world, through the vehicle of the U.S. national stale. Exactly this sort of
leadership from the U.S. was called for in early 1999 by the foreign affairs columnist for
The New York Times, Thomas Friedman, who proclaims that globalization is the new
international system that has replaced the cold-war system and that the driving idea
behind globalization is free-market capitalism. For globalism to work, argues
Friedman, “America can't be afraid to act like the almighty superpower that it is.”
Managing globalization “is a role from which America dare not shrink.” Highlighting
his article for the March 28, 1 999 New York Times Magazine is a full-cover fist painted
with red, white and blue stars and stripes of the U.S. flag. Calling for a global enforcer,
Friedman argues: “The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden
fist McDonald s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15.
And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's lechnologies is called
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Ihe Un„ed States An„y, Air Force, Navy and Marine Cot>s” (Fr.edn.an, Marcl, 28.
1999, pp. 84, 96).
As is evident with the recent US/NATO-led war on Yugoslavia, the U.S. is
willing to bypass established
.ntemational
ntstitubons-institutions
established
,n the
wake ofWWII—at least temporarily, to achieve i
U.S. hegemonic rule can long afford to
Its aims. It is unlikely, however, that
Ignore existing international institutions and
agencies and. more likely,
,t will, as in the case of the Intemat.onal Criminal Tnbunal
for the Fomter Yugoslavia-established in May, 1993 to prosecute violators of
international humanitarian law committed m the territory of the fonner Yugoslavia
since I991-ut,hze ,ts leverage to direct these agencies to pursue activities in
accordance with overall U.S. foreign policy ohjec,tves.'“ The withholding of U.S. dues
to the United Nations until it undertakes U.S.-directed reforms is also another fonn of
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Charges assailing the International Criminal Tribunal for Ihe Former Yugoslavia andtnbuna prosecutor Judge Louise Arbour for their lack of impartiality have beefmTde
y Professor Michael Mandel. a professor of law at York University in Toronto and oneof the complainants in a (so far unsuccessful) case brought against NATO leaders
andel notes that judge Arbour appeared at two press conferences during Ihe 79-day
St i’ h7 ’ rllf^ Cook and once with U.S. Secretary ofate Madeleine AIbnght, both ofwhom have formal complaints against them before
*0 press Conferences were highlighting alleged “Serbian war
cnmes. Further evidence substantiating his charge of bias in the intemat.onal tribunal
can be gleaned from the fact that Secretao- Albright publicly announced at that press
conference with Judge Arbour that the United States was the major provider of funds for
the t^nbunal and had pledged even more money to it. “Within two weeks,” of this press
conference, wntes Mandel, “indictments were issued against Yugoslav President
S obodan Milosevic and four other Serb leaders, in what seemed indecent haste, dictated
not by the needs ofjustice, which certainly could have waited, but by flagging popular
support for NATO’s war effort m the face of mounting ‘collateral damage’” (Mandel
July 20, 1999, p. All).
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pressure utilized to effect its will on an international agency."'’ Providing a leadership
role in the establishment of the WTO while cont.nuing to shore up the IMF and the
World Bank, promoting worldw.de economie integration by supporting the
establishment of free trade areas in the Americas. Asia, and Africa, wh.le assisting in
European Union consolidation, it .s arguable that a two-track policy is being pursued,
one which promotes the authority of (pro-U.S.) international institutions, and one which
maintains U.S. domination in the
.ntemational order, both tracks to be pursued by the
lifting and/or removing of national restrictions on trade.
But .s the world ready for barrier-free world trade—i.e. laissez-faire on the
grand scale-albeit under the rubric of an international trade regime? Former Deputy
Director of the GATT from 1987 through 1993, Charles R. Carlisle, answers in the
negative. “Whatever the appeal of global free trade,” he asserts, “the political support
for the idea is just not there” (Carlisle, November/December, 1996, p. 115). Pointing
out that no major initiative of the WTO stands a chance of success without both U.S.
and E.U. cooperation, Carlisle recollects how the Uruguay Round ofGATT talks nearly
broke off over U.S.-European differences over agricultural subsidies and protection.
Also, he notes that protectionist sentiment is still very high in both the U.S. and Europe
not only in the area of agriculture (this sentiment is shared also by Japan, South Korea,
and many other countries) but also in the areas of services, textiles, and especially labor.
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As Senator Charles S. Robb stated on June 1 7, 1 997, “the political reality of the
situation we find ourselves in is that a majority of this body [i.e. the U.S. Senate] is
prepared only to pay our debts conditioned on comprehensive refonns being
implemented at the U.N.” (Robb, June 17, 1997). By 1999, U.S. arrears to the UN had
exceeded $1.3 billion.
263
IluIcccI, whether (he WTO will adopt
.nte.nalio.,ally reeogMi/ed labor rights is, states
( arhsle, the “most highly eontested question” (Carlisle, Novemher/I )eeember, l<)«)6, p,
I 14). And while, argues Carlisle, the extent to which inereased international
competition has contributed to job losses can be debated; nonetheless, he writes,
“hllicre can be little doubt, however, that it is a signilieant lactor, and politieal
objections to job losses are being raised in l-iurope and Ameriea.” I le continues;
I he burden ol adjustment teiuls to fall most heavily on those least able to
handle it those who have lew skills and little edueation, or lack job
mobility because ol their age, health, or economic cireumstances. In
shoit, tile burden (alls on those unable to move into high-|iaying export-
lelated jobs (C arlisle, November/December, 199b, pp. | Ib-I 7 ).
Noting also that Hiina is not yet a member of the WTO, he cautions that reciuiring it “to
commit to opening its markets completely to I'oreign competition would be as unwise as
It would be rutile” (C arlisle, November/December, 199b, p. 117). Russia akso has not as
yet been admitted to the WTO, and C arlisle extends this same cautionary advice as
legards C hina to Russia as well. C 'arlisle concludes by noting that “| l'|ree trade
worldwide is a distant goal, I'raught with dirilculties,” but, he says, “regional trading
arrangements have been somewhat easier to attain” (C'arlisle, November/December,
I99C), p. 118).
Arguably, given the above develo|iments since 1990, the market Cor capital
(llnancial or otherwise) is more globally oriented than ever before, though it is clear that
the I ).S. lemains the driving force ol this global capitalist system. I he con.solidation o(
the l'..U. and the establishment ol several Iree trade areas caught organi/ed labor off-
guard, partially owing to the disorientation a.ssociatcd with the Soviet I Inion’s collap.se
and that ol its Warsaw Pact allies, as well as labor’s lack o( strong international
2M
orga„.za.io„a,
,,es and/or differences between ,he interests and capahi, it.es ,t.e. owing
.0 technological variances) of labor in developing countries from that of labor in the sc
called developed world.'” With the es.abltshmen. of the WTO in 1995. the
mechanisms for regulating global free trade are in place, though their legitimacy and
enforcement power remain to be fully tested. Moreover, policies which tend to
undermine national sovereignty and self-determination are being pursued by the WTO,
Ihe IMF, and the World Bank, which appear to have as their common rallying cry:
“Privatization”. The decentering of national state power (i.e. other than the U.S.)
appears to be the aim of many of these policies which, in turn, is wreaking havoc over
the social safety net of many countries’ econom.es, which likewise impacts consumer
demand, as millions of workers around the globe find scant secunty in their new-found
economic condition.
Preliminary caution and alarm resulting from this crisis produced by
globalization was uttered by financier George Soros in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian
cnsis when he stated that if the crisis were “left unchecked,” it would “lead to the
disintegration of the global capitalist system..
.[and] permanently transform the world’s
The 1997 defeat of Fast Track legislation to expand NAFTA in the U S Congress
indicates organized labor’s growing strength as they were credited with largely
engineering this defeat and as well signals the possible limits to the free trade euphoria
reigning since the beginning of the decade. So-called “fast track” legislation would
allow the President to negotiate trade agreements and write “implementing legislation”
needed to change U.S. laws to adapt to the agreement. Under such power granted to the
President, Congress must vote “yes” or “no” on the implementing legislation with no
amendments within 60 legislative days.
Three main bodies currently exist which promote international organization ties
among labor: the International Labor Organisation (ILO), the International
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rd capitalism and free markets.” Morover, Soros added,
”[w]hat makes this
the system itself is the mam cause.” Dismissing criticism of the cnsis as being wholly
atlnbuted to “crony capitalism ”
“Confucian capitalism,” or “
remarks that “(tjhe inescapable conclusion is that the crrs.s is a symptom ofpatholog.es
mherent in the global system.” Singling out blame for
financial markets, he writes:
the Asian model,” Soros
unrestrained international
:r"fsr»”ni7
Contrao. to free market ideology which states that “financial markets are supposed to
aet in the long n.n like a pendulum, always swinging back toward equilibrrum,” Soros
concludes that in the absence of public-policy measures enacted on the how of
international finance, then “[ijnstead of acting like a pendulum, financial markets can
act like a wrecking ball, swinging from country to countty and destroying evetything
that stands in their way” (Soros, Winter 1998 -99
,
p. 58 ).
It IS in this context of economic globalization that many question whether the
U.S. emphasis on civil society’ and its comcomitant private institutions can fill the
socioeconomic void, service the needs of affected populations, and stave off political
disorder while legitimating a new international political compact. Theoretically, what
may follow, if the U.S. is successful in this complex and long-term endeavor, is a single
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the (marxist oriented) World
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collapse along with global political disniption could likely result.
The Imperative of the Market & Its Democratic Cover
To analyze these intemational economic developments in a Marxian framework,
a basic model of a capitalist entetprise will be presented followed by a Marxian class
analysis which atlempts to specify the complex fundamental and subsumed class
positions comprising this new intemational or globalized social formation. This will be
followed by an analysis of whether the export of U.S. democracy through the NED will
contribute to or detract from the expansion of capital and, hence, the extension of U.S.
hegemony.
Utilizing the categories offundamental” and “subsumed” class positions, I have
herein chosen a maniist analysis based upon that depicted by Resniek and Wolff ( 1987)
which understands Mant as clearly distinguishing between different types of capitalists,
as, for example, between the “functioning capitalist” who is engaged in the extraction of
unpatd labor directly from the laborers as opposed to the merely property-owning
capitalist, merchants, or moneylenders. In this sense, the “productive” or “industrial”
capitahst exists within the production process, refeired to as the fundamental class
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).
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process, and is
-d,needy involved ,n .he appnopnahon of supins labor in .he fonn of
sopios value'. (Resn.eh
. Wolff, p. 143). So-called
eapiuHs.
Who are no. dinec.ly engaged ,n appnopna.ing surplus labor and who are ou.side of .he
producon process, such as merchan.s or moneylenders, provide
.he condi.ions of
exis.enee for
.he funda,nen.al capi.alis, class process as, for example. e,.her in selling
off excess inven.ory or ex.endmg money or cred,. so
.ha, a prod, is realized for
.he
.ndus,nal cap,.ahs,s. In .h.s regard, such unproductive capi.a„s.s occupy a subsumed
class position v,x-u-v,s
.hose productive capitalists engaged in the fundamental
extracdon of surplus value. And because Marx understands caphal as
-self-expand.ng
value", each type of capi.ahs, realizes an expansion in one's initial capital. In a
successful creui, of capital expansion, the industrial capi.ahs, realizes a profit, that is,
value over and above his or her ini.tal outlay for land, labor, machinety and materials
for commodity production. Likewise, the merchant or moneylender will receive a share
of the surplus value either as “merchants’ discounts or interest payments” which “permit
the values they dispose of to be expanded” (Resnick & Wolff, 1987, pp. 142-3)
Subsumed class payments by industrial capitalists are made, therefore, in order to
ensure the continued existence of the fundamental class process.
As well, Resnick and Wolffs marxian analysis takes as its epistemological entry
point the concept of "overdetermination” drawn from Freud (1895/1957, 1900/1950),
Lukacs (1923/1976), and Althusser (1970). To say a theory is overdetermined is, for
Resnick and Wolff, to assert that “its existence, including all its properties or qualities,
IS determined by each and every other process constituting that society. Theory is the
complex effect produced by the interaction of all those other processes. As such an
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effec,
.he process of .heo„ en.hod.es
.he d.fferen.
...n.,ences of ..s n.any de,en..„.an.s’
(Res„.ch and Wo.ff, .PS, p. 2) addh.on,
.his
...an.is.
...ode, ,s a,..iesse...ia„s. in
<ha. i. rejecs
.he
..o.ion ,ha. ‘•con,plex..ies are red.,cible
.0 si,nphci..es of .he cause-
and-effec.
.ype. Ins.ead,” no.e Resnick and Wolff, “.he presump.ion is .ha. every
elenren. in .he con.ex. of any even, plays i.s d.s.incive role in de.emr.n.ng
.ha. even."
To wit:
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d.alec.c,
.he more complex i. becomes. “However.” he s.a.es
®
It can be shown that this complexity is not the complexity of an effectiveoverdetermmatwn, but the complexity of a cumulative mternalization
hich ,s only apparently an overdetermination. In fact at each momentof ..s development consciousness lives and experiences its own essence
( e essence corresponding to the stage its has attained) through all the
echoes of the essence
.t has previously been, and through the allusivepresence of the corresponding historical forms. Hegel, therefore, argues
at every consciousness has a suppressed-conserved {aufgehoben) past
even in its present, and a world (the world whose consciousness it could
1
!’ Phenomenology, its presence virtual and
latent), and that therefore it also has as its past the worlds ofits
superseded essences. But these past images of consciousness and these
worlds (corresponding to the images) never affect present
consciousness as effective determinations differentfrom itself these
images and worlds concern it only as echoes (memories, phantoms of its
histoncity) of what it has become, that is, anticipations ofor allusions
to Itself Because the past is never more than the internal essence (in-
itself) of the future it encloses, this presence of the past is the presence to
consciousness of consciousness itself, and no true external
determination. A circle ofcircles, consciousness has only one centre,
which solely determines it; it would need circles with another centre
than itself—decentred circles—ior it to be affected at its centre by their
effectivity, in short for its essence to be over-determined by them. But
this is not the case (Althuser, 1965/1986, pp. 101-2).
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very cause is itself also an effect and vice versa. An antiessentialist or
b«a ,‘T'" of =>ny eventecause rt does not presume that it exists. An antiessent.alist theo^
nderstands every theory (nicluding itself) to be inherently partial apamcularly focused intervention in social discourse (Resnick and Wolff
In addition to the previously descnbed aspects of this marxian analysis, another basic
component in its theorization of society is the entry-point concept of class, understood.
as the economic process of performing and appropriating surplus labor” (Resnick and
Wolff, 1987, p. 26). Marxian theory, from this vantage point
begins Its analysis of any society by initially specifying the forms of the
class process existing within that society. It proceeds to elaborate how
such forms are overdetermined by all the nonclass processes existing
within the social totality and how they participate in overdetermining all
those processes (Resnick and Wolff, 1987, p. 26).
These aspects of the marxian analysis depicted above set off and distinguish this
analytical approach from others which either do not differentiate amongst the different
types of capitalists, do not distinguish themselves from the Hegelian dialectic, are
cssentiahst m that they point to some simplicity which lies at the core of any apparent
complexity, or which utilize the entry-point of class to function as an essence. This
understanding of marxian analysis will be utilized in the example which follows.
In his book One World, Ready Or Not: The Manic Logic ofGlobal Capitalism
(1997), William Greider, commenting on the apparent discreditation of the Communist
system “by human experience,” remarks to the contrary: “but the ghost of Marx hovers
over the global landscape, perhaps with a knowing smile.” This is so, he adds, because:
The gross conditions that inspired Karl Marx’s original critique of capitalism in the
nineteenth century are present and flourishing again.” And then as now, he writes.
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“[t]he fundamenlal struggle... is between capital and labor. That struggle is always
about control of the workplace and how the returns of the
(Greider, 1997, p. 39).
enteqirise shall be divided”
Though Greider recognizes that inequality characterizes the present condit.on of
peoples subjected to globalizing capital, it is precisely because of the developntcnt of
the global nrarketplace that he rejects the Ma.„an solut.on of the socialization of capital
and property with the production and distnbution of the surplus to be decided upon by
the direct producers. For Greider, the global marketplace is shifting
“opportunities for
wealth and incomes from the older, richer socict.es to the poorer ones.” And, while this
transition is accompanied by ugly and “exploitative aspects,” nonetheless, he predicts:
the process of productive dispersal has the potential to produce adramatic dep^ure from the past, an opening for greater equality on a
global scale (Greider, 1997, p. 42).
Projecting the metaphor of a seesaw, Greider sees a unique development emerging in
human history, that the general prosperity of one side of the seesaw can only be
defended by attending to human conditions at the other end. In sum, he argues: “For
masses of people in the global marketplace, economic self-interest is converging with
altruism” (Greider, 1997, p. 43).
While the validity of Greider’s harmonious prognostications remain to be seen,
his basic model of a capitalist enterprise can serve as a useful heuristic device to
examine the fundamental mechanism of capitalist economic development. Paraphrasing
Thorstein Veblen, who taught that the problem of capitalist enterprise is always the
problem of supply, i.e. “managing the production of goods in order to maximize profit
and the return on invested capital,” Greider states that “the present economic upheaval
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revolves around old-fash,oned questions
.ha, have always been the basics of
capitahsm ” Spec.fically, he notes:
-The challenge of .nanaging supply to match the
market demand and to maintain profit levels is the hear, of what preoccupies every
business manager from the comer shop to the larges, industrial corporation” (Greider.
1997. pp. 44-5). To explain this, he lays out h.s basic model of capitalist production by
focusing on a localized, self-contained market in which an enterprise attempts to
produce jus, enough to meet visible consumer demand. He writes:
As demand rises and a firm’s productive capacity is eventually
exhausted, then the company invests in building more plant capacity toincrease its output. In the meantime, its rate of profit should increasebecause, as nsmg demand exceeds the supply of goods, a firm is able to
raise its pnees, restrained only by competing firms that might capture thenew sales by keeping their prices a bit lower.
On the contrary, Greider notes, when demand is weak and the company’s returns are
threatened by its production consistently outrunning the market of available buyers, this
forces the firm to
limit Its supply of goods or else be struck with unsold inventories,
surpluses that must be disposed of at discount or perhaps a dead loss.
Excess production threatens to drive down prices and thus narrow the
profit margins on the company’s output. When a firm’s profits decline,
owners of capital typically respond by moving their investment capital
elsewhere, dumping the company’s stock and searching for others that
will deliver a better return.
Eventually, in order to “halt the damage,” Greider writes.
the company has to shrink supply and even its productive capacity
—
closing the factory, either temporarily or permanently. In simplified
terms, these are the main variables that managers try to keep in balance
as they respond to changing conditions in the market (Greider, 1997, p.
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Heralding as a “great virtue of capitalism”
,ts ability to yield more from less, this
expanding potential to produce more goods, he notes, “also poses the enduring
contradition for capitalist enterprise: how to dispose of the surplus production ” “You
can make more things,” he says, “but can you sell them?” He explains:
n undisciplined expansion of productive capacity will be self-defeating
even dangerous for a firm, if all it accomplishes are continuing supply
surpl uses that degrade prices and undermine the rate of return The
probletn of surplus capacity drives not only the competition among firmsfor market shares but also the imperative to discover new markets
(Greider, 1997, p. 45).
The global revolution towards a one world market, Greider argues, “has deranged the
logic of standard business calculations." Globalization, he argues, accelerates decision-
making while technological innovation works to reduce costs and increase output on “an
exponential scale.” The new machines, he writes, “have given capital wings and
allowed firms to disperse globally, going after shares in markets that were once securely
local.” In addition to expanding potential supply, he notes, “the breakout ofnew
production methods and products creates pervasive downward pressures on prices.”
Consequently, he states:
The old standard logic is thus destabilized: the imperative to
modernize must be heeded lest a company lose out in the price
competition, but the modernizing process also makes the supply problem
worse. When companies adopt the technologies that reduce costs and
protect their market shares, the inescapable result is to enlarge productive
capacity. They do this to keep up, though it means supply surpluses will
steadily accumulate somewhere in the marketplace—goods that can’t be
sold, plants that can t be operated at full capacity. Someone somewhere
will have to eat the losses. Business people hope it is not their company
(Greider, 1997, p. 46).
This scramble to avoid being left holding the surpluses is, argues Greider, now a major
threat to the functioning of the current international economic system. Companies may
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anen^p. ,o pro.ee,
.henrselves by clos.ng fac.ones or unload.ng excess goods below
prevading prices, bu,
.hey are caugh.
.he logic of .he sys.en, wh.ch •‘compels .hem
.o
keep do.ng more of .he same: more cos, reducion and price-cu„ing and, in .um, more
expansion of po.en.ial supply ” “The circle conl.nues,” he concludes, “wi.h i.s
deslrucive elemen, concealed by .he fabulous expansion of .he sys.em” (Greider, 1997,
P. 46). No,ing ,ha, .he supply problem “is no, .he only way global revolu.ion upends
slandard praCices,” he argues none.heless: “bu, i, is .he one mos, cen.ral ,o every.hing
else that happens” (Greider, 1997, p. 46).
While Greider’s pnmary focus above is on the problems of the capitalist
enterprise and of its basic contradiction found in its tendency for supply to outpace
available demand, an analysis is also required of the basic class structure of civil society
which upends the enterprise and makes capitalist production of commodities possible if
we are to more fully understand the potential social and, hence, political disruptions
which may undermine the NED’s implantation of liberal democracies abroad. Quoting
Marx, Resnick and Wolff understand the “class process” as that ‘“in which unpaid
surplus-labor is pumped out of direct producers’” (Resnick & Wolff, 1987, p. 115). In
demonstrating the exploitation inherent in capitalist production, Marx distinguished
between necessary and surplus labor, with the former referring to the “quantity of labor
time necessary to produce the consumables customarily required by the direct producer
to keep working. Surplus labor,” on the contrary, is “the further, the extra time of labor
the direct producer performs beyond the necessary labor” (Resnick & Wolff, 1987, p.
115). Writes Marx:
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In the present state of production, human labour-power not only
produces in a day a greater value than it itself possesses and costs- but
with each new scientif.c discovery, with each new technical invention
there also rises the surplus of its daily production over its daily cost
'^
1
,'
Ihere diminishes that part of the working day in
which the labourer produces the equivalent of his day’s wages, and onthe other hand, lengthens that part of the working day in which he must
present labour grato to the capitalist (Marx, 1849 & 1865/1933 &
1935/1985, p. 12).
The quantities of necessary and surplus labor vary depending on technological
innovation, political strength or weakness of the workers or owners (i.e. the class
stmggle), the market for the specific commodity (-ies) the firm produces, the market of
available labor, etc. In sum, the process of extracting surplus labor in capitalist
production is a determination of many other aspects in the firm and society at large or
rather, as Resnick and Wolff refer to it, it is overdetermined (Resnick & Wolff, 1987, p.
1 15). What is useful in this approach, for the purposes of this analysis, is the
understanding that 1 ) the extraction of surplus labor is “the creation of ‘unpaid value’”
from the direct producer who is paid only a wage equivalent to her or his necessary
labor, and this has its counterpart in 2) the “industrial profit ‘as appropriation of other
people’s labor’ (meaning their surplus labor)” (Resnick & Wolff, 1987, p. 1 16) for the
firm and, hence, for those who own such enterprises—ownership being sanctified in the
legality of private property in a capitalist social formation. The class process described
above, pending no major disruptions, reproduces the two primary classes which
comprise any particular capitalist social formation: i.e. capitalist and worker.
Resnick and Wolff refer to the above process where the direct producers perform
necessary and surplus labor while capitalists extract or appropriate surplus labor as,
outlined previously, the fundamental class process. The theoretical category of the
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amdamental class process, they emphasize, does not refer to any essential function as
.he ftnal detenninant of social change, bttt rather it is a conceptual category utiltzed to
dtstinguish the production and extractton of suttIus labor and the class of persons
corresponding to this process, the producttve laborers and the tndustrial capitalists, from
other persons who occupy, what Resnick and Wolff refer to as, subsumed class
positions, that is, persons who distribute the already appropnated surplus labor or its
products. The purpose of the subsumed class distributors and recipients of surplus value
ts to “provide specific conditions of existence of the capitalist fundamental class
process” (Resnick & Wolff, 1987. p. 119). Thus, for example, a portion of the surplus
value may need to be paid to a landowner so that surplus value may be produced and
appropriated. In this respect, the private landowner occupies a subsumed class position
in that the landowner provides a specific condition of existence necessary for the
capitalist fundamental class process to occur. Resnick and Wolff provide other
examples of subsumed classes, for example, the necessity of private moneylenders to
provide “access to quantities of money capital” so as to satisfy a specific condition of
the capitalist fundamental class process. “Government, too,” they argue.
provides conditions of existence under certain social conditions, for
example, a judicial apparatus for adjudicating and enforcing contractual
relations. The existence of the capitalist fundamental class process may
then require that a distribution of surplus value to the government be
accomplished (in the form of taxes on capitalists) (Resnick & Wolff
1987, pp. 119-20).
It is possible, they add, for the government to defray its costs in other ways without
levying a tax on surplus value, that is, by providing a judicial condition of existence
without requiring a subsumed class distribution, though it is not readily apparent how
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m.gh, occur. Cher ,ha„ by Ux.ng ,he direct producers for such cos.s, perhaps
.he
authors are referring to state plunder and booty from war or other impenal “taxes”
extracted in a hegemon.c
.nterstate relat.onsh.p which allows a government to defray its
costs without a subsumed Cass distnbut.on for j udicial or other conditions of existence
necessary for the operation of the fundamental class process? Suffice it to say that
whether through government taxing authonty or private expenditures of sunrius value,
the conditions of existence for the fundamental class process to operate wtll vary in
form and content relative to the population and geographical parameters either extant or
foreseen in the near future in any part.cular capitalist social formation. “In general
terms,” they state,
the
capitalist fundamental class process and all
other processes occurring within any particular social formation will
verdetermine which conditions of existence of that fundamental class
diTn'ir
subsumed class process to exist. Subsumed classes arehe the persons occupying the positions of distributors or receivers ofthe portions of surplus value allocated to secure the provision of those
conditions of existence. The overdetermination of both fundamental and
subsumed class processes implies that both are contradictory and
constantly changing (Resnick & Wolff, 1987, p. 120)
Viewed within this Marxian framework, the operatives of the National
Endowment for Democracy in pursuing its mission of exporting liberal democracy
abroad can be seen as occupying a subsumed class process. In this regard, the political
arrangements the NED seeks to establish and support worldwide are geared towards
establishing specific conditions of existence (e.g. electoral democracies based on two or
more market-oriented parties, with apolitical and anticommunist trade union
movements, support for collective bargaining arrangements, privatization of public
enterpnses, civilian control of national militias and defense forces, etc.) for capitalism’s
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fundamental class ptocess to operate on a global scale under U.S. begentony. And all of
these efforts of the NED are enabled tlrrough subsumed class payments of sundus value
through the taxtng authorrty of the U.S. goventmen, utilized to fund this endeavor.
Gtven the necessity for capitalists to balance the.r potential supply of commod.t.es with
available consumer demand, the necessity for workers-the d.rect producers-to ean,
enough in wages to cover the costs of their daily reproduction, coupled with the
necessity of any capitalist social fomration to expend surplus value tn order to prov.de
specific conditions of existence for its fundamental class process to occur (such as
maintaining its class domination and hegemonic rule in that social fomiation), it is
apparent that these necessao^ tendencies will continue to interact, contradict one
another, and overdetermine each other in the developing globalized capitalist world
economy. As well, it is arguable that if large sections of the globe are to be organized in
a transnational social formation under the direction of one national segment of the
international extracting class, then the particularity of such a universal arrangement will
likely generate the universality of a particular opposition. National jealousies and
resentment towards the U.S. hegemon for what most assuredly will be perceived as the
usurpation of the nghts of self-determination of nations are unlikely to be contained
under present conditions and understandings. Traditional (i.e. since WWII) reliance
upon either military dictatorships in Latin America, authoritarian dictatorial rulers in
Asia, military strongmen or racial extremists in Africa, or Emirs, Sheikhs, Sultans,
Crown Princes, and Shahs in the Middle East worked adequately for the Bretton Woods
LIEO and for U.S. hegemonic ascendancy since WWII. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union and, hence, the departure from the scene of the U.S.’s mam protagonist
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representative of what ant,
-soviet partisans referred to as ••itnpcr.ar eotnnnnnsnt,
then-short of the revitalizat.on of the
-communist threat”-a new ideological
framework is definitely a log.eal necessity for the maintenance and expans,on of U.S.
post-Cold War hegemony.
That democracy and ,ts particular development under the conditions present in
the U.S. capitalist social formation, and especially as a response to democratic
developments elsewhere in the world in the last two eenturies, has become the primary
organizing mantra in the construction of this post-Cold War hegemony is
understandable, given the apparent acceptance of its contradictory aspects and
definitions by successive generations of the U.S. populace, or so we are to believe by
those promoting this policy. The degree to which actual implantation of this form of
capitalist democracy can be established and sustained abroad is, arguably, of limited
duration, however, though perhaps sufficiently so as to allow for (re)organization of
existing or new international organizations (e.g. the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO,
etc.), the establishment and/or consolidation ofnew regional economic regimes (e.g.
NAFTA, APEC, FTAA, the EU, etc.) in conjunction with the diminishing of existing
state bureaucracies through the opening up of countries to the unfettered How of trade
and investment, and the standardization of business practices in order to take advantage
of the political void opened up by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies. Some
notable contradictory effects contrary to the U.S. goal of democracy promotion,
however, can be witnessed with governmental power either remaining with or reverting
back to communist party leadership in Cuba, Belarus, Mongolia, and Romania. In
Cuba, for example, Fidel Castro continues to rule over a one-party communist state with
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a socialized econon,y despite nunterous attempts by the U.S. and the NED to oust
and/or undenntne the Chan Communist Party, rule. Indeed, lops.de.l votes in the
United Nations calling on the U.S. to end its embargo against Cuba for the past etght
years suggests that many countries support Cuba In order to spite the U.S. for its
perceived hegemonist.c policies. As a Pepperdine School of Pubhc Policy study stated
“The 1999 vote [for ending the Cuban embargo] was 152-2, w.th only the U.S. and
Israel voting against engagement.” The study concludes that “Amertca has been acting
essentially unilaterally against Cuba, while many of its allies have estabhshed formal
diplomatic ties and enjoy extensive trade relationships with Cuba” (McCormally &
Skandera, April 2000). Another example ofoutcomes contrary to NED goals can be
seen in Belarus, a former province of the Soviet Union which became an independent
state in 1991. Since hts landslide election vietory in 1994, President Alexander
Lukashenko has ruled Belarus as a soviet-style communist state despite attempts by
NED supported groups to bolster a viable opposition in the interim. As Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Tony Wesolowsky writes: “For years there’s been little
reason for hope for the opposition in Belarus, where President Alyaksandr Ltikashenka
has kept the country locked in the repressive Soviet pass” (Wesolowsky, October II,
2000). And, on July 3, 2000, in Mongolia, the communist controlled Mongolian
People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) swept back into power winning 72 of 76 seats in
Mongolia’s unicameral Parliament ousting the free market oriented “democrats” who
had taken power in 1 996 under the banner of the Democratic Union from office. And,
indeed, a 1 9-member delegation organized by the International Republican Institute—
a
core NED recipient did “not observe any instances of systematic fraud or widespread
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votmg irregularities”
,n the Mongolian vote (Nicholson, September 1, 2000, p. 1 ). The
MPRP, which had ruled for seven decades and had received patronage from the Soviet
Union, stated the Sou,J, Chi,,a Morm.g Post, “was riding a wave of popular anger
against political gridlock under the Democratic Union coalition government and
economic austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which
have plunged many of Mongolia’s 2.4 million people into poverty” in this landlocked
nation the size of Western Europe (”Fonner Communist Rulers Swept Back Into
Power”, July 4, 2000; Rennie, July 4, 2000). And on December 9, 2000, former
Communist Ion Iliescu won Romania’s presidential election gamering over 70 percent
of the vote in this country of 23 million people. Facing an ultranationalist rival,
Comehu Vadim Tudor, Iliescu secured the backing of many “mainstream groups” who
“pledged to back the former communist functionaiy, fearing that Romania could
become an international pariah if Tudor won” (“Polls Show Ex-Communist Wins
Romanian Vote”, December 10, 2000). These anti-capitalist reactions to the pro-
capitalist NED agenda possibly foreshadow the limits of this U.S.-led crusade or, at the
veiy least, indicate that the NED’s path will have outcomes at times contrary to the
intentions of its “democratic activists”.
In this latter regard, the question arises as to the possible formation of
hegemonic and counterhegemonic blocs, in the Gramscian sense, of either a broad
unification of intellectuals and masses in support ofNED-style democracy or, on the
contrary, a widespread movement organized in opposition to this perceived “foreign”
import. In the case of the ouster of President Milosevic in Yugoslavia in October 2000,
Zoran Djindjic, Democratic Party President and campaign manager for the NED-backed
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successor ,o the Yugoslav.an pres.dency, Vojislav Kostunica, was able to unite 18
oppostbon parties which garnered Kostunica an initial electoral majority which united
.mo a successful den,and for Mtlosevic’s ouster when the latter attempted to hold a run-
off election. Suffering from ten years of war and western economic sanctions, the U.S.
had created the material conditions within Yugoslavia which had given rise to
Ideologies contrary to Milosevic and his Socialist Party rule. Previous opposition
leaders such as Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Djmdjie himself had been unable to rally the
masses behind the pro-democratic anti-socialist rhetoric of the NED. Kostunica,
however, presented himself as a Serbian nationalist, even though he was an ardent
advocate of western conceptualized democracy and liberal economics. A 56-year-old
former legal scholar, Kostunica strongly supported Serbian troops in Kosovo and is
opposed to NATO interference in the traditional Yugoslavian province. In fact, during
the 2000 presidential campaign, one CNN reporter wrote that “his disdain for Milosevic
was matched only by his contempt for the United States” (Ratnesar, October 6, 2000).
Kostunica’s nationalism combined with his anti-U.S. rhetoric and the depressed
economic conditions of a war-weary Yugoslavian population had produced the
conditions for what Gramsci refers to as a historical bloc, “[tjhat is to say the complex,
contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures” reriecting “the ensemble
of the social relations of production” {PN, p. 366). In this linkage of form and content.
ideologies and matenal forces, Gramsci echoes Marx’s idea that “a popular conviction
often has the same energy as a material force” and writes:
To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a
validity which is psychological”; they “organise” human masses, and
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create the terrain on which men move,
position, struggle, etc. {PN, p. 377).
acquire consciousness of their
The historical bloc is that wielding together of an ideological unity by the class of
.ntellectuals of the would-be dominant group. It is the intellectuals of the “historically
(and concretely) progressive class” who end up “subjugating the intellectuals of other
social groups,” argues Gramsci. In this manner, “they thereby create a system of
solidarity between all the intellectuals, with bonds of a psychological nature (vanity,
etc.) and often of a caste character (technico-juridical, corporate, etc.).” At first
manifesting itself “‘spontaneously’” in its progressive penod, when the bloc “really
causes the whole society to move forward,” eventually, notes Gramsci,
[a]s soon as the dominant group has exhausted its function, the
ideological bloc tends to crumble away; then “spontaneity” may be
replaced by “constraint” m ever less disguised and indirect forms,
culminating m outnght police measures and coups d’etat (PN, pp. 60-1).
Though It IS still too early to tell whether the social group which has fonned around
Kostunica is 100% homogeneous on the level of ideology, an extreme which Gramsci
utilizes only to emphasize the very real “existence of the objective conditions for the
revolutionising of praxis” and, hence, the creation of an historical bloc, Kostunica’s
stunning victory nonetheless indicates that the intellectuals around him have, at least for
the near-term, supplanted the intellectual moral leadership of Milosevic’s Socialist Party
(PN, p. 366). One month later, on November 25, however, Milosevic was reelected to
lead his Yugoslavian Socialist Party, which is now in opposition. To create a
counterhegemonic bloc, the task for Milosevic is to link Kostunica with U.S. funding
through the NED and to denigrate the latter’s Serbian nationalism as contrary to
Yugoslavia’s best interest and indeed as a pretense for continued U.S. transgression of
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Yugoslavian sovereignty. Gaging the success of such hegemonic or counterhegemonic
IS not undertaken here. Suffice
blocs would require a protracted long-tern, study which i
.. to say that the fonnation of such htstortcal blocs will requtre ntore than a few years to
soltdtfy, though nascent examples of such development exists, as in the case of
Yugoslavia. As well, it is also noteworthy that in the Yugoslavian case above, the
tntttal success of the NED-backed candidate ts. in part, due to hts exhibition of a
virulent anti-U.S. rhetoric and determined Serbian nattonalism. elements which, in the
long term, may undermine the very democracy the U.S. seeks to create in Yugoslavia.
The push for capitalist “democracy” as the expected, nonnal, developed and
destred form of govemment-the apex of human achievement in soetal relations-and
the institutions and practices associated with this catchword by the NED represents a
U.S. attempt at providtng intellectual and moral leadership in this New World Order and
serves to provide a normative trajectory of how social and political development in
much of the world should proceed. Backed up by its status as the singular most
powerful superpower (both mtlitarily and technologically), some would argue that the
current U.S. effort to promote “democracy” abroad falls within the prescription for
hegemontc rule outlined by Gramsci (in the fotmula of intellectual leadership protected
by the armor of coercton), and on this criteria alone they would be correct. Such
leadership, however, is likely to suffer from its grounding in one particular state of the
tntemational system, and charges of cultural chauvinism, elitism, racism, sexism, and
imperialism may grow proportionally with every instance of the use offeree made
necessary by the U.S. hegemon (e.g. the 1999 Kosovo conflict). It is in recognition of
this likelihood that the political tendency for the further development and enhancement
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of inten,a,.onal governing ins.i.ut.ons will-i,, ,he absence of any sys.ennc dysfnnc.on
or failrrre or nrajor aUerat.on of ,he developing globalized eapi.alis, social fomra.ion-
l.kely gain nromentum and further poli.tcal efficacy amongst the members of the
tnterpational extract.ng class and its subsumed class participants. That such a
development is possible follows from the capab.lit.es of the forces a. work tn the
present in.ema.tonal system and eehpses the logic not only of a s.ngle hegemonic center
(t.e. the U.S.) but as well will bring to the forefront baste questions of political
obligation of the citizen to the national state.
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